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ABSTRACT 
THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION: 
AN ECLECTIC FIELD STUDY OF 
A STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION EFFORT 
February, 1986 
John Joseph Voyer, A.B., Harvard University 
M.B.A., Clark University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Joseph A. Litterer 
Professor George S. Odiorne 
Professor Robert R. Faulkner 
Using Mintzberg's notions of intended, realized, and emergent 
strategy, the notion of strategic implementation is examined and 
reconceptualized around interpretive ideas. The idea of frame of 
reference is central. A software development organization is researched 
in an effort to answer key questions raised by this reconcept- 
0 
ualization. These questions revolve around whether a professional 
organization like this one can get from strategic intent to strategic 
realization deliberately, or if there is a substantial emergent element 
to the outcome. Key issues are the agreement on intended strategy at 
the outset, the adequacy of communications, the nature of the frame of 
reference, the enactment of a realized strategy by the organization, and 
the relevence of political models of strategy formulation for strategy 
implementation. Methods include participant observation, sociometry, 
semantic differential with discriminant analysis, cognitive mapping, and 
ethnography, yThe results showed that there was no organizational 
xi 
agreement about strategic intent. The organization was also not 
cohesive in terms of administrative communication, technical 
communication, and social interaction. The cognitive map revealed a web 
of interrelated variables which indicated that the members believed that 
the likeliest outcomes of the project would be dissatisfaction, 
turnover, non-advancement of their careers, and commercial and technical 
failure. Among the major causal variables in the map were: the 
intensity of organizational politics, the lack of incentives built into 
the effort, the aforementioned lack of effective communications, and the 
lack of agreement on strategic intent. The study concludes with the 
building of an integrated model of this implementation effort. This 
complex model has four tracks: an "institution building" track which 
concerns the enactments of the members of the development organization; 
a technical track, concerned with task elements; a mqj&keting track, 
concerned with the formulative and political activities of that 
function; and an organizational political track, concered with the 
i 
formulative and political activities of the organizational context 
within which the development project was embedded. Variables from all 
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Strategic implementation is one of the six process elements in 
the Schendel and Hofer (1979) paradigm of strategic management. It is 
not well defined in their paradigm, save that they say it is essentially 
a behavioral process. One finds it hard to disagree with this 
assessment by Schendel and Hofer, but unfortunately the readings in 
their book that deal with implementation are about (1) formal planning 
systems and how best to get them working (Lorange, 1979), and (2) the 
fit between strategy and structure (Galbraith & Nathanson, 1979), i.e., 
work from the Chandler (1962) tradition. The Schendel and Hofer 
treatment of strategic implementation is not unusual--the concept is 
seldom defined. The purpose of this review is twofold--to attempt to 
develop a definition of implementation, and to identify important 
questions about strategic implementation that could be addressed given 
the context of this study. 
Dictionary Definition of Implementation 
Let us begin with a dictionary definition of implementation. 
According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1983), 
implementation is "the act of implementing or the state of being 
implemented." The same dictionary's definition of the verb implement is 
to carry out: ACCOMPLISH, FULFILL; esp. to give practical 




This definition implies that some scheme has already been devised, and 
is waiting for someone, an implementor, to "really fulfill" it. Indeed, 
the etymology of the word strongly implies this kind of interpretation. 
The word implement comes to modern English directly from Middle English, 
which in turn came from the Late Latin implementum, "action of filling 
up," which came from the Latin implere, "to fill up." Since one can 
fill up something only if it already exists, this etymology strongly 
implies that implementation occurs after the formulation of a plan or 
strategy (in the context of this paper). 
Computer software engineers use the word implementation quite a 
lot, and they use it in this way. They first design their program, then 
they implement it, in a sense "filling up" or "fleshing out" the 
skeleton of their design. One engineer interviewed by the author used 
the word implementation several times. When asked what he meant by it, 
he replied, "Writing the code." 
Underlying Process Models of Strategy 
Formulation and Implementation 
This type of definition of implementation is typical of what 
Chaffee (1984) calls the linear model, and what Narayanan and Fahey 
(1982) call the rational model, of strategy formulation. As the latter 
say, "Many [rational model] authors separate strategy formulation and 
implementation into two distinct phases" (1982: 32). Bourgeois and 
Brodwin say that 
the traditional textbook approach to strategy implementation 
was to treat "implementation" as an activity following 
"formulation." Usually, the topic was treated as a question 
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of organization design, where systems and structures were 
manipulated in concert with strategic goals (1984: 241). 
This type of conceptualization reflects the underlying metaphor of 
"filling up" a "vessel" (a strategic plan) which has already been 
created. This metaphor seems to be so firmly imbedded in managerial and 
scholarly thinking that no authors bother to define implementation. A 
key question is--"Is this the proper metaphor?" 
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) make the metaphor more explicit 
•(although they neglect to give an alternative definition to the term 
implementation), and they identify five approaches to implementation 
which can be found in the business policy literature. The first 
approach is the Commander Model; in this approach the CEO's strategic 
question is "How do I formulate the optimum strategy?", and the CEO's 
role is that of Rational Actor. Bourgeois and Brodwin say 
Generally, [this model] fails to consider the 
implementability of plans, either as a binary variable 
("implementable" or "not implementable") or as an aspect of 
strategy with a cost in time and money associated with it 
(1984: 243). 
Four requirements flow from the Commander Model: 
1. Easy implementation, since it is not addressed in the model 
2. Good information, since success relies on the CEO's getting 
complete, accurate information 
3. Objective planners, who will not bias the process which turns data 
into plans 
4. Splitting the firm into thinkers and doers 
All four of these requirements are questionable. Implementation is 
usually not straightforward, information is often biased, planners often 
4 
skew plans in favor of their subunits, and there is much evidence 
(Bower, 1970; Carter, 1971; Mintzberg, 1977; and Burgelman, 1983) that 
strategy often results from individuals taking the initiative in 
identifying and championing opportunities. Yet this, despite these 
shortcomings, is the model which is most prevalent in the traditional 
literature. Bourgeois and Brodwin offer some reasons about why this is 
the case--the model offers a valuable perspective to the CEO, reduces 
the number of inputs the CEO must process, and puts the planner in a 
position to influence the firm's destiny. Lastly, they say, 
. . . the separation between the planner/manager as a 
thinker and everyone else as a doer fits the view of the 
boss as an all-powerful hero, shaping the destiny of 
thousands with his decisions. This somewhat macho view 
naturally appeals to many aspiring managers (1984: 245). 
The second model is the Change Model. The strategic question is 
"I have a strategy in mind; now how do I implement it?" The CEO's role 
is that of Architect. Bourgeois and Brodwin describe the model: 
This approach starts where the Commander Model ends: with 
implementation. It assumes that the economic tools [of] 
strategy formulation have been mastered and adds to the tool 
kit three sets of behavioral science techniques to increase 
the probability of successful implementation: (1) the use of 
structure and staffing to convey vividly the firm's new 
priorities and focus attention on the desired areas; (2) the 
alteration of systems used for planning, performance 
measurement, and incentive compensation; and (3) the use of 
cultural adaptation techniques to introduce system-wide 
change (1984: 246). 
The Change Model preserves the split between formulators and 
implementers. 
Bourgeois and Brodwin next identified the Collaborative Model, 
where the strategic question is "How do I involve top management to get 
5 
commitment to strategies from the start?" The chief executive's role is 
that of Coordinator. The authors say that "in this model, the CEO 
employs group dynamics and 'brainstorming' techniques to get managers 
with differing points of view to provide their inputs to the strategic 
process" (1984: 248). But the input is still solicited only from 
management, and focuses on formulation. As the authors state, "This 
model preserves the artificial wall separating thinkers and doers and 
fails to draw upon the full human potential within and throughout the 
organization" (1984: 249). 
The Cultural Model asks the question "How do I involve the whole 
organization in implementation?" The CEO's role is that of Coach. This 
approach essentially takes the participative elements of the 
Collaborative Model to lower levels in the organization. According to 
Bourgeois and Brodwin: 
In this model, the CEO guides his organization by 
communicating and instilling his vision of the overarching 
mission for the firm, and then allowing each individual to 
participate in designing his or her work procedures in 
concert with that mission. So, once the game plan is set, 
the CEO plays the role of "coach" in giving general 
direction, but encourages individual decision-making to 
determine the operating details of executing the plan (1984: 
250). 
The authors quote critic Robert Reich (1981: 30), who claims that the 
Cultural Model is just another variant of the macho-flavored Commander 
and Change Models: "The sharp distinction between thinkers and doers 
will remain intact but will be camouflaged by cosmetic devices—quality 
circles, work groups, collaborative teams, encounter groups . . . which 
serve to soften or blur the underlying management control. • . " 
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Lastly, Bourgeois and Brodwin propose the Crescive Model. The 
central strategic question is "How do I encourage managers to come 
forward as champions of sound strategies?" The CEO's role is that of 
Premise-setter and Judge. This model is named from the Latin crescere, 
"to grow," because it is a model of 
strategy "growing" from within the bowels of the 
firm. ... The role of the CEO has moved from designer to 
that of premise-setter and judge. Here, the strategic 
problem revolves around the CEO's ability to define 
organization purposes (i.e., set decision premises) broadly 
enough to encourage innovation, and to select judiciously 
from among those projects or strategy alternatives that 
reach his attention (1984: 254). 
Strategic management (which includes implementation) in this model 
requires balancing between "emergent strategy" (Mintzberg, 1978) or 
"autonomous strategic behavior" (Burgelman, 1983), on the one hand, and 
strategic control at the top (Bales, 1977). 
Mintzberg, in a model-building article derived from much 
empirical research, generally supports the crescive model and 
underscores the dynamism of strategic management. He defines strategy 
as "a pattern in a stream of decisions (1978: 28)." He argues that 
patterns develop in the interplay between intended strategies and 
realized strategies. Intended strategies which are realized are called 
deliberate strategies, Intended strategies which are not realized are 
called unrealized strategies, and strategies which are realized, but not 
intended, are called emergent strategies. Mintzberg's important point 
is that the dichotomy between strategy formulation and implementation 
can be a false one. It ignores the learning process that often takes 
place after an intended strategy is conceived. Mintzberg argues that 
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the word "formulation" is misleading, given his definition of 
strategies--many consistent organizational behavior patterns that were 
not completely developed consciously and deliberately. Mintzberg's 
argument follows the crescive model in the sense that strategy is seen 
as growing from organizational activity, through the learning process 
mentioned above, as opposed to being deliberately formulated, as in the 
commander model. 
Another empirical study which supports the crescive model is 
Bower (1970), a study of the resource allocation process in a large, 
complex company. He found that three sub-processes operated in the 
firm's resource allocation process. One group of managers defined the 
need for projects. A second group provided the impetus for the 
commitment of resources. And a third group shaped the structural 
context (measurement, information and reward systems, and organization 
structure). It was the interplay between these three factors which 
shaped the firm's resource allocation pattern, and not a deliberate, 
linear "commander-type" approach. Carter (1971) did a similar study 
which showed that setting the premises too narrowly tended to suppress 
proposals deemed to have to low a probability of approval. Note the 
similarity between Bower (1970), Carter (1971), Mintzberg (1977; 1978), 
and the crescive model proposed by Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984). Bower 
and Doz (1979) explicitly adapted the earlier Bower work to strategic 
management. They said that complex organizations are characterized by 
the interaction among three processes: 
1. Cognitive processes: for understanding of the environment 
8 
2. Social and organizational processes: channelling perceptions and 
developing commitments 
3. Political processes: shifting the power to influence purpose and 
resources 
According to Bower and Doz: 
Strategy is viewed as an outcome of these processes and the 
task of the chief executive is viewed as the administration 
of these processes (1979: 159). 
The second set of processes mentioned above, social and organizational 
processes, are close to the premise-setting aspect of Bourgeois and 
Brodwin's (1984) crescive model. Bower and Doz explicitly reject the 
commander model saying: 
Far from the heroic view of the chief executive . . . , what 
emerges is a view of the CEO as a shaper of the premises of 
other executives' thoughts and the source of balance in the 
personal interactions of others. His or her contributions 
to strategy may be more than anything else, an effective 
call for change . . . , a higher level of aspiration or a 
new sense of what voices should contribute to the debate 
(1979: 157). 
These empirical studies lend much support to the crescive 
model. There are some other works, more explicitly political, which 
suggest the validity of the crescive model. To these we now turn. 
Explicitly Political Models of Strategic 
Formulation and Implementation 
Pettigrew (1977) posits that strategy formulation is 
contextually based, with strategic choices focusing on environmental and 
intra-organizational dilemmas. Strategy evolves out of the partial 
resolution of those dilemmas. Therefore, he argues, strategy 
9 
formulation and implementation are inextricably intertwined, with 
formulation issues flowing out of the organizational interactions that 
take place during implementation. The formulation issues, in turn, have 
an effect on the interactions. For him, the process of strategic 
formulation is as follows: 
1. Identification of the set of dilemmas faced by an organization over 
time 
2. Analysis of the dilemmas that become a focus for organizational 
interest and of those that are suppressed 
3. Specification of the individuals or subgroupings that seek to define 
alternative dilemmas as worthy of organizational attention 
4. Study of the demand by those individuals and subgroupings that 
certain dilemmas be discussed and of the attempts to mobilize power 
in support of those demands 
5. Specification of the outcomes of these processes of demand- 
generation and power-mobilization 
6. Consideration of the interactive relationship between formulation 
and implementation 
The resolution of these dilemmas takes place in the context of a 
political decision making process. Pettigrew, in an approach remarkably 
similar to Bower's (1970), says that the process has two broad elements: 
(1) demand generation (similar to Bower's definition), and (2) power 
mobilization (similar to Bower's impetus process). Bower does not couch 
this type of process in political terms, but Pettigrew does, saying that 
political behavior is defined as behavior . . . within an 
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commitment to strategies from the start?" The chief executive's role is 
that of Coordinator. The authors say that "in this model, the CEO 
employs group dynamics and 'brainstorming' techniques to get managers 
with differing points of view to provide their inputs to the strategic 
process" (1984: 248). But the input is still solicited only from 
management, and focuses on formulation. As the authors state, "This 
model preserves the artificial wall separating thinkers and doers and 
fails to draw upon the full human potential within and throughout the 
organization" (1984: 249). 
The Cultural Model asks the question "How do I involve the whole 
organization in implementation?" The CEO's role is that of Coach. This 
approach essentially takes the participative elements of the 
Collaborative Model to lower levels in the organization. According to 
Bourgeois and Brodwin: 
In this model, the CEO guides his organization by 
communicating and instilling his vision of the overarching 
mission for the firm, and then allowing each individual to 
participate in designing his or her work procedures in 
concert with that mission. So, once the game plan is set, 
the CEO plays the role of "coach" in giving general 
direction, but encourages individual decision-making to 
determine the operating details of executing the plan (1984: 
250). 
The authors quote critic Robert Reich (1981: 30), who claims that the 
Cultural Model is just another variant of the macho-flavored Commander 
and Change Models: "The sharp distinction between thinkers and doers 
will remain intact but will be camouflaged by cosmetic devices--quality 
circles, work groups, collaborative teams, encounter groups . . • which 
serve to soften or blur the underlying management control. . . " 
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organization that makes a claim against the resource-sharing 
system of the organization (1977: 81). 
Organizational members (individuals or groups) can be seen as interest 
groups, making differential demands on the system because of specialized 
functions and responsibilities, and individual career dynamics. For 
Pettigrew, the connection between demands and mobilization is the 
management of legitimacy. He argues that it is managed through 
symbolism, language, beliefs and myths. In this regard, Pettigrew's 
formulation contrasts with Bower's notion of structural context, 
although it could be argued that the latter is a subset of Pettigrew's 
"meaning system." 
Pettigrew's analysis and model obviously bears little 
resemblence to the commander model. It is an explicitly political 
approach to conceptualizing strategic management. Pettigrew's process 
model does not directly resemble any of Bourgeois and Brodwin's five 
models; in spirit, it resembles the crescive model, in that it implies 
that a strategy will grow out of the partial resolution of political 
struggles among the interest groups in the firm. If an analogy can be 
drawn between "premise setting" and "the management of meaning," then 
the models are roughly similar. 
Quinn (1980) proposes a model, called logical incrementalism, 
which was developed after many years of fieldwork at many large U.S. 
companies. His work fits in nicely with the research reviewed so far. 
Quinn says that there are three patterns that characterize the 
successful management of strategic change in large organizations: 
1. Creating awareness and commitment--incrementally, 
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which involves: 
a. need sensing to get objective 
information 
b. amplifying understanding and awareness 
c. establishing and building credibility, 
often using symbolic moves to change 
direction 
d. legitimizing viewpoints 
e. tactical shifts and partial solutions 
f. broadening support 
g. overcoming opposition 
h. structuring flexibility 
2. Solidifying progress incrementally, which 
consists of: 
a. implanting support 
b. a focus on developing strategies at 
critical points 
c. managing coalitions 
d. formalizing commitment 
e. insuring that the consensus does not 
become inflexible 
3. Integrating processes and interests, which 
involves: 
a. making sure that the pattern of 
action, though incremental, is not 
piecemeal 
b. using formal analytical techniques to 
evaluate the resources required, the 
benefits sought, and the risks 
undertaken 
This model also resembles Bower (1970) and Pettigrew (1977). Creating 
incremental awareness and commitment is similar to Bower's definition 
12 
and Pettigrew's demand generation, and incrementally solidifying 
progress resembles Bower’s impetus and Pettigrew's power mobilization. 
Integrating processes and interests roughly resembles Bower's management 
of structural context and Pettegrew's management of legitimacy. Quinn's 
model is somewhat more political than Bower's, in that it explicitly 
calls for the general manager to manage coalitions, and somewhat less 
political than Pettigrew's, in that it implies that the general manager, 
and not the various interest groups, is the focus of action. It seems 
appropriate to classify it as a political model. In any case, Quinn's 
work strongly supports the notion of the inseparability of formulation 
and implementation. Indeed, his model illuminates the details of this 
link better than most of the others. 
Narayanan and Fahey (1982) developed what is perhaps the most 
supported conceptual model of strategy formulation as political 
process. They assert that "organizations are fundamentally political 
entities: coalitions of interests and demands emanating from within and 
outside organizations" (1982: 26). After citing many authors who 
provide examples of sources of different interests and demands, 
Narayanan and Fahey summarize: 
• . . Organizations can be viewed as loose structures of 
interests and demands, competing for organizational 
attention and resources, and resulting in conflicts that are 
never completely resolved. . . . [This] is a political 
conception of organizations (1982: 26-27). 
Narayanan and Fahey (1982) develop a model of strategic decision 
making (see Figure 1). The first phase is called gestation, and it is 
concerned with things like "problem formulation," "attention directing," 
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"problem finding," and "problem identification." It has three stages: 
1. Activation: individuals become cognizant of issues or concerns 
salient to them 
2. Mobilization: elevation of issue awareness from the individual to 
the organizational level 
3. Coalescence: a coalition forms as a result of the need to take 
action on strategic issues 
The second phase is called resolution, and it is concerned with things 
like "problem solving," "choice," or "selection." It has two stages: 
1. Encounter: the coalition interacts with other organizational 
entities 
2. Decision: a commitment to action, or a postponement of action, or a 
dropping of the issue, or a transformation of the issue, etc. 
Although Narayanan and Fahey do not try to extend their model to 
implementation, they cl£ attack the rational model for, among other 
things, making formulation and implementation separate, distinct 
phases. Perhaps this model can be adapted or extended to an 
implementation process. That the authors think so is implied in this 
quotation: 
The coalitional model of strategy formulation suggests that 
logical incrementalism ... is a more appropriate 
description of the process of strategy making than that 
implied in the analytical scheme of a strictly rational 
conception. . . . Formulating the content of strategy 
inevitably entails managing its context and processes (1982: 
32; emphasis added). 
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The Underlying Process and Political Models: Implications 
for Understanding Implementation 
The most important thing learned from the literature reviewed in 
the previous two sections is that there is nothing straightforward about 
implementation. One cannot simply say that "implementation is the 
execution of the plan." (The exception, according to Mintzberg (1978), 
may be in highly bureaucratized firms.) In general, there are too many 
social, organizational, and political forces that come into play 
whenever any plan is proposed. 
Indeed, this literature shows that these forces are so 
pervasive, and potent, that they affect the "formulation" of the 
strategic intent as much as they affect the "implementation" of it. 
Bower (1970) showed that while definition of a capital need was often 
done by individuals using quasi-analytical methods, the impetus process, 
which got those projects a hearing by people in a position to do 
resource allocation (i.e., formulate a plan), was more social, 
organizational, and political than analytical. According to Pettigrew's 
ideas, getting the organization to rally around a "plan" was more a 
function of power-mobilization than of analysis. 
Hence, it is difficult to support the commonly-invoked dichotomy 
between formulation and implementation. Mintzberg's alternative term 
"strategy formation" (1977; 1978) seems much more appropriate. Removing 
this distinction introduces the notion of learning as important to the 
understanding of strategy formation. As Mintzberg puts it: "Strategy 
formation then becomes a learning process, whereby so-called 
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implementation feeds back to formulation and intentions get modified en 
route, resulting in an emergent strategy (1976: 946)." Mintzberg and 
Waters make this point about emergent strategy even more forcefully: 
In our view, the fundamental difference between deliberate 
and emergent strategy is that whereas the former focuses on 
direction and control--getting desired things done--the 
latter opens us this notion of "strategic 
learning. . . . The concept of emergent strategy, based on 
the definition of strategy as realized, opens the process of 
strategy making up to the notion of 
learning. . . . Emergent strategy itself implies learning 
what works--taking one action at a time in search for that 
viable pattern or consistency. ... It is also frequently 
the means by which deliberate strategies change (1985: 
270-271). 
The concept of learning will prove to be very important for 
understanding implementation, as will be shown later. 
Some shortcomings of this literature 
While the ideas in the process and political models discussed 
above are fairly complete, there are some gaps in this literature. 
Primarily, the models are described at a fairly high level of 
abstraction, but are not well specified in particular contexts. In 
other words, no one has gone into the "black box" these models describe, 
no one has investigated the goings-cn in detail. 
For example, while the notion of emergent strategy is very 
plausible, and has been amply supported by Mintzberg and his colleagues, 
we really don’t know what causes an intended strategy to deviate from 
deliberate strategy to become emergent. We also don't know how this 
process differs in various forms of organization, if at all. We don't 
know, specifically, how organizational politics enters into this 
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formation process--we only know the skeletal framework, some of the 
important gross variables, of how politics affect strategy formation. 
This study will fill in some of these holes. It will attempt tc 
specify the detailed model of how an organization goes from intended 
strategy, to emergent strategy, and finally to realized strategy. It 
will also attempt to examine in necessary detail the role of 
organizational politics. As to the question of how these processes 
differ among organizations, this study will contribute a detailed 
investigation cf the model in a professional research and development 
organization; however, there will not be any comparative treatment of 
organizations. 
Other literature on implementation 
It seems appropriate at this point to mention some other 
literature on implementation which has been developed recently. This 
literature takes a very different approach from the one taken so far in 
this review. It could he characterized as the "rational" or "planning" 
approach. Many authors take a view of implementation which is 
synonymous with control and control systems (Camilles, 1980a, b, c; 
Camillus & Grant, 1980; Roush & Ball, 1980). Others look mostly at how 
to set up and optimize the performance of planning systems (Lenz and 
Lyles, 1981a, b; Lorange, 1979). The fit between strategy content and 
the research and development efforts of firms is the focus of some 
research (Tushman, in progress; Iyer & Ramaprasad, 1980). 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1983) studied how strategic managers’ 
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prediliction toward risk would affect the success of strategic 
implementation. Using a survey design, they found a relationship 
between risk-taking and success. Although they did not explicitly 
define implementation, since they measured various financial outcome 
variables, it is safe to say that they implicitly defined implementation 
as the financial performance of the firm. According to the view of 
strategic implementation developed so far in this paper, the Gupta and 
Govindarajan view of implementation is very limited. It is not dynamic, 
it does not examine the process of implementation, and comes dangerously 
close to a trait theory of strategic leadership. It is far removed from 
organizational reality, and it takes a monodimensional view. 
Vancil (1979) explored how profit center managers perceived 
their relative autonomy, and found that the most important determinant 
was the managerial climate created by the philosophy and style of 
corporate managers. The second most important determinant was 
functional authority, expressed by the profit center manager's custody 
of physical resources. Although this work is limited by the focus on 
perceived autonomy, it does serve to highlight the role of structural 
context (Bower, 1970). 
A New Metaphor for Implementation; 
Organizational Learning 
The literature reviewed so far suggests that the "filling the 
container" metaphor prevalent in the strategy literature's skimpy 
discussion of implementation is inappropriate. The review suggests that 
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strategy formation is an interaction between definitional, political and 
administrative processes within the firm, processes which do not 
resemble a distinct sequence between formulation ("building a 
container") and implementation ("filling the container"). It was 
suggested earlier in the review that strategic learning becomes more 
important as strategy becomes more emergent. As Mintzberg and Waters 
said, "Emergent strategy itself implies learning what works--taking one 
action at a time in search for that viable pattern or consistency" 
(1985: 271). In other words, if strategy is a pattern in a stream of 
actions and decisions, then strategic learning revolves around the 
discovery of viable patterns. In this context, learning is the 
acquisition of a new realization of what one has been doing; it is the 
search for a new way of doing things (if the old way isn't working); and 
it is the realization that in a dynamic world one should always be 
prepared to change. 
Therefore, a more appropriate metaphor might be "learning to 
constantly redefine and change (1) the shape of the container and (2) 
its contents," using cognitive, social, organizational and political 
processes. This is a more appropriate metaphor because we are focusing 
on the makeup of realized strategy--how much is deliberate, how much is 
emergent? The literature reviewed in depth earlier implied that much of 
it is emergent. This in turn implies, again according to the same 
literature, that the role of learning is crucially important. This 
leads to the question, "What is being realized?" The answer is (1) the 
organization itself ("the shape of the container"), and (2) its strategy 
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("the contents of the container"). 
Frames of reference; 
The medium for organizational learning 
A metaphor based on "learning" leads in two directions: (1) how 
individual strategic managers learn from emergent strategy, and (2) how 
organizations learn to construct themselves and their realized 
strategy. Individual learning, and its effects on decision making, has 
been studied a great deal. However, this study will not look at 
questions in this domain. 
Organizational learning has not been studied nearly as much. 
One scholar who examined this question was Jelinek, who did an 
historical and qualitative study of Texas Instruments (Jelinek, 
1979). Her main interest was in discovering how a large and successful 
firm could institutionalize innovation. She grappled with the notion of 
organizational learning, and decided that trying to analogize from 
individual learning to organizational learning was problematic: 
individuals have a single brain, organizations do not, so it is 
nonsensical to discuss the two forms of learning in the same way. She 
resolved this problem by using theoretical assumptions based on 
Silverman's (1970) notion of an "action frame of reference" shared by 
all (or at least most) members of an organization. Her conclusion was 
that organizational learning stemmed from evolution in this frame of 
reference. 
Weick (1979) argues that "an organization is a body of thought 
thought by thinking thinkers." As Pfeffer puts it: 
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Weick specifically rejects the conceptualization of 
organizations as being dominated by routines, standard 
operating procedures, and uncertainty-reducing mechanisms, 
with a correspondeng deemphasis on thought and cognition. 
For him, organizations are at once bodies of thought, or 
causal schemata, and also embody specific types of thinking 
practices, or algorithms (1982: 215). 
Weick's notion of "bodies of thought" is equivalent to the frame of 
reference notion which Jelinek borrowed from Silverman. 
Michel Bougon, a disciple of Weick's, believes that socially 
constructed realities can be found in the cognitive structures of the 
organizational members (Bougon, 1983), and that one can aggregate the 
cognitive maps of organizational members to arrive at a representation 
of the organization's frame of reference. Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst 
(1977) conducted one study to test this line of thinking. The setting 
for their study was the Ultrecht Jazz Orchestra in the 
Netherlands. They uncovered a good cognitive map and were able to make 
some interesting interpretations of how the variables were arrayed on 
the aggregate causal map. Essentially, Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst 
found that 
1. their etiographic technique yielded an ordering of variables that 
were interpretable in terms of organizations 
2. the ordering of the variables was strongly associated with the level 
of the participants' perceived influence over the situation 
3. the ordering ranked the variables plausibly in a sequence of three 
clusters of givens, means, and ends 
This study is important for three reasons. First, it shows that, out of 
the interplay between the intended strategy and the realized strategy of 
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the orchestra, their develops a distinctive cognitive map, a surrogate 
for a frame of reference, which makes sense, and can be interpreted. 
Second, it demonstrates how the notion ofthe development of a frame of 
reference must be one element of any definition of implementation. And 
third, it demonstrates that direct measurement of a frame of reference 
is possible, by using cognitive mapping. All of these points will be 
addressed in great detail later in this paper, as they bear directly on 
the present study. 
Although he did not use the term "frame of reference," Barnard 
(1938) placed a lot of importance on the body of values generated by an 
organization. He stated that executives of organizations must fulfill 
three functions: (1) facilitating communications (which includes 
structure), (2) inducing members to contribute to the organization's 
goals, and (3) defining organizational purpose. Presaging many of the 
authors reviewed here, Barnard had this to say about the distribution of 
the latter function: 
The formulation of organization purposes and objectives and 
the more general decisions involved in this process and in 
those of actions to carry them into effect are distributed 
in organizations, and are not, not can they be, concentrated 
or specialized to individuals, except in minor degree (1938: 
187; emphasis added). 
In saying this, Barnard rejected the split between "formulators" and 
"implementors." Barnard placed most of his analytical weight on the 
third executive function, definition of purpose, and said that 
organization-wide interaction processes led to a definition of purpose, 
embodied in a system of values. (Parenthetically, it is interesting to 
note that in their hugely popular book, In Search of Excellence (1982) 
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(a work which focused on implementation), Peters and Waterman drew on 
Barnard (1938), highlighting his view that managers must be shapers and 
guiders of values, and on Weick (1979), pointing out that he felt that 
important management assumptions lie embedded in the frames of reference 
that arise out of the minutiae of day-to-day activities.) 
Summary of ideas relating to frames of reference 
The definition of strategy which is being used in this section 
is Mintzberg's (1978: 935), "a pattern in a stream of decisions.” As 
Mintzberg and his colleagues have shown, these patterns can be either 
deliberate or emergent. To the extent that they are emergent (which 
Mintzberg says is "common” (1978: 947)), the concept of learning becomes 
centrally important to strategy formation (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Organizations learn by using, and evolving, organizational 
frames of reference (Jelinek, 1977; Silverman, 1970). The concept of 
frames of reference is widely accepted (Bougon, Weick, & Binkhorst, 
1977; Bougon, 1983; Weick, 1979), and can help us to understand 
organizations (Barnard, 1938; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Weick, 
1979). And, in a point which will be expanded later, frames of 
reference are measureable (Bougon, 1983; Pfeffer, 1982; Weick, 1979). 
The argument of this review can be summarized as follows: if 
organizational learning is a key component of strategy implementation 
(formation), and if frames of reference are a key medium for 
organizational learning, then our understanding of implementation will 
be increased if we focus on the frame of reference of an organization 
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which is "implementing" a strategy. 
A working definition of implementation 
The word implementation is in quotation marks above because, in 
practice, the split between formulation and implementation is a false 
one. (A better word, borrowing from Mintzberg, might be "realizing" a 
strategy.) However, the two activities can be distinguished 
conceptually, with "development of strategic intent" (which need not be 
a formal, or group, process) being analogous to formulation, and 
"organizational strategic activities" being roughly analogous to 
implementation. 
Probably the best route to the development of a good definition 
of implementation is (1) to adopt a working definition at the outset of 
the study, (2) examine the findings, and (3) construct a more complete 
definition. This is the route which will be followed here. The working 
definition which will be used is "organizational activities and events 
which seem to advance the realization of strategic intent." This 
mirrors Mintzberg*s terminology: to the extent that strategic intent is 
fully realized, we have deliberate strategy; to the extent that 
non-intentional elements creep into the realization, we have emergent 
strategy. Either way, this working definition meets Mintzberg's test 
that an operational definition should be designed to give the researcher 
"a tangible phenomenon" (Mintzberg, 1978: 935) to work with. Using this 
working definition, the tangible phenomenon is a stream of activities. 
It is interesting to note that in Mintzberg and Waters, those authors 
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s tate 
. . . because of practical necessity, we have been drawn 
into studying strategies as patterns in streams of actions, 
not decisions, since the latter represent intentions, too 
(1985: 257; emphasis added). 
The Setting for This Study 
The firm studied here, Northeast International Computer Company 
(NICC), made a strategic decision to enter a market to which it had not 
previously paid attention. This required a new product which would 
address the needs of a set of customers new to NICC. 
NICC could have acquired a smaller firm already in this market, 
or it could have resold, under its name, the equipment of other 
manufacturers (so-called OEMs), but, instead, it chose to innovate, to 
internally develop its own distinctive computer for this new market. 
The history of this project, called "the 1221 project" in this 
paper, will be examined in great detail below. The focal organization 
of the study is the software development group, within the larger NICC 
research and development department, which was charged with writing the 
operating and applications code for the new machine. By necessity, the 
marketing department, and upper management of NICC, will receive some 
attention, as will a few other salient groups in the larger NICC context. 
Some Key Issues 
The focal organization here is a cross between what Mintzberg 
(1979) called a "professional bureaucracy" and an "adhocracy." In any 
case, the professional status of the organizational members, and the 
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dynamic and complex environment of the computer industry, introduce some 
distinctive issues. 
The outcomes, the "strategic intent," are only partially 
specified. This is partly because of the dynamism and complexity of the 
environment, and partly because of the somewhat "artistic" nature of the 
profession of software development. That is, the software development 
professional can accomplish the same technical task in many different 
w^ys; which way is "better" is not necessarily technically determinable, 
but contains a large judgemental component. Therefore, the outcome of 
the work, and the method of performing it, are largely determined by the 
members of this professional organization. 
This situation is akin to what Mintzberg and Waters call "the 
umbrella strategy": 
Leaders who have only partial control over other actors in 
an organization may design what can be called umbrella 
strategies. They can set general guidelines for 
behaviour--define the boundaries--and then let other actors 
manoeuvre within them. In effect, these leaders establish 
kinds of umbrellas under which organizational actions are 
expected to fall. . . . (1985: 263; emphasis in original) 
Implementation involves the members' of the organization 
creating a method (algorithm, frame) by which they attempt to carry out 
the strategic intent (stay under the umbrella). But in the umbrella 
strategy situation, it is impossible to specify this method. So we need 
to examine how it could be created. In other words, how can a process 
be developed which will help organization members make choices which 
will support the strategic intent? Is there a way to encourage the 
enactment of a frame of reference which will increase the 
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"deliberateness” (staying under the umbrella) of the strategy, thereby 
reducing its "emergentness" (straying from the umbrella's boundaries)? 
Mintzberg and Waters put this issue this way: 
In its pursuit of an umbrella strategy--which means, in 
essence, defining general direction subject to varied 
interpretation--the central leadership must monitor the 
behaviour of other actors to assess whether or not the 
boundaries [of the umbrella] are being respected. . . . 
(1985: 263-264; emphasis added) 
The emphasis was added to the preceding quotation to show how 
this conceptualization supports the notion of the enactment of a frame 
of reference, which is an interpretive concept, as a key element in 
implementation. We need to know the frame, or frames, of reference held 
by the actors who make the behavioral choices. The more similar those 
frames, the more coordinated the actors, the likelier it is that 
strategic realization will be deliberate rather than emergent. The more 
consistent frames at the operating level are with those at the strategic 
level, the more deliberate, and the less emergent, will be the realized 
(implemented) strategy. Finding answers to these questions, which are 
largely of a process nature, can be guided by the general sociotechnical 
framework (Homans, 1950), which suggests that information and 
interactions, which ultimately lead to the formation of a frame, can 




Relatively little is known about strategic implementation, 
particularly as it has been discussed here. The motivation of this 
study is to begin to illuminate the issues as they have been framed 
here. In essence, the questions addressed in this research project are: 
"What events occurred during this implementation process?" and "How 
were these events interpreted by the people involved so that they formed 
a frame of reference about their activities?" The former question is a 
complicated and difficult methodological issue. The second question is 
equally difficult, and requires some attention to the means by which 
data collection on people, activities and interpretations of events was 
carried out in the 1221 organization. The latter set of issues will be 
addressed in the methods section. Here, the research, or content, 
questions will be presented. These questions arise out of the general 
issues raised given the distinctive view of implementation assumed in 
the preceding review, and they arise out of the peculiar nature of the 
group studied here. 
1. "What were the initial outcome specifications for the project? Was 
there an integration in the project about these objectives, or was 
there conflict and ambiguity between technical and business 
objectives? Or between the managers and the engineers?" (This is 




2. "How effective were communications and interaction patterns in terms 
of technical, administrative, and social activities?" (As pointed 
out earlier, the sociotechnical systems framework was used here to 
guide data gathering and analysis, which seemed appropriate given 
that what was being studied here was a process.) 
3. "What was the frame of reference which emerged in this 
organization? What was the pattern of givens, means, and ends in 
the cognitive map of the project's organization?" (This gets 
directly at one of the contentions of the definition of 
implementation developed in this study--that what is implemented is 
not merely a product or service, but also a structure, some 
processes, and a scheme for representing how the organization views 
itself, i.e., a frame of reference also emerges as a product of 
implementation.) 
4. "How did the members of the organization extend the initial, 
partial, outcome specifications into subunit outcomes? How did the 
subunits extend those into overall organizational outcomes? Putting 
it another way, what was the interplay between the project's 
intended strategy and its emergent strategy?" (This encompasses 
questions about the members' reaction to technological and strategic 
constraints, the structure and processes which developed in the 
organization, and the content strategy which resulted from the 
project.) 
5. "How useful are the political models of strategy formulation, 
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specifically the Narayanan and Fahey (1982) model, in explaining the 
process of implementation?" (Remember, one of the assumptions in 
this study is that formulation and implementation are not separable 
in practice. Therefore, this model should be applicable; if it is 
not, either it is wrong, or the assumptions are wrong.) 
C H A P T E R III 
METHODS 
Types of Data 
As we have seen, understanding the complex phenomenon of 
strategic realization, or implementation, requires obtaining data on how 
an organization learns. This in turn requires data on the nature of the 
organization enacted by the "implementors," and data on the frame of 
reference of the organization. 
Re-examining the questions from the previous chapter, and 
recalling the peculiarities of a professional research organization, 
implies that specific kinds of data are needed: 
1. Data on the strategic intent of the organization 
2. Data on the interpretation of and agreement about the strategic 
intent 
3. Data on coordination, communication and interaction, regarding 
technical, administrative, and social factors, within the 
organization 
4. Data on the basic content of the frames of reference of various 
actors in the organization, making sure that the data distinguish 
among the frames of these different actors 
5. Data on the overall frame of reference, if there is one, of the 
complete organization 
6. Data on the political events and activities in the focal 
organization and its larger organizational context 
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7. Data on the realized strategy, and how it might differ from the 
intended strategy 
Issues in Data Gathering 
How does one get these data? Some could be gotten through 
standard quantitative approaches. For example, agreement on objectives 
could be measured with a semantic differential questionnaire. The 
degree of coordination and communication could be measured, at least in 
part, by using sociometric interviews. Some data, especially about 
strategic intent, could be gathered archivally. 
But, since process research requires detailed description of the 
process, most of the data need to be gathered qualitatively. This means 
that the researcher must get very close to, probably inside, the 
implementing organization. Typically, organizational research is 
carried out in one of two paradigms (Evered & Louis, 1981): "inquiry 
from the inside" or "inquiry from the outside." Evered and Louis argue 
that a far better approach is to combine both ways of knowing and both 
kinds of knowledge, a view accepted here. But the preceding discussion 
shows that an electic approach is desirable from a practical as well as 
a philosophical standpoint. Therefore, this study combines "inside" and 
"outside" techniques. 
The most effective means for collecting information on 
implementation and frames of reference is a combination of 
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technologies--observation, interviewing, questionnaires, and cognitive 
mapping. This chapter explains each method in detail. 
Note on data quality checks 
The quality of the data gathered by each method used in this 
study is examined in the section where the method is discussed. The 
criteria used were developed by Guba and Lincoln (1981). They argue 
that data from any scientific inquiry must meet three tests: (1) truth 
value, also known as Internal validity or credibility, (2) 
applicability, usually called external validity or transferability, and 
(3) consistency, the well-known criterion of reliability or 
dependability. The quality of each kind of data will be evaluated 
against each of these criteria. 
Participant Observation 
This research employed participant observation, using the 
definition from Schwartz and Jacobs: 
[Participant observation] means being in the presence of 
others on an ongoing basis and having some nominal status 
for them as someone who is part of their daily lives (1979: 
46). 
The author became something of a fixture during the nine months of 
fieldwork, visiting the site an average of three time a week, and even 
receiving his own office at the site. The author occasionally even 
assisted the engineers, in very modest ways. Observation was done of 
staff meetings of the 1221 managers, and of members of the 1221 project 
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at work. Many informal conversations, resulting from participant 
observation, were manually recorded in extensive field notes. 
In order for researchers to get enough detailed data on an 
implementation process, some form of observation must be included in the 
many methods used. Simple observation would probably not be rich enough 
to address the issues raised in the implementation process as it has 
been developed in this dissertation, namely, details on organizational 
gpals, structures, processes, and frame of reference. Survey data alone 
would not suffice to get the richness of detail which is necessary. So 
the researcher engaged in relaxed interaction with and observation of 
the members of the 1221 project. The information so gathered helped to 
answer the questions of what took place in the project, what the 
interplay was between the intended and realized strategies, what were 
the communication and interaction patterns, and the reactions to 
technological and strategic constraints. 
Quality checks on participant observation data 
Internal validity, the credibility of the information gathered, 
is a great strength of participant observation. In this study, it was 
enhanced by the richness of detail recorded, by persistent observation 
(9 months, 3 days a week, 6 hours a day), and by member checks, i.e., 
asking the members of the organization if data and conclusions were 
accurate. Validity was also improved through peer debriefing by three 
other researchers, two of whom were company insiders, and by 
triangulation, i.e., validation using other methods (discussed below). 
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External validity is not necessarily a strength of this method, 
unless the ethnographic description is detailed enough for readers to 
decide if the setting corresponds to other, similar ones. Discussion 
with people knowledgeable about softward R & D suggests that this study 
meets this test. 
The chief referee of the reliability of participant observation 
is triangulation, i.e., the extent to which the observations are borne 
out by other methods; in this study, reliability is high, as the reader 
will see later. 
Open-Ended Interviews 
At the beginning of the research project a series of open-ended, 
tape-recorded interviews were conducted with some members of the 1221 
project--the department manager, the five group managers, the two most 
senior project leaders, two marketing managers, and the human resources 
specialist assigned to the 1221 project. The purpose of these 
interviews was twofold--to get information, but mostly to build rapport 
quickly with the members of the project. The information gathered 
related mostly to the manager's or staff member's duties and 
responsibilities, to the history of the project to that point, to the 
rationale for the 1221 product, and to some of the issues of being a 
project embedded in a larger organization. Two other tape-recorded, 
open-ended interviews were conducted--one with a senior manager, one 
with a junior engineer. On both occasions the reason was to get their 
unstructured points of view about what was happening in the project. 
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These interviews were also crucial to generating the needed 
level of detail in the data. Since the research project did not start 
at the same time as the development project, some method was needed to 
get historical information. Open-ended interviews were deemed best for 
accomplishing this. And as countless anthropologists have shown, 
open-ended interviews are an excellent tool for gathering cognitive 
data. These interviews also gave considerable insight into the 
technical and marketing requirements of the product, and the 
intra-organizational political ramifications of the 1221 project. The 
interviews conducted with the leader of the overall project were the 
major source of information about the very earliest stages of the 
project and about the politics of the situation. 
Quality checks for unstructured interview data 
For these data, internal and external validity were both high. 
Members told their stories in their own words, which was built-in member 
checking. The sample of people interviewed was important--top managers, 
top technical people, marketing managers, and some less central sales 
and manufacturing staff people. This sample provided a good overview of 
strategic intent, and of the context within which the 1221 project was 
embedded, and its comprehensiveness improved external validity. The 
varied interviews triangulated with one another, providing an additional 
check. Also, this method could be validated by other methods, 




Other interviews were conducted from a semi-structured protocol 
of questions. The areas investigated using these were: (1) position, 
(2) reporting relationships, (3) work flow, (4) information flow, (5) 
sociometric choice, (6) role sets, and (7) role expectations. The 
questions were suggested by Homans's (1950) model of group dynamics and 
sociotechnical systems (extended here to a larger organization of forty 
to fifty people). 
Waves of interviews 
The interviews were conducted in two waves, and tried to gather 
data on three points in time, which was crucial given the historical 
perspective taken here. 
The first wave. The first wave of interviews took place from 
mid-January to late February of 1984. One objective of the first wave 
of interviews was to gather current data. But the second section of the 
protocol asked about the period of June, 1983. This was an attempt to 
get a retrospective measurement of the development project at that 
point, from those people who were there at that time. 
The second wave. The second wave was conducted in June, 1984, 
to add one other time point to the measurement. 
Summary of time points. In all, then, three points in time were 
measured: 
1. June, 1983, which was retrospectively measured in January-February, 
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1984 
2. January-February, 1984, which was measured in "real time" 
3. June, 1984, which was measured in "real time" 
Sampling 
Rather than interview the entire 1221 department, the researcher 
identified a "vertical slice" judgement sample of about 25 members of 
the 1221 project. This sample included all of the managers, all of the 
project leaders, and a subset of the remaining workers. The latter were 
selected in order to make the sample representative of the overall 
project. This meant the inclusion of at least one member of each 
sub-group in the 1221 project. 
Quality checks for the semi-structured 
interview data 
Both internal and external validity were enhanced primarily by 
two factors. Triangulation was again a major quality check. For 
example, the data on interaction patterns and communication could be 
checked by observation; this aided internal validity. The variety of 
data sources enhanced the description of the situation, which improved 
the transferability or external validity of the findings. 
The sampling was done purposefully and theoretically. The 
purposeful part was the deliberate inclusion of the managers and the 
technical supervisors. The theoretical part was the random selection of 
representatives from all parts of the whole organization. The sampling 
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thus ensured adequate coverage of the project team, improving internal 
validity. It also enhanced the transferability or external validity of 
the findings by being comprehensive in its view of the whole 
organization. 
Internal validity was also helped by the longitudinal 
measurement. Since what was being studied was a process, the phenomenon 
was dynamic. A static, one-time measurement would have been a serious 
violation of internal validity. Since most project evolutions are also 
dynamic, this aided external validity too. The reliability of the data 
were primarily enhanced by standardizing the interview protocol. Also, 
some of the interviews were conducted by peer researchers who were 
company insiders; this enhanced the reliability of the data. 
Questionnaires 
The questionnaires investigated the meanings assigned to various 
statements that reflected the dichotomous nature of the 1221 effort, 
namely, striking a balance between business and technical goals. As 
mentioned earlier, the question of goal congruence is particularly 
important in a professional organization like the 1221. Six concepts 
were gleaned from initial interviews at the company, three from each of 
the two competing attitude sets: 
1. Business considerations 
a. Low end product 
b. First customer shipment by July 
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c. Product compatibility 
2. Technical considerations 
a. Technical excellence 
b. Lots of functionality 
c. "State of the art" work 
The questionnaire used the semantic differential technique, and 
had twenty of Osgood's original 76 scales (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 
1957). These twenty scales were heavily skewed in favor of the scales 
that Osgood and associates interpreted as evaluative. This was because 
of the need to measure the 1221 organization's members' cognitive 
assessment of the possible dichotomies inherent in the development 
effort. 
Quality checks in the semantic differential data 
Internal validity was enhanced by the sampling, for much the 
same reasons that were valid for the semi-structured interviews. The 
particular concepts which were gleaned from the open-ended interviews 
were a great source of internal validity, since they were generated by 
the members themselves; this was built-in member checking. And, again, 
triangulation was important here. The selection of the six concepts was 
reviewed by research collegues familiar with the project, which improved 
internal validity. 
External validity was enhanced by the use of terms which were 
sufficiently broadly worded to be generalizable to other settings, and 
by the proper sampling of engineers and managers. 
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The major means for ensuring reliability was the selection of 
standard Osgood semantic differential scales. These scales have been in 
use since the early 1950s, and have been shown to be reliable. 
Cognitive Mapping 
Cognitive mapping was used in this study because it is an 
effective way of measuring the frame of reference of an organization 
(Bougon, Weick, & Binkhorst, 1977). In this discussion of 
implementation, we have stated explicitly that implementation can only 
be discussed in the context of experience, i.e., of what happens in the 
organization as its members seek to move from strategic intent to 
strategic realization. Presumably they have experiences, which they 
process in some way. 
The question then becomes, "What do human beings do with their 
'processed' organizational experiences?" Of course, seeking the full 
answer to this question would occupy the full professional lives of many 
organizational researchers. But a partial answer can be obtained by 
looking at work done by some scholars with similar interests. We have 
already discussed the work of Bougon, Weick, and Binkhorst (1977), 
Silverman (1970), and Weick (1979). Weick's work, in particular, 
focuses on how people deal with their experiences. In his ESR Model 
(Enactment, Selection, and Retention), he shows how people sort and 
select ("punctuate") their experiences, how they put these into cause 
and effect chains, and how they combine them into frameworks ("bodies of 
thought"). Let us look at some other works that deal with these 
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issues. 
Tversky and Kahnemann posited that individuals construct 
"frames" with their experiences. Their use of the word is similar to 
how it has been used here: "... the decision-maker's conception of the 
acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice" 
(1981: 453). These frames take on the form of "schemata": webs of 
acts, outcomes, and the connections ("contingencies") between them. 
Bougon sees experience as being processed and retained in a very 
similar way 
... the process transforming raw experience into knowledge 
relies on cortical schemas. . . . For perceiving patterns 
into one's raw experience (i.e., for acquiring knowledge), 
one needs schemas. For organizing and retaining that 
knowledge, one needs further schemas. Schemas, perception, 
and knowledge are intimately interrelated, and one cannot be 
isolated from the others (1983: 175). 
The work the notion of schemas, of organizational variables 
connected in some sort of meaningful way, is potentially a very powerful 
way to understand what organizations enact when they go through an 
implementation process, to understand how they process their 
organizational experience. The question then becomes, "What does it 
take to know an organization's schema?" Bougon responds that it is 
impossible to truly know, but that an approximation is possible: 
... Every schema is associated with a concept, [and] 
concepts are the notions behind words, and ... a schema 
can reconstruct the pattern of concepts that it recorded. 
Therefore, to the extent that concepts in the 
concept-structure [i.e. schema] of [an organization] are 
tagged by words, we can explore that concept-structure 
[schema] (1983: 177). 
Bougon calls the mapping of schema cognitive mapping. Here, 
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cognitive mapping was combined with all the other methods, resulting, it 
is hoped, in a triangulation around the frame of reference of the 
organization. We have already discussed at length the appropriateness, 
in the context of strategic implementation, of the notion of causal 
schemata. If these are appropriate, then measuring the causal schema of 
an implementing organization should be very desirable, perhaps even 
necessary. Cognitive mapping is simply one of the best techniques which 
has been developed so far to capture causal schemata, an assertion 
supported at length by Axelrod (1976) and Pfeffer (1982). The latter 
gave the following assessment of this method: 
Using [cognitive mapping] it is possible to assess the 
extent to which members of an organization ... share 
causal schemata, as well as to discover those relationships 
for which causal perceptions vara. These causal 
schemata ... reflect the members' understanding of the 
organization and represent the organization and its 
organizing process. • • . [Cognitive mapping helps in] 
understanding the causal structures which underlie 
organizations (1982: 216-217). 
Cognitive mapping is the most "qualitative" of the various approaches to 
surfacing organizational schemata, and allows the inquirer to get the 
closest to the organization members and the phenomena of interest. It 
uses the members' own words as variables. Other techniques rely a great 
deal on multivariate statistical techniques and data gathering 
techniques which are more sterile. 
The technique of cognitive mapping 
The technique of cognitive mapping used in this study was a 
three-stage process. First, the researcher interviewed the 
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respondents. The interview consisted of the researcher's asking the 
respondent to develop questions about his or her view of the 
organization. The respondent did not answer these questions. Instead, 
the researcher gleaned concepts from the questions, and then checked 
these for accuracy with the respondent. 
Second, the researcher examined all the concepts developed, and 
constructed a set of the ones mentioned jointly by all the respondents. 
Third, a square matrix of the items was constructed. The 
respondents filled in the cells of the matrix to indicate their beliefs 
about the existence and type (positive or negative) of 
interrelationships between the concepts. The respondents were also 
asked to indicate their perceived level of influence over the inter¬ 
relationships. The data were aggregated for the entire sample and 
analyzed by the researcher, who then developed the cognitive maps. 
Quality checks on the cognitive mapping data. 
The generation of the map in close cooperation with the members 
of the 1221 project, at every step of the way, greatly enhanced internal 
validity. Since this was the first time cognitive mapping was used in 
this kind of setting, it is not clear just how much external validity 
there is to the data. But the sampling, the nature of the people 
responding, leads to the belief that external validity is fairly high. 
Triangulation, as mentioned above, was a major source of confidence in 
internal and external validity, and was the primary source of 
reliability 
CHAPTER IV 
CHRONOLOGY AND ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE 1221 PROJECT 
Pre-1221 History 
To really understand what happened in this project, one must go 
back to 1981, when the company introduced its first "low end" word 
processor, the NICCwriter. This is important for two reasons. First, 
one of the key managers on the 1221 project was the manager in charge of 
the NICCwriter. Second, the NICCwriter was the closest thing to the 
1221 that the company had previously tried to develop. 
The NICCwriter met with only limited success. Several reasons 
were cited. One was that it lacked competitive functionality, i.e., it 
couldn't do the things that the editors on the word processors of NICC's 
competitors could do. Another was that the company was unable to 
adequately compensate its sales force, which had always been oriented 
towards large, expensive word processors. A third reason given by many 
NICC insiders was that the NICCwriter had excessive manufacturing 
overhead. Finally, observers felt that the marketing department had 
erred in targeting only the large National Accounts held by NICC, 
thereby marketing the NICCwriter to only thirty percent of its potential 
market. 
While all this was happening, Alfred Tsou, who eventually led 
the 1221 project, was managing the Microsystems group. (See Figure 2 
for the pre-1221 NICC organization chart.) Tsou is an interesting 
character. A native of Hong Kong, he joined NICC in 1973, and became a 
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manager in 1977, He is about thirty-three, medium height, and wears 
glasses. He wears the "standard" garb for middle and upper managers at 
NICC, a suit; in his case it is usually gray. Tsou is very energetic. 
He speaks in an emphatic way, hardly seeming to pause for breath. As 
his managers will attest, he is not shy about candidly articulating both 
his beliefs and his expectations. Tsou is very self-conscious about 
being Chinese, even though a large percentage of the engineers at NICC 
are Chinese, and even though he speaks virtually accent-free, rapid-fire 
English. He is self-conscious in the sense that he feels his ethnicity 
is an advantage to him. "I am from another culture," he says. "I use 
the same survival skills in the NICC culture that I used in Hong Kong." 
Tsou evidently did not know his biological father very well, and it is 
clear that he views Dr. Smith as a surrogate father. 
In 1981, Tsou's Microsystems group tried to build a low cost 
terminal for NICC's largest machines, the Mainframe Systems (MS). These 
terminals were so different from the expensive ones NICC traditionally 
made, that they were not accepted by the company. Despite this, Tsou 
went ahead and built prototypes without telling anyone. Risky as this 
might seem, "bootleg" projects like this were, and are, quite common at 
NICC. "You really shouldn't use frontal assault when you're trying to 
work against internal competition," Tsou said. "I like to think of what 
I'm doing as playing GO. To win you have to use encirclement and 
subtlety." During this episode Tsou began to demonstrate his 
understanding of the political element in getting strategy formulated 
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sponsor can be found who will give some impetus to the project; one 
waits to form the proper coalitions. 
Tsou's leading subordinate in Microsystems was Jim Miles. Miles 
was originally from Illinois, outside Chicago. He is about five feet, 
ten inches tall, rather thin, and wears glasses. He speaks in a nasal 
tone, apparently from chronic allergies. Unlike Tsou, he rarely wears a 
suit, but he usually comes to work in a sport coat, and he always wears 
a tie. Miles is a very measured speaker. If a question can be answered 
in one word, he is sure to answer it that way. It is clear that he has 
thought about most questions that people put to him. He is meticulous 
and believes in planning and preparation, even if that means sacrificing 
something in the short term. Miles went to the Univeristy of Illinois 
during the Vietnam War era. "My draft number was 43," he said, "so I 
ended up in ROTC." Allergies prevented him from becoming a pilot or 
navigator, so the Air Force placed him "with the computers on the base" 
in California, where he was stationed. He was reassigned to the 
Pentagon, to work on computer security. "That was a research type of 
place," Miles said, "as opposed to just a standard military thing. The 
Pentagon being the Pentagon, it was a 9 to 5 job." Miles recounted that 
his superior at the Pentagon was also Chinese, "just like Alfred. I 
think that they grew up in the same town--they have identical 
personalities. ... He was a captain when I knew him. He just got 
promoted to full Colonel about two weeks after Alfred got promoted to 
the project," he said, remarking on the irony. Miles went to work for 
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Honeywell after the military. He eventually worked on terminals. After 
a shakeup at Honeywell, Miles joined NICC in 1981, where he worked for 
Tsou on terminals and microprocessor-based equipment. 
In August, 1982, Tsou and Miles co-authored a paper on low 
cost/high functionality systems. Said Miles: 
It recommended that we take the—at that point, it was aimed 
directly at the terminal products like MS--that we use 
technology to our advantage in two different directions: to 
lower the cost of our products, yet maintain the current 
. functionality; the other direction was to maintain the cost 
and boost the functionality. Since we're very product 
oriented, the cost is the main competitor. So, 
functionality and cost are the two key themes. 
The writing of this paper was the definition (Bower, 1970) or activation 
(Narayanan and Fahey, 1982) (at least from the lower levels, which Bower 
called the "initiating" level) of what would ultimately become the 1221. 
The paper's recommendations were not accepted, but it did achieve some 
notoriety. "The paper," Miles said, "was being waved as the flag within 
NICC--people were saying that there are people who can be innovative, 
and that type stuff. It made me feel proud." Even though the paper 
became visible, this was not the mobilization phase (Narayanan and 
Fahey, 1982), because the paper did not raise awareness of issues to the 
organizational level. It simply raised awareness about how someone 
could write such a paper at NICC. 
During this period Alfred Tsou chaired a task force on 
strategies for terminals for the MS group and the Office Automation 
Systems (OAS) group. Tsou had acquired a reputation for being 
aggressive and pushing things through quickly, which was a key factor in 
his selection for this chairmanship. The paper had something to do with 
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it, too, according to Jim Miles: "At [this] point in time--I don't know 
all the ramifications—the NICCwriter was getting killed on the 
marketplace. Because of that paper, Alfred had been named chief of the 
task force for NICC's work station strategy for MS and OAS. But the 
politics at NICC at that time were so heated that the right thing to do 
was just totally lost. So the task force really got nowhere." Almost 
as an aside, Tsou and his hardware counterpart, Jim Bunning, began to 
investigate possibilities in electronic typewriters. 
Hans Erhardt was the software manager of the NICCwriter 
project. Physically, he was the most distinctive of the managers on the 
1221 project. Tsou said that "Hans adds color." He is about six feet, 
four inches tall, and is neither thin nor overweight. At the beginning 
of the project he had only a mustache on his bespectacled face, but he 
grew a beard in the early winter, which he kept. Erhardt dresses like 
the other managers, in sportcoat and tie. His attire is decidedly 
"preppier" than most of the others'. Erhardt joined NICC in 1970. Like 
many of the veterans at NICC, and elsewhere, Erhardt had an unusual 
background for a software engineer. Like Jim Miles, Erhardt was from 
Illinois. He got a bachelor's degree in physics and a master's in 
mechanical engineering from the California Institute of Technology. His 
first job was for the California Electronics Accelerator. "It was a big 
physics laboratory at Berkeley," Erhardt said. "I was the operations 
engineer, which basically meant running the machine." After he'd been 
on the job for two years, the Atomic Energy Commission cut the funding 
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of the Accelerator, and Erhardt had to find another job: 
I was sort of gearing myself as being half physicist and 
half engineer. ... I noticed from the advertisements for 
jobs that there were very few jobs for physicists or 
engineers at the time [1970], but hundreds of jobs for 
programmers. And I decided I was going to make a change and 
go into this field of computers, which I actually hadn't 
ever studied in school at all. ... I started going across 
the street to the Harvard Computation Center, getting 
manuals on various things and reading them and playing 
around with this little basic language computer they had in 
the lab. And getting . . . sort of testing the patience of 
my friends who were programmers by plying them with beer and 
asking them dozens of questions--"What is a _?" 
Erhardt received some good fortune when the wife of a coworker at the 
Accelerator, who worked for a small software company, got him an 
interview, which led to a job. "It turned out," Erhardt said, "that 
this software company had been bought by Northeast International 
Computer Company, although it was still an independently operating place 
at the time. That's basically when I joined NICC. I joined this little 
200-man software company, and now, like, without changing companies, I'm 
with a billion dollar corporation, which is kind of weird." After some 
initial breaking-in, Erhardt went to work on micro-coding what turned 
out to be NICC's first word processor. He kept on working on 
enhancements and improvements of word processors, including the first 
CRT-based word processor and the first NICC use of microprocessors. 
Erhardt took a brief sabbatical at another computer company in the area, 
and he also spent about three years working on communications software, 
but he ultimately ended up managing software on the NICCwriter project. 
In the summer of 1982, while the NICCwriter was in its 
"maintenance" phase, after introduction, Erhardt had some time on his 
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hands. He developed a proposal that was similar to the Tsou-Miles one, 
except that it was not for a low end product: 
I had this idea of a real high-end fancy thing we were 
calling NICCwriter 3 that was going to be built on the PC 
[NICC's Professional Computer], and some fairly specific 
ideas about a powerful screen hardware facility and so on 
and so forth. My proposals weren't being eagerly listened 
to by anybody, but I kept working on it anyway. 
The Genesis of 1221 
In the Fall of 1982 there began to be some concern among top 
management at NICC that the company needed a shot in the arm. This 
feeling was strongest for Herbert Rodman, a Vice-President and "the 
father of wordprocessing and OAS", according to Miles. Miles continued: 
Rodman was very upset with how OAS was going nowhere, how 
NICC in general was going nowhere. He was Dr. Smith's right 
hand man. So, they had a big meeting and Rodman went out 
and just cut everybody apart—the MS, the OAS, the PC, 
vice-presidents, and so on--saying how none of them knew 
what they were doing or where they were going. I don't know 
if Alfred brought it up, or if Fred Riley [the Vice 
President of Research and Development] brought it up, but 
one of them brought up the fact that, well, Alfred does have 
this paper ; . . . and that's when it hit the top and things 
started happening. 
It was then that mobilization occured. The issues raised earlier by 
Tsou and Miles in their paper suddenly penetrated the awareness of top 
management. Dr. Smith, Fred Riley, and Herbert Rodman were very 
powerful, and they became the sponsors of Tsou's and Miles's idea, i.e., 
they provided the idea with some impetus. The formation of this group 
marked the coalescence phase (Narayanan and Fahey, 1982). 
Some thought was given to developing a typewriter replacement. 
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The coalition met with Ray Culp [V.P. in charge of the Professional 
Computer], and Larry Rosen [V.P. in charge of MS]. They all decided 
that the typewriter concept didn't fit anywhere, so they changed it to a 
low end word processor. They decided to re-enter the low end market, 
despite the problems with the NICCwriter. But there was some degree of 
indecisiveness, because of the success of the large systems. These 
discussions marked the encounter phase, where the coalition backing the 
1221 came into contact with representatives of two groups which had a 
different point of view on the issue of launching a low-end effort. The 
top management coalition prevailed. 
On December 21, 1982, the 1221 (named after the date) was 
approved. The product was targeted for 70 percent of small business 
companies. Top management decided to split the 1221 organization off 
from existing divisions. (See Figure 3 for the post-1221 organization 
chart.) 
The selection of Alfred Tsou to run the 1221 project was not 
automatic. It took until January of 1983 before Dr. Smith decided to 
let Tsou run it. Once he had the project, Tsou and Miles began to 
estimate the parameters of the project: what the product should do, 
where the product should go, what could be adopted from other groups, 
who could be recruited from other groups. The project officially began 
on February 1, 1983, when Tsou had twelve people assigned to him. Five 
of these, including Hans Erhardt, were from the NICCwriter project, 
which by now was officially buried. Seven, including Jim Miles, were 
from Tsou's terminals section in Microsystems. This movement was met 
54 
I - 




I Cl. I X O I O - • H V 
I « > 
a o> v 







0 CL H « H 
a e v 
cm o *0 qo a 
cm m « u ce a 
*-» o n « 0 a 
o. m a 
—< 4) X I 
< O a 
a 
- i 







1 1 a i a « 
1 1 a i a c 
1 1 a i i o U 1 
1 1 i i a 4> 1 
1 1 a a a CO *J a. i 
I O i - i i ■ a 03 3 3 l 
1 U 1 i i a V o. o a 
I U 1 i i a L-i e u i 
1 1 a i a o 0 O i 
a a i a a u o 

































a - a 
a as a 
a « o 4J i 
a —« u o. i 
I L M 3 l 
a <l o a. o a 
» .* X « a 
a u X 9 » 
a 4> 0 co U a 
i co >s *0 a 
a 0 0 a 
a >s o « oi i 
I Li U CD U i 
• o D 3 D I 










S *h Q oa > 4J « 4) 
CD Q CD 
>» «H 
CO E 0 





Q0 O 0) 
<C M J* 
C oi -( 
« X « X H Z 
« .* Jd H M u 
6u X •"> 
_ 1 1 a a a a - i 
1 1 a a i i i 
1 1 a a 1 1 CD i 
1 1 i c as i • i >> » 
oO i a i o E i 1 1 CO i 
C ( a i <v i 1 1 <u « 
—-i I a a Li u i i i oo <y i 
4J 1 i a <0 CO • 1 I C J i 
<U 1 a i E >» i a a -h i 
^ i i — i 4) o CO i i — i *j >* i 
Li 1 i a O •u i ■ a u » 
<a i i a •H 3 i 1 U 4) » 
X I i a VW < i 1 V E i 
1 i a IM i 1 CL us i 
1 a a o i 1 o » i 
» a a i a i 







































































































with acrimony by the terminals engineers who remained behind, according 
to Jim Miles, "They were very antagonistic when we left the terminals 
area," he said, "Finally, they were getting to do new things, as 
opposed to the same old stuff. Then, when Alfred and I left, every time 
we walked by their cubicles, they'd shout out, 'Turncoat! Traitor!', 
They were really upset. They thought we left them out to dry and walked 
away from them, because the driving forces of getting things done had 
lpft; and now they had to fall back into the old mode of operation." 
The Structure of the Task and the Organization 
A microcomputer is a complex machine. At the "bottom", which is 
the term the engineers give to the most basic level of the machine, is 
the hardware. This is composed of silicon chips, which contain 
thousands of tiny switches. Some of the chips are for storage of 
information. These are called "memory." Temporary memory is called 
"random access memory," or RAM. The information on these chips is 
erased when the user turn off the computer. Some chips have routines 
permanently inscribed onto them; these are called "read only memory," or 
ROM. Occasionally, computer engineers will install chips which can be 
altered like RAM chips, but only by service technicians, not the users. 
These are called "programmable read only memory," or PROM. 
All computers have what is known as a "Central Processing Unit," 
or CPU. This is the part of the computer which carries out computations 
and manipulates data. In microcomputers, the CPU is a specialized chip 
called a "microprocessor." 
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Microcomputers typically have three other important hardware 
components--keyboards, disk drives, and video screens. Technically, all 
three of these are considered "peripherals," i.e., not part of the CPU. 
Keyboards are used to input data and commands. Disk drives hold 
magnetic disks, which can be used for permanent storage of information 
and programs, and from which data and programs can be loaded into the 
central memory. Video screens are the most common form of output device 
in microprocessors, or in the terminals which are used as workstations 
on larger computers; they are used to display information that is being 
input, and information that is the result of various computer 
operations. In addition, microcomputers have a myriad of wires and 
other hardware that perform various "housekeeping" and connecting 
functions. 
The hardware in a microcomputer must somehow be gotten to 
perform effectively. Actually, all the activity in any computer could 
be "hard wired," i.e., etched right into the chips which make up the 
computer. This would, of course, make for a very rigid computer. The 
usual course is to place many of the instructions to the hardware on 
disks, in the form of programs, usually called "software." Software has 
various levels, also. 
The level of software which is closest to the hardware, which 
directly controls the hardware, is the microcode. The microcode is in 
turn controlled by the operating system. This is the code which directs 
the computer to shift data, for example, from a floppy disk to the core 
memory, or from one part of core memory to another, or from core memory 
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to disk, or from disk to an output port (to a printer), and so on. Sets 
of data are usually called "files," and these are handled by a 
subsection of the operating system called the file management system. 
The software which is furthest from the hardware is called 
applications software. These are programs designed to take advantage of 
the capabilities of the hardware, as controlled by the operating and 
file management systems. In the 1221, there were three applications. 
The most important by far, given that the machine was conceived as an 
office automation product, was word processing, an application which 
allowed users to write, edit, and print special files, called 
"documents," much more effectively than one could with a typewriter. In 
the 1221, word processing was itself broken down into the editor, which 
is the interface through which a person uses the application, and the 
formatter, the part of word processing which readies the input text for 
typewriter-like printing. 
The 1221 had two other applications. One was office 
applications, which allowed users to emulate a typewriter, define and 
print mass-produced forms, and use industry-standard software packages, 
like spreadsheets and accounting. The other was the CRT Phone, which 
allowed a user to process data, and transmit voice and data, all 
simultaneously. 
As mentioned above, applications are written to exploit the 
capabilities of the operating and file management systems, which in turn 
are written to exploit the capabilities of the hardware, particularly 
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tie the applications and systems software together. In the 1221, this 
was handled by two programs--the document manager, which provided disk 
support for the interface between applications and systems, and the 
screen manager, which provided video support for the interface. 
Administratively, the programmers writing these linking 
functions could have been placed with either the systems or_ the 
applications group. In the 1221 organization, they were placed with the 
applications, at least initially. Figure 4 shows how all these 
technical functions were linked in the 1221. The organization structure 
of the 1221 project was broken down as follows: a "systems" side, 
consisting of Jim Miles, as the architect, a file management system 
group, and an operating system group; and an "applications" side, 
consisting of a word processing group and a CRT Phone group. (The 
Office Applications group was not added until August, 1983. See Figure 
5 for the detailed organization chart of the 1221 project, as of late 
October, 1983.) 
Some key people 
One person Hans Erhardt brought with him from the NICCwriter 
group (although she was a new addition to that group) was Mary Becker. 
In her mid fifties, she usually dresses in casual dresses (never 
slacks), often accompanied by cardigan sweaters. She speaks in a very 
soft tone, and gives the impression of a very nice person with esoteric 
interests who would like to be left alone to pursue those interests. 
She joined NICC in 1976, and began working in the telecommunications 
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group that was being managed by Hans Erhardt. She stayed with 
telecommunications after Erhardt left to manage the NICCwriter group. 
At the end of 1982 she arranged a transfer into the NICCwriter project, 
but shortly after the transfer became effective, Erhardt had become part 
of the 1221 project. So Becker became part of it too. She was 
nominally the project leader of the editor subgroup, concentrating on 
the interface between the user and the word processing editor. 
Mark Theroux was another person who joined the 1221 project in 
February of 1983. Theroux had bachelor's and master's degrees in 
mathematics. He had joined NICC in 1976 about three weeks after 
completing his master's degree. He is about five feet, ten inches tall, 
medium-to-thin build; he does not wear glasses, and keeps his hair close 
cropped. One might say that Theroux dresses like the stereotypical 
computer engineer--tee shirt, blue jeans and sneakers. But in most 
other ways he seems far from stereotypical. He is quite good at 
communicating orally, and seems to take great pride in putting his words 
and sentences together with precision and style. Perhaps it was 
qualities like these that led Theroux to be characterized by another 
member of the project staff as "a creative genius" at programming. Up 
until 1982 Theroux worked for the MS division, mostly writing assembly 
language and micro code programs. In late 1981 and early 1982 his old 
department began to break up because of reorganization, and Theroux 
ended up working for Alfred Tsou in Microsystems. This led directly to 
the 1221 project. His early input to the 1221 was in writing conversion 
utilities. Software development usually occurs in an environment where 
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the hardware and the operating system of the computer are given. 
Applications programmers "write to the system." But the 1221 was being 
developed distinctively--the hardware was developed first, but the 
systems software and applications software were being developed in 
"parallel." And even though the hardware was "set," there were no 
circuit boards available until the project was about ten months along. 
So some way had to be found to allow the software engineers to design, 
write, and test code in the meantime. Mark Theroux was the person 
chosen to write the utilities that would allow the development systems 
on hand to emulate the eventual 1221. Although he wanted only technical 
responsibilities, Theroux was unofficially the project leader for the 
File Management System (FMS) subproject. 
Emery Lee also came to the 1221 project from Alfred Tsou's 
former group. Lee is a native of Hong Kong, and had been in the United 
States for about ten years. He held a master's degree in electrical 
engineering. He is about five feet seven inches tall, with a slight 
build and glasses. While working for a rival electronics company, Lee 
received a standing job offer from Tsou. Becoming disenchanted with 
his job, Lee joined NICC in 1980. He worked on one of Tsou's low-end MS 
enhancements, which was released in 1983, just as the 1221 project was 
being formed, and he was put in charge of the operating system. 
The other manager in the 1221 project was J.P. Chin. Chin is 
also from Hong Kong, and he holds a bachelor's degree in applied math 
from a Taiwanese university. He also holds a master's degree in 
computer science from Ball State University. Chin is about five feet. 
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five inches tall, wears glasses, and is very slight. He joined NICC in 
1978, going to work for Tsou. Given Chin's interests in the 
applications of microprocessors to telecommunication, he was placed in 
charge of the "CRT Phone", which was somewhat separate from the main 
1221 project, but used the same hardware and operating system. 
Early Politics 
One of the first things a software development group needs for 
its work is a development system, i.e., a computer on which to write and 
test code. The 1221 organization had a difficult time getting a 
development system. 
The fastest way for it to get a system was to use an existing MS 
machine. But Larry Rosen, the manager of the MS group, and until 
recently Tsou's boss, was angry over Tsou's leaving, and taking good MS 
people with him, for the 1221 project. Another good system for the 1221 
was the new NICC PC [Professional Computer], since the chip on the PC 
was very similar to the chip on the 1221. But Ray Culp, the manager of 
the PC group, didn't like the 1221 project's being split off from the 
rest of the company, and particularly from his group, since it might 
have been logical to put both microprocessor-based products together 
under his purview. It was widely rumored that both men forced design 
changes in the early stages of the 1221's development, changes which did 
nothing but make things more difficult for the 1221 engineers. The 
upshot was that the latter made extensive design changes. Jack Nelke, a 
young engineer working on the Pile Management System, talked about the 
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effects: 
This created a lot of frustration among the engineers. They 
shouldn't be exposed to the politics. Managers should 
handle the politics. I'll give you some examples. We 
thought we could use the PC for development work, because of 
the similarity in chips. Ray Culp vetoed the idea. I've 
heard that Fred Smith chose not to override Culp. 
When the hardware finally got straightened out, Bob Erlich 
was chosen as our liason. But he was not a supporter of the 
1221, so our hardware support has been poor. Larry Rosen, 
my former boss at MS, was so angry about our leaving his 
group that he forced us to physically move off our old floor 
before we wanted to. This was very unsettling for us. 
In those days, when I identified myself as working for the 
1221, it really turned people off. 
These data suggest that encounter, the organization's (now an actual 
development team, with some engineers in it) coming into contact with 
other interest groups in the company, does not end with the decision 
phase of strategy formulation, but continues well into the actual 
execution of the strategy. 
The project team finally did get a MS and an OAS for development 
work. Miles also arranged for the project to be a beta test site for a 
new development tool being brought out by Tektronix. Since all these 
machines had different characteristics, many conversion utilities needed 
to be written and used. Sometimes a given engineer would have to go 
through all three machines in order to write and test code. The 
Tektronix was in itself a complicating factor. "We started our 
development on the Tektronix," Nelke said. "We feel that this was a 
fundamental error on Jim's part. It's a really bad development 
system." These sentiments were echoed throughout the project's staff. 
After a while, Tsou helped the situation a great deal by 
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persuading Culp to allocate some PCs to the 1221 project. Most of the 
engineers got one, although it took several months in some cases. Most 
of the engineers who got a PC spoke highly of them. But one problem 
that persisted throughout the project was the scarcity of mundane 
materials, especially floppy disks. No one knew quite why these basic 
but necessary items were so scarce, but the rumor which circulated was 
that Tsou was determined to not only develop this machine in record 
time, but also at minimum cost. Tsou may have done this for reasons of 
political "impression management." 
Equally unclear was why Tsou refused to spend money on more 
powerful development tools. Rudolph Kaiser was the system architect. 
He joined the project in mid-autumn, 1983, after Miles had initially 
performed the architect's role. Kaiser was charged with developing 
variations on the theme of the 1221. He felt, perhaps more so than 
others on the project, that the development tools were poor. He urged 
Tsou and Miles to spend about $200,000 on a really good system. "After 
all," he said, "this product is supposed to make millions for the 
company." Tsou's response was that, for political reasons, only NICC 
equipment and the Tektronix could be used. Tsou, with his penchant for 
"subtlety and encirclement", may have felt that using non-NICC equipment 
may have been too provocative, a "frontal assault" on his peers in the 
MS, OAS, and PC groups. He may have felt that neutralization of this 
potentially hostile interest group may have been worth the 
inconvenience, to his engineers, of poor development systems. 
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The Early Stages 
In March, 1983 work began on designing the 1221. Barbara 
Campbell, from the marketing staff, was contracted to do some market 
research, based on the initial functionality and price specifications. 
Her study of the 1221 convinced her that this was the best word 
processing editor ever. Her report was sent to Fred Riley, which 
increased the visibility of the 1221 project. But not everyone agreed 
that Erhardt's design was the proper approach. Jim Miles had 
reservations about it. He said later, "Hans took the wrong turn with WP 
from the beginning. His approach was not on the mark. Hans's WP is a 
scientific achievement, but it is not a desk top system. I don't think 
it was made clear to the programmers in WP just what the parameters 
were. People were told, 'Come up with these functions.' And they did. 
But no one made it clear to them that they only had 128K to do it in. I 
knew in May, from the design, that they couldn't cut back. I knew they 
needed a different design, one that would allow cutting later. But I 
kept getting assured that the size goals would be met." Miles felt that 
Tsou was determined to prove to others in the company that Erhardt could 
be trained to become an effective manager, from a commercial standpoint, 
despite his esoteric technical background and unsuccessful recent track 
record. 
In May, Tsou and his superiors decided that compatibility among 
all NICC word processors was a critical variable in NICC's marketing 
strategy. Monica Long in the OAS group was developing a new editor 
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called the V4, which was considered to be the NICC standard. Hans 
Erhardt and Long began negotiating over the features of their respective 
editors; Erhardt had the technically superior product, but Long had the 
standard for the company. These negotiations proceeded for several months. 
The Business Plan 
The month of June brought an important element--the Business 
Plan. The author was marketing staffer John Steffano. Steffano is an 
interesting character. He holds three degrees, and "none have anything 
to do with computer science," he said. Steffano joined NICC in 1979, 
doing systems analysis and consulting for an end-user organization that 
used NICC products. He joined Product Marketing in 1980. During the 
1221 project he worked for the Standalone Office Products sub-subgroup 
of the Office Systems Marketing subgroup. Here is how he described his 
role: 
I'm responsible for all that the 1221 is from a product 
standpoint--its functionality, its interface, and things 
like that. I tie the whole thing together. • . . Largely, 
my task over the past many months has been one of 
definition, consolidation, and just what is the 1221 and 
what's it going to do. 
Steffano related that writing the plan had been extremely time 
consuming and burdensome. Steffano had been working on it since January 
or February. He described the process: 
The approach that I took was there is not a NICC format for 
a business plan. There is not a NICC document that says, 
"This is what a business plan should be, how long it is, 
etc., etc." Earlier on, the largest business plan that I 
think that I had ever seen was out NICC PC business plan, 
which was in the 50s in terms of page length. I wanted to 
do one about 10 or 20 pages. In fact, the first draft was 
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something like that. My director • . . said that's 
definitely not what he wanted. He wanted substantial pages 
and wanted substantial things. So, what I did is I reviewed 
business plans that had been written here and looked at some 
of our competitors' outlines [of business plans] that I got 
a hold of; and we came up with an agreed outline, which was 
four pages long in and of itself, of items that should be 
included in the Business Plan. Everybody agreed on that; 
and, once that was done, it was basically a matter of 
filling in the blanks. Tnere are major sections in there 
that have to do with manufacturing, customer engineering, 
marketing, competitive and financial risks, 
product--hardware, software--development plans, and things 
like that. What I primarily did is I went to each of the 
people who are involved in the program and said, "This is 
what we want. This is the type of information from your 
organization we would like. You are going to be involved in 
it, so please make a contribution." What I did is I 
collected just lots and lots of information and made a 
120-page document. 
Steffano pointed out that the Business Plan was more than a 
straightforward business plan: 
... An interesting thing about business plans is that they 
are perhaps, being charitable, fifty percent business plans; 
and the primary purpose of that document, other than a 
business plan, was to sell the product. The Doctor and 
everybody else [in top management] was committed to it, but 
the rest of the organization was not necessarily. So, one 
of its primary functions in life was to act as a sales 
instrument. . . . You [can] see that in terms of the 
redundancy of certain sections and in phrases repeated and 
emphasis placed on certain issues; but it also appears in 
ways you don't see, like the way the numbers add up. 
Here is another suggestion that the 1221 organization continued to 
maneuver politically after the strategic decision to commit. Here, the 
symbolic weight of a business plan was placed behind the project. It is 
interesting to note that the financial justification for the product was 
formulated after the decision to commit; this goes counter to the usual 
model, where projects are subjected to discounted cash flow analysis and 
the superior ones selected for funding. In this case, the financial 
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analysis is used purely for political justification and image building. 
The rationale for the 1221 was straightforward. The 1221 
Business Plan, dated June 1, 1983, began with the concession that no one 
product can satisfy every need, and that the 1221 was a recognition of 
that. Combined with NICC's leadership in word processing, the Plan 
stated that the 1221 was an effort "to redefine the low-end word 
processing market." 
An extended quotation from the Business Plan would be the best 
way to capture the flavor of the rationale for the 1221: 
The 1221 is a new, low-cost standalone word processor with 
hardware and software optimized for advanced text editing 
operations. Just as the [NICC] Professional Computer has 
been designed for professional office support functions, the 
1221 is intended to satisfy clerical office support. . . . 
The 1221 offers word processing to those who need it without 
the additional cost associated with high-end data processing 
and decision management tools on professional computer 
systems. It performs a better job than traditional 
high-cost standalone systems at one-third the price and 
offers an upwardly-expandable alternative to expensive 
top-of-the-line electronic typewriters. . . . 
Essentially, the 1221 will create a new standard of word 
processing functionality at a breakthrough price. 
Given its price/performance characteristics, the 1221 was 
envisioned by Steffano to be positioned between three distinct product 
markets. It would be below the traditional standalone word processing 
market. It would be above the electronic typewriter marketplace. And 
it would be an alternative, or parallel, to the market held by personal 
computers with word processing functions. 
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Corrolary Issues 
John Steffano recognized that this type of product presented 
distinctive challenges to the company. It would have to be carefully 
positioned vis-a-vis the NICC PC and some OAS products. It would 
require the development of new distribution channels. The advertising 
would have to be different. In fact, most of the product marketing 
would have to be different, since this was a high-volume, "consumer" 
product. For example, the Plan discussed the need for new types of 
service arrangements for the 1221 compared to the more expensive NICC 
systems. The base technology of the 1221, the Intel 80186 
microprocessor, was a new chip, and supply was dependent upon 
Intel. Also, manufacturing had to be done differently; the design had 
to be simple and durable, able to withstand the rigors of high-volume 
production. Steffano addressed all of these issues in thorough and 
exhausting detail. 
Summary of the business plan 
The Business Plan for the 1221 demonstrates that the idea for 
the product was painstakingly developed. A market niche opportunity was 
identified, and a product, making use of what were seen as NICC's 
distinctive competencies and competitive advantages, was proposed to 
fill that niche. The Plan had estimates for costs, prices, projected 
sales, actions by competitors, and important marketing and manufacturing 
issues. 
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More Marketing Actions 
At just about the time of the Business Plan's release, Rich 
Findlay joined the company. He was a product manager, and he became 
John Steffano's boss. Findlay had a bachelor's degree in English 
literature, and had developed himself as a marketing specialist through 
on-the-job experience at various companies. Immediately before coming 
to NICC, Findlay worked for the Apex Business Machines company, doing 
product planning for their low-end word processors. He also had some 
experience marketing typewriters. "I was recruited here," he said, 
"because they were getting into low-end products." Findlay was also 
hired because of his experience with distribution systems: "[At Apex] we 
were very big into the dealer organization—dealer marketing. That was 
Apex's, and still is, their strong point." 
Findlay said that "the problem when I started here [was that] 
nobody wanted to sell [the 1221]." He corroborated Steffano's view of 
the the Business Plan: 
When I came on board we were in the process of issuing the 
first Business Plan, which was a combination business plan 
and almost a sell-the-product type of document. The first 
thing I got tasked with was trying to work the distribution 
issues--who would be willing to sell this, who would want to 
sell it, what would we have to do to get it sold through 
different channels. 
Shortly after the release of the Plan, the 1221 project, through 
Findlay, established an interface to the Indirect Sales Organization 
(ISO): 
[So the next thing I did was] trying to establish an 
interface within the ISO group. That's the NICC group that 
handles dealers. ... It's not just dealers; it's systems 
houses and OEM distributors all rolled into one. This 
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product itself is a dealer product because of the price and 
where it's going. ... With this kind of product ... you 
have to have everything lined up before it. You don't do 
consumer products as a "let's build it and then sell it." 
It should be a flow. The product starts as an idea. It 
goes through R & D. At the same point, people are getting 
distribution channels and sales channels ready for the 
product to be primed. It's introduced, and it's pushed 
right into those channels. You don't have a big window. 
You want to sell a lot of products. You've got to be there 
very quickly and maintain a steady volume in sales over the 
relatively brief life of the product. 
This marketing philosophy complicated the political problem for the 1221 
coalition, because it meant that the latter would have more encounters 
with other coaliltions and entities within the company. 
Software Development Continues 
Alfred Tsou had decided earlier in the project that certain 
"milestones" would be established in its schedule. The first milestone 
was scheduled for sometime in June of 1983. Tsou called it "Demo I," 
since it was intended not only as a scheduling objective for the 
software group, but also as an opportunity to demonstrate progress to 
others in the company. Demo I did not occur; the product was simply not 
developed enough. 
In late June and early July, it became clear that Hans Erhardt 
and Monica Long would not resolve the editor issue. So Tsou stepped in 
and resolved it--he decided on Long's version, requiring that the 1221 
programmers write word processing code that would run adequately on OAS 
and MS systems. This decision was not popular with Erhardt. Later in 
July, upper management mandated that the 1221 word processing software 
must have compatible data structures with the OAS V4 editor being 
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developed by Monica Long's group. This was a more exacting standard 
than the one specified in Tsou's earlier decision. Erhardt felt that 
this would use too much memory space, but he was overruled. 
In August, Tsou personally began to work with the Marketing and 
Sales organizations at NICC. This month also marked the arrival of Sam 
Fratelli, who was put in charge of a small subgroup that was to develop 
software to handle the processing of forms. Fratelli was different from 
the other managers. They had all been with the company for a time as 
engineers before coming to the 1221; some got promoted when they joined 
the project, like Lee and Chin, others had been managers at NICC 
previously, like Miles and Erhardt. Fratelli was the only one hired 
directly into a management position from the outside. Fratelli was from 
New Jersey, and had a master's degree in computer science from the 
Stevens Institute of Technology to go with his bachelor's degree in 
computer science from the New Jersey Institute of Technology. 
Fratelli was put in charge of developing a small group which 
would write a specialized software application--the forms package. This 
software would enable a secretary to define the fields for an often-used 
form, enter the data into the appropriate fields, and print the form 
out. Fratelli claimed that Tsou told him that this package was needed 
to overcome the need, on the part of secretaries, for keeping 
typewriters on their desks: 
It seems that when we sell office automation equipment, the 
secretaries still refuse to give up their 
typewriters. . . . Even here at NICC, nnxt to the 
wordprocessing terminal, the secretary has an IBM Selectric 
typewriter. The primary reason, I'm told, is that the 
secretaries need a typewriter to fill in forms--preprinted 
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forms, doing labels, things like that. So, we*re trying to 
automate that on the 1221. ... The thing we*re trying to 
do is to justify the replacement of the typewriter. Don’t 
give in to the excuse that they need the typewriter to fill 
out forms. And it needs only to be as good as how it would 
be done manually, you see. Because it only has to be as 
good as the way you perform it. 
On the organization chart, Fratelli's group fit in on the applications 
side, along with Erhardt's and Chin's groups. (See Figure 5 for the 
1221 organization's chart for this approximate period.) 
. In late September, the 1221 project finally held Demo I. The 
managers demonstrated the hardware and the operating system (OS) to 
people from Product Marketing. The results were modest, but everyone, 
especially Tsou, was pleased. The project was only a week or two behind 
the revised schedule. 
A Change in Leadership for the 1221 Project 
Early October, 1983, brought a big surprise. Alfred Tsou, who 
until a few months earlier had only managed small or medium-sized 
staffs, was promoted to director of the OAS division. He went from 
managing the 30-person 1221 project to managing it plus one of the 
company's three product family divisions. This appointment was not 
really a "natural" one. Tsou's experience had been in the MS group, and 
specifically in low-end terminals. The 1221 group was another low-end 
group. The OAS division had always been NICC's premier division. But 
it had fallen on hard times. Tsou viewed the turnaround of OAS as a 
difficult challenge. "What do you do with a division" he asked, "when 
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charter? The MS and Standalone groups have both developed, or are 
developing, products that OAS should have developed, but didn’t. What 
do I do with OAS now?” 
This announcement came about three weeks before the scheduled 
time for Demo II, which would be when the word processing editor would 
be demonstrated. Tsou temporarily decided to try to run both OAS and 
1221 simultaneously, with Jim Miles as his day-to-day manager in the 
1221 organization. 
Demo II did not occur until November 4, about two weeks later 
than scheduled. In the weeks between Tsou's promotion and Demo II, the 
word processing (WP) group worked feverishly to try to finish enough of 
their code to make a good demonstration. Tsou, Miles, and Erhardt 
decided that functionality, and not code size, would be the target for 
Demo II. One of the specifications for the 1221 was that it would have 
a core memory size of 128 kilobytes (128K). However, for development 
purposes a prototype with 512K was being used, in order to avoid 
problems with achievement of functionality. Mary Becker described what 
was going on: 
Right now, we're really concentrating on getting the thing 
implemented--getting the functionality up to, you know, what 
we said it was; and then we're going to have to really see 
what we can do about squeezing it into the memory. ... 
[Both the user interface and] the formatter . . . are really 
too large to fit into the memory that we've allocated to 
ourselves. So we have some problems with that. 
Complicating the code-writing process for the programmers was 
that Tsou had decided early on to use a high-level language, C , for 
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all the code. Computers operate by tiny switches being opened and 
closed by electrical impulses. One of the engineers said that the 
instructions on which switches to open or close could be placed on 
either software--programs stored on magnetic devices like tape or 
disks--or hardware--the silicon chips used to make computers. "There's 
always a tradeoff as to' how much you should 'hard wire' and how much 
should be software," he said. "Whatever you can put on software, you 
could also put on hardware. The problem is that you would be tied to 
whatever that machine had on its chips." It is easy to visualize the 
limitations of having all the computer's instructions etched into the 
machine's silicon. But there are levels of software, also, and they 
vary in their flexibility. At the lowest level is the microcode, which 
is almost embedded in the wiring. This is code which actually causes 
the hardware to do certain things. At the next level is assembly 
language, which is basic code that gets translated into microcode, 
causing the computer to perform certain operations. Both microcode and 
assembler are specific to given microprocessors. Next, and last, come 
"high-level languages," which resemble English. These languages are 
translated internally into assembly language, which in turn gets 
translated into microcode, which causes the computer's electronic 
switches to perform. Upper-level languages are the easiest to use, but 
they offer an even greater advantage--they are "portable." Microcode 
and assembler are tied directly to the hardware, the microprocessor, of 
a computer system. But upper-level languages are universal. A program 
written in BASIC, a very popular upper-level language, can be used on 
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any co«puter which supports the -ASIC language, regardless cf its 
hardware. This could he inpcrhant ir the fas :-ci*r£iri werid cf 
co«puters. As Tsou put it, "Tcu irest write transportable cede, ir h i g f 
level languages. This is because hardware car he chsclete ir rwc 
years. But this tas.es up ncre space tear assembly language." Therein 
lay the problem for the programmers. The C language was chcser b-ecause 
it was ere of the nest "structured" cf the high-level larguages. i.e., 
it ercouraged coders to rase nininun use cf memory» But it still used 
nore space thar assenbler. 
C also preserted a prcbler distinct frer other high-level 
languages. It hac to do with hew the disc operating syster went alert 
storing and retrieving inferratien, specificslly, with how it stored 
location races for data. Inferratien is stored in thin magnetic disks. 
usually called "floppy disks" because they are acre flexible than the 
netal disks used for large rainfrare cerprters. Although this storage 
is ”transparent" to the user, the engineers who design, the reoharisra 
for actually Moving the infcreation free the core rerory, through the 
disk drives, and onto the surface of the disk, have cany decisions to 
cake. One decision is where to place the inferratien, and a related 
decision is how to let the syster "know" where particular inferratien is 
being stored. This is done by using "location nares,” which are 
literally the nates given to physical space on a disk’s surface. There 
are two ways this can be done in the C language--"large rede" and "srall 
■ode." In large node, location cites are handled entirely by the 
applications prograr (like word processing'1, with no need to use the 
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operating system. In small mode, location names are processed by both 
the applications program and the operating system. The 1221 WP group 
was writing in small mode, and the OS group was writing in large mode. 
Each group had an interest in writing its code in its chosen way. By 
writing in large mode, the operating system's overall code size would be 
smaller, since part of the location name processing would be done by the 
applications programs. The word processing group wanted to use small 
mode, since its code would be smaller if the operating system bore the 
full burden of processing location names. Neither group was aware of 
the difference before Demo II. 
Demo II 
When the demo date finally arrived, it did not go well. Miles 
and Erhardt from the 1221 project, Findlay, Steffano, Barbara Campbell 
and two others from Product Marketing congregated in the 1221 lab. "The 
groups didn't come in because it's too crowded," Miles said. "They've 
seen it." Erhardt began to "run the board." "It's a formality," Miles 
added. Even though the demo was late, the project staff still hadn't 
gotten all the functions implemented. Steffano began to field questions 
from his marketing colleagues: "I'd like to know about the movement of 
the cursor," one person asked. "How do you find it if it's lost on the 
screen?" Someone else asked who should be utilized to test--should it 
be NICC operators? "Wouldn't it be better to use people not familiar?" 
someone else offered. In the meantime, Erhardt was pecking away at the 
keyboard. Steffano said that the purpose of this demo was to make the 
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marketing people feel comfortable, to show the changes since the last 
demo, and to identify problems (although not necessarily to resolve 
them). 
Miles mentioned that the 1221 had all the functions expected to 
date, but that it hadn't been debugged. "There were still glitches as 
of this morning," he said. The only functions it had at this demo were 
create document and edit text; both had to be rewritten in the near 
future. Miles said, "Engineers like to talk about all the bits and 
bytes changed, and the marketing people just want to know what it can 
do." The functions seemed to be there, but they kept cancelling. Every 
time Erhardt hit a wrong key, the entire system would "go down." Mary 
Becker came in to see what was wrong; she and Erhardt moved away from 
the marketing group to a new board. They were joined over the next ten 
minutes by three other members of the WP group. Erhardt never got it to 
work. His four group members looked frustrated, disappointed, and 
demoralized. The meeting ended with a discussion among the marketing 
people about who should be used to test the machine. 
Later, Mary Becker talked about what had happened at the demo: 
It was really sort of a disaster. We had the functions that 
we were supposed to demonstrate pretty well working last 
week, you know. We really weren't very rushed towards the 
end at all. We kind of had things; but we did . • . but 
there were a few bugs. We thought, "Well, the more bugs 
that we can clear up before the demo, the better off we'll 
be." It was really working, basically, pretty well. We 
could do the basic things without messing up. Just the 
morning of the demo, we had one last build--we call it a 
"build", where we compile all the programs, we put it all 
together. ... We had one last one [that] morning to 
compile the discs for the demo. We did that, and it all 
appeared to go smoothly. We gave the disks to Hans to go to 
the demo, and so on. Then, apparently, during the demo, 
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things were just really going screwy; and there were all 
kinds of bugs that--it appeared that there were all kinds of 
bugs that we didn't even think we had. People didn't seem 
to be that upset. I don't know. I couldn't figure out why 
it wasn't a disaster, you know. I thought the roof would 
fall in or something. But, you know, from my point of view, 
it was a real disaster. But, the marketing people were kind 
of smiling and all looking at the thing. And when it blew 
up, they didn't seem to mind. They said, "Well, you have a 
bug." But, we had thousands of bugs in that. 
Anyway, it turned out later that something had gone wrong 
during this build process. We had gotten some of the wrong 
modules and with the wrong ... well, you know, it was a 
much worse demonstration than it should have been. You see, 
one of our things with our hardware is we can have • • .we 
can run programs in small mode C or large mode C. Actually, 
we run our programs in small mode on the PC for debugging 
because it's much easier to debug in small mode. Then, when 
we go to the 1221, we have to run a large mode because the 
OS doesn't support small mode. So, we have these two groups 
of modules, and one should not combine them on the same 
disk, and try to run some small and some large, which is 
what happened in the last build. ... Yesterday, we had 
another demo. This was just for some tech writers that 
happened to be around. We had the demo again for them, and 
it was much better. • . . 
A few days after Demo II, Tsou held his weekly meeting with the 
1221 managers. His staff meetings frequently turned into monologues by 
him. This November 9th meeting was no exception. The memory 
constraints were on his mind as he addressed his subordinates. "The 
1221's objectives may not be reachable," he began. "The memory size may 
be too limited at 128K. But our competitors all have good machines at 
128K. I want to challenge you. Are we not as good as our competitors' 
engineers?" There was dead silence from the managers. Tsou continued. 
"Are the people working on the 1221 truly committed to cost efficiency 
in programming? Tell your software engineers not to do things for their 
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own convenience, but to take the painful steps necessary to compress the 
program. The big systems, high end people are convinced that what the 
1221 is trying to do is impossible. This makes me even more determined 
to meet the 1221's objectives. 
"I'm going to challenge you," he continued, "at the risk of 
insulting you. Where is our technical excellence? Our competitors have 
had products out for two years. Why can't we? Let's achieve the same 
level--or better. We've got to cut costs, which means count bytes. I 
will not accept that we are not as good. Where is your professional 
pride? You've got to give me no less than any other competitor has or 
you're out." 
"But we're working under extreme limits," Hans Erhardt said. 
"I expect you to create innovative solutions," Tsou retorted. 
"We have not done our best. If we can't beat them we might as well drop 
the project." 
Re-Thinking the Product 
On November 15, 1983, John Steffano called a meeting between 
him, Miles, Erhardt, and Fratelli. The memo Steffano circulated said 
The purpose of the meeting is to identify the product focus, 
from a development perspective, of the 1221 product family 
in general and the 1221 128K base unit in particular. Time 
permitting, we will investigate the growth path to the 
larger versions of the 1221 family. 
This was a coded way of saying that he was concerned about the problems 
in the overuse of memory. The managers did not tell Alfred Tsou about 
this meeting 
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The group began by forming a matrix of product configurations 
(128K system with one disk drive, two disk drives, and hard disk; 512K 
system with one disk drive, two disk drives, and hard disk) by market 
type (personal computers with word processing, high end word processing, 
offices seeking to replace electronic typewriters, and offices seeking 
to add electronic typewriters). Then they filled in the cells of the 
matrix with percentages representing how they felt each configuration 
















PC with WP 10 25 40 30 40 40 
High end WP -- — — 30 40 50 
ET repl 70 45 30 20 15 10 
ET addon 20 30 30 20 5 — 
Figure 6. The price/market matrix developed by the 1221 managers 
The four men sat around a conference table looking at the matrix 
when Tom Findlay entered. Steffano briefed him quickly. Findlay agreed 
with the four-segment breakdown. Then he addressed the engineers. 
"This should be a NICCwriter that we can sell. This matrix seems to be 
on the right track. The Direct Sales Organization will sell the 512K 
with hard disk, and will combine the 128K system with other office 
products." 
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"You want NICCwriter functionality with V4 document structure?" 
Erhardt asked, with a note of incredulity in his voice. 
"Yes," Findlay replied. 
"There will be problems with indexing," Erhardt said. 
"Leave out what we don't need," Findlay said. "Just put in 
'hooks.'" 
"We won't have compatibility," Erhardt argued. 
"I think what Hans is saying," Steffano interjected, "is that 
there's too much overhead." 
"Exactly," said Erhardt. 
"Unfortunately, that's the way it has to be," replied Findlay. 
"There's no problem with leaving some of the code on the disk. I want 
the 128K to be full-functioned word processing . . . 
"With the V4 document structure?" asked Erhardt, 
sarcastically. 
"Yes," replied Findlay. "But understand, word processing. We 
have no choice with the V4 document structure. 
"Remember," Findlay continued, "this is low end marketing. 
These people have never been able to buy NICC products before. Now, the 
512K machine is a totally different machine, aimed at a different 
market." 
"Our numbers show that, too," Fratelli interjected. 
"The numbers look OK," Findlay said, looking at the matrix on 
the marker board. "In the first year, eighty percent of the 1221s will 
go out with dual disks. One hundred percent will be 128K." The group 
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then spent about a half hour going over various functions that were 
either necessary or could be dropped for the 128K version. 
The Climax of the First Memory Problem 
Two days later Tsou, Miles, Ray Culp (manager of the PC group) 
and Fred Riley met. They decided that the NICC PC and the 1221 should 
have different hardware and software. This increased the distinction 
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between the two products, lowering the chance for one's eating into the 
other's market. They also decided that NICC would produce an electronic 
typewriter, and that Tsou would have the responsibility for that 
development effort. 
On November 21, the group managers met, without Tsou. They 
openly questioned the direction of the project. They expressed concern 
about whether or not they could accomplish what they wanted with the 
memory constraint. They were joined by Steffano. The discussion turned 
to what the 1221 was supposed to do. The group examined the list of 
functions, and they discussed the performance problems (the 1221 ran the 
code very slowly). Steffano said that he needed background print or 
"it's not a product." (Background print is when the printer is typing 
out a document while the user is editing at the terminal. This is a 
specific example of "multitasking," i.e., doing more than one task at a 
time.) Erhardt responded by saying that there were problems with the 
memory. Steffano said that he wanted all the functions, but Erhardt's 
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solution was again to add memory. The group decided to work on the 
problem, come up with a solution, and then take it to Alfred Tsou. 
Two days later Jim Miles and Emery Lee were having a 
conversation in the 1221 lab. They were discussing some problem with 
another group when Miles suddenly told Lee that there was an eighty 
percent chance that the operating system will go onto a PROM. Lee 
expressed surprise. "There are three options for solving this memory 
problem," Miles said. "One would be for Alfred to get upper management 
to drop the requirement for V4 compatibility, but that seems unlikely. 
The second would be to put in a special set of RAM [Random Access 
Memory], but that would be very expensive. The third option is to put 
the operating system onto a PROM. [PROM stands for "Programmable Read 
Only Memory"; this means that the code is stored on a silicon chip, not 
a floppy disk, and that it can only be "read" by the system, i.e., the 
user can not "write" information on the chip. Writing can only be done 
by service technicians.] 
"This will cost about $10, and will raise the price by about 
$50," he continued. "It will also put us over certain functionality 
limits. This PROM would be the cheapest way to get core memory into the 
box, and it would allow Hans to put in a better editor.” The idea did 
have some disadvantages. The major one was the potential for a 
servicing disaster. "If we make a mistake in the OS," Miles explained, 
"and the error is on a floppy disk, all we have to do to straighten it 
out is send all our customers an updated floppy. But," he continued, 
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"if the error is on a PROM chip, we have to send a service person to 
each purchaser, and to each dealer, to install a new chip. That's 
obviously a lot riskier and more expensive." 
One week later, November 30, the managers felt confident enough 
about their solution to bring it up to Tsou in the weekly staff 
meeting. After some sharp questioning and expressions of skepticism, 
Tsou accepted the PROM solution, although wihout much enthusiasm. He 
admonished the managers for "not doing their jobs," while he had done 
his job of paving the way politically for the 1221. He ended by telling 
them that success was crucial, and that there were "some senior VPs who 
would love to see you fail." 
Later that day, the company formally announced that it would 
build an electronic typewriter. Observers predicted that the 1221 
department would be working on it by January 1st. 
A Promotion for Miles 
On December 1st, Tsou and Miles discussed the formal elevation 
of Miles to the position of manager of the 1221 project, still reporting 
to Tsou. Tsou had not been able to devote himself to the 1221 
organization as much as was needed, so he decided that someone had to be 
formally elevated to department manager. Miles, who had been acting 
department manager ever since Tsou's promotion to head the OAS division, 
expressed a desire for this legitimizing move, but said that he was 
concerned that Tsou use the proper rationale in explaining the 
promotion. "I don't want people to perceive me as your 'favorite son,'" 
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he said. 
The next day, Tsou made the formal announcement at the weekly 
technical staff meeting. His rationale was that Miles was the most 
hard-nosed and aggressive of the managers and thus was the best 
qualified to hold the position. Later that day, Miles related that this 
would relieve his frustration of not being able to control important 
aspects of the 1221'8 development. But he also said that this move 
increased his feelings of basic displeasure with the Job. "I miss the 
nuts and bolts work in the lab," he admitted. The move also raised his 
anxiety about the project, he said. "The formal title makes me more 
personally responsible now." At the same meeting, Tsou announced 
another change. Sam Fratelli took over responsibility for all printing 
function8--background print, typewriter emulation, and the forms mode 
that he already had. Hans Erhardt retained responsibility for the 
electronic aspects of word processing--the editor, the formatter, the 
screen manager, and the document manager. This move was widely 
interpreted as a reprimand for Hans Erhardt. (See Figure 7 for the 
revised organization chart.) 
Suicide Missions 
Later that afternoon, Miles interviewed a college student who 
wanted to get a co-op Job with the 1221 project. "What I like about 
co-op jobs," said the student, "is that we learn what the real world is 
like." 
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We like to think we're a little different. We are people oriented. We 
are aggressive. A lot of people think we do suicide missions, but the 
accomplishments are great." 
A few days later Miles talked about that statement. "I jlo feel 
a certain pride at being associated with a 'suicide mission,'" he 
admitted. "There are two kinds of engineers--those who are 
professional, and those who see it as a job. Those who see it as a job 
.will not attempt difficult projects. The pros will. Seventy percent of 
the engineers at NICC see it as a job. This pisses me off because it 
means that I have to spend a lot of time persuading that seventy percent 
that a difficult project is worth doing. 
"When the 1221 began," he continued, "there were some people in 
the project who acted like it was just a job. But I see less of that 
now, because people are seeing the 1221 happen. They believe that it 
will be done." So even within the core of the 1221 organization, the 
software engineers themselves, the job of persuasion, of gaining 
commitment, had not ended with the decision to proceed with the 
strategy. 
The schedule of demos bore out Miles's "suicide" notion. Demo 
II had occurred in early November. Since then there had been serious 
problems with functionality, performance and memory usage. Yet Tsou 
held to his target of December 16th for Demo III until almost the last 
minute, when he changed it to December 30th. 
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Preparing for Demo III 
On December 14th, he held a meeting with his managers. nSam," 
he asked, "when will the printing functions be ready?" 
"December 30th," replied Fratelli. 
"Sam's testing them now," interjected Miles. 
"I don't want this to be last minute," Tsou stated, "and have it 
croak in front of these people. What hiccups are there towards Demo 
III?" Miles and Fratelli answered that there were problems with the 
NICC Professional Computers being used for the software development 
itself, and problems with spare parts for the prototype 1221 circuit 
boards. Tsou and Miles agreed that Bob Erlich [Miles's hardware 
counterpart] was being antagonistic toward the 1221 project. "Bob says 
he's not," Miles related, "but that the board we're using is a piece of 
shit, and he wants to clean it up before it goes to manufacturing." 
"He has spare resources to clean up the board," Tsou asserted. 
"He has people sitting around down there. Jim, I want you to push for 
spare parts and a clean board. We have to go that one last step, Demo 
III, to convince the other 25,000 people at NICC." 
A few minutes later, Miles asked Tsou, "Is the 1221 going to be 
the industry standard 32-bit operating system?" 
"I'm not afraid of that," Tsou shot back. "We can do it. I am 
going head on with IBM. I don't want to beat around the bush about it. 
I want people to recognize our software as being so superior that people 
will use it on IBM machines. And when the IBM PC wears out or breaks, I 
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want people to think about buying a NICC as a replacement. And our 
products will all be compatible. IBM will never have that. That's 
where we will beat them!" 
On December 16th, Tsou held another meeting with his managers, 
this one to iron out technical problems. But the conversation quickly 
turned toward a pressing administrative issue—getting cooperation from 
% 
hardware on providing prototype circuit boards. Tsou asked Miles and 
Steffano to "beat up" on hardware, if necessary, in order to get the 
boards. Tsou also asked Steffano to get him the Winchester hard disks 
from Jim Bunning, the hardware manager. 
"How many do you need," Steffano asked, "of the fifty that 
you're supposed to get?" 
"Say 'all,'" Fratelli advised, "and we'll take what we can 
get." 
"I don't want you to make that kind of request," Tsou said 
sternly. "It destroys our credibility. Figure out what you really 
need. Now, are there any other problems regarding Demo III?" (Tsou was 
still thinking about managing the image of the 1221 development team 
with the rest of NICC.) 
Miles offered his opinion that the 1221 organization could not 
meet the December 30th deadline for Demo III. "I just don't think 
there's enough hardware to let us do all the necessary integration in 
time," he said. 
Tsou stared at Miles. "Is that the only reason?" he asked. 
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"Or night we not not make it on our own?" 
"If we had the hardware," Hiles asserted, "we would make it." 
With that, Tsou went right to a phone which was in the 
conference room. He called Jim Bunning. Bunning was not in, so Tsou 
left a specific message about the lack of boards in the software 
development group. "Tell Bunning I'm yelling at him," Tsou told the 
secretary, "and tell him to call me as soon as he comes in." 
Tsou looked at his managers. "I can’t overemphasize the 
importance of a good demo," he said. "Six years of rehearsal can be 
blown in fifty minutes on stage." 
Demo III 
Things did take longer than Miles thought. The integration of 
the entire system simply could not be done in the small amount of time 
allotted. But by mid-January, things finally fell into place. Demo III 
was done during the week of January 16th, 1984. So many people had the 
1221 demonstrated to them, that it took several days. One of the groups 
even included Dr. Smith and Fred Riley. It really had a "show biz" 
atmosphere. The demo was held in a local hotel's conference center. 
John Steffano stood on a stage, with one marketing staffer to his left 
and one 1221 software engineer to his right, each with a working 1221 
prototype. He would talk about a function, then walk over to one of the 
operators, who would then demonstrate the function. Steffano alternated 
between the two operators in this way until all functions had been 
demonstrated. This demo, in contrast to Demo II, was a huge success. 
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Moving Towards Alpha I 
NICC has a graduated system for releasing its products to end 
users. The first step is the Alpha Release. Next comes Beta Release. 
And last comes First Customer Ship (FCS). 
Alpha releases consist of NICC's allowing the product to be used 
by some of its own clerical and secretarial workers. The idea is to 
test the product for bugs in a relatively risk-free environment. If 
major problems are found, the only people who know about it are inside 
the company. No customers are alienated. There may be several alpha 
releases before the next step is taken. 
Beta releases are the first time the product is used outside the 
company. It is lent to trusted customers, who give the company feedback 
on the product's performance. After the bugs have been worked out in 
alpha and beta releases, the product is produced in quantity and shipped 
to paying customers--FCS. After Demo III, the 1221 organization was 
aiming for Alpha I. 
Starting on January 16th, the engineers engaged in extensive 
debugging and rewriting of code to prepare for Alpha I. They also 
continued to try to integrate the code being written by the various 
subgroups. The objectives for Alpha I were: to improve the 
functionality achieved for Demo III, or at least to maintain it at that 
level; to reduce the amount of core memory used in the total system 
(operating system plus word processing) to 128 kilobytes; and to have 
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good performance, i.e., do all of this at a fast speed. Early on, these 
processes went along at a difficult, but not frenetic, pace. As the 
projected release date, March 14th, approached, the pace became brutal. 
The last two weeks before Alpha I were eighty- or ninety-hour weeks for 
most of the engineers and managers. And still, they missed the March 
14th date. 
. Alpha I 
The person in charge of the Alpha I integration of code was Tom 
Dickinson. Dickinson was a veteran computer engineer. He had joined 
NICC just recently, during the summer of 1983, having spent about twelve 
years at Honeywell. Whenever he was asked about the fast pace at NICC, 
Dickinson would point out that at Honeywell they used to take their time 
on product development. "We'd have great products," he said, "but 
they'd get to the market too late for anyone to want them." Yet he felt 
that perhaps the pace on the 1221 project was a little too fast. "There 
must be a golden mean somewhere," he mused. 
Dickinson worked under Emery Lee in the OS group. He was a very 
measured and methodical person. He had noticed after Demo II that there 
was no formal mechanism for doing the integration "build" of the entire 
system's disk. So he devised a mechanical system for doing that. 
First, each engineer was responsible for making sure that his or her 
piece of code worked. Then he or she would bring it to Dickinson. He 
put it all together, and gave each subgroup copies of two disks which 
contained all the necessary code. Each engineer was then responsible 
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for making sure that his or her code worked with everyone else's. 
Finally, necessary changes were made. Sam Fratelli added, "And if 
things don't work, people stay until it's finished and working. 
"These bursts of code integration have always coincided with 
milestones, like demos and releases," Fratelli admitted. "People are 
reluctant to integrate more often because they're reluctant to abandon a 
piece of code that's been working for them, even though it might not 
work in conjunction with anything else." He said that he'd like to see 
formal integration occur more often, maybe once a week or once every two 
weeks. 
On March 20th the project members were still working on 
integrating the code for Alpha I. Fratelli said that this release was 
easy compared to the one coming up, Alpha II, on April 4 th. "You see, 
our code is about thirty percent over capacity," he said. "Up until 
now, we've been using machines with 512K, including the ones for this 
release. But the next release must use 128K. It'll be a big job to get 
it to fit." 
Over in the forms group, a final test of the forms package was 
going on. Some sort of bug was affecting the printing of a form. 
Information was printing in the wrong boxes on a form. One of the 
engineers, Roger Johnson, was determined to show that the problem was 
not in the program, but that someone had misused it. He sat down to 
define a form. 
One of the other forms group engineers, Rich Brown, brought his 
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code to Tom Dickinson. "Here's three-quarters of the forms package," he 
told Dickinson as he handed him the disk. "OK," Dickinson responded. 
Miles was there with Narendra Gupta, the engineer in charge of the 
"screen manager," the piece of code which controlled the video display. 
There was a bug in the screen manager. They hurried off to see about 
correcting it. 
The forms group got its package to run, but had a peculiar bug. 
".After we create a form," Brown said, "we have to power down before the 
printer will reset and print the form." Fratelli spent about ten 
minutes trying to find Bill Wright, the engineer who would know why this 
was happening. When he finally found him, Wright told him that they 
needed to insert a command from the file management system. Fratelli 
rushed back to tell Henry Rogers, the person in charge of printer code. 
Rogers said that he'd found another bug. Fratelli sighed, and told him 
to fix it and get the code to Dickinson by three o'clock. 
Mary Becker and her associate Carolyn Holle, in the editor 
group, told Miles that they were still "chasing a bug." He told them to 
keep looking, but to be sure to get everything to Dickinson by three 
o'clock. 
The final integration did not occur until late that evening. 
Alpha I finally happened on March 21st. The entire system was 
integrated, and prototypes were delivered to users at NICC for field 
testing. 
The next day, Dickinson was reflecting on why the release had 
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been a week late. 
Partly it was because of the testing and debugging 
process. People have been coding and debugging in 
isolation. They can get things to work, but only under the 
assumptions they were using when they began coding. For 
example, perhaps they had to make a call to the printer, but 
the printer wasn't ready. So they worked on something else, 
or they made a simulated call. Then, when I put their code 
together with the printer code, the call doesn't go to the 
right place. Or tnaybe their code works in isolation, but 
when someone "hammers" on it, it breaks. 
So the integration-debugging process definitely slows things 
down. But it's not the process itself that was too 
slow. That target date never changed. We kept approaching 
the date without doing the integration, and when we finally 
finished coding, we had little time for integration. I 
haven't really thought it through completely, so I don't 
want to point the finger at anybody. 
Later that day John Steffano was sitting in a patent attorney's 
office, thinking ahead to Alpha II. "Alpha II will be a problem," he 
admitted. "We have functionality problems, we have performance 
problems, and we have code size problems. Putting in all the functions 
we need is hurting the performance and taking up a lot of space. As for 
functionality, what we're working on for Alpha II is the bare minimum, 
except for a couple of things." 
Debugging 
A week after Alpha I, Jack Nelke of the File Management System 
group (FMS) and Bill Wardley of the Operating System group (OS) were 
sitting together in front of a debugger in the lab. There was some sort 
of bug in the interface between the FMS and OS. Wardley was sitting in 
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for Emery Lee, who had to attend a meeting. Nelke and Wardley worked 
for an hour and a half, with no success. After lunch, Lee rejoined 
them. Several problems were found, all in Lee's code. Lee and Nelke 
discussed how best to solve them. "Why don't you just make some 
'patches,'" Lee suggested to Nelke. (Patches are temporary solutions.) 
"I don't want to do that," Nelke responded. "I already have to 
make some patches to FMS for Cary [Whipple, in the telecommunications 
group]. Why don’t you make a new release of the OS and we can fix all 
the problems at once?" Lee seemed reluctant, but he decided to go 
along. 
Any software group will have bugs on the interfaces between its 
various subsystems. The real issue is how the solution of those 
interface bugs is handled. In the 1221 project, for whatever reason, 
those bugs frequently did not surface until all the code was 
integrated. Nelke was trying to avoid such an occurrence when he 
suggested to Lee that the change be made publicly. 
Nelke didn't think that people debugged together because of any 
particular technical or administrative reason, but more as a matter of 
personal preference, particularly if they work well together. "When two 
people debug, one can hold the printout and provide the code's author 
with information. It speeds things up." As for the debugging incident 
described above, it really had nothing to do with a problem with the 
interface between FMS and OS. "Emery didn't test the code after he 
wrote it," Nelke said. "The problems were all internal to his code. I 
just happened to be the first one to call it. 
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"In all fairness," he continued, "this code was written just 
before Alpha I, and no one called the function until now. I guess Emery 
just didn’t have the time to test it. But if he had, it would have 
eliminated this problem." 
The Climax of the Second Memory Problem 
Bill Parris, the engineer in charge of the document manager, had 
been under more pressure than some other engineers because of the 
requirement that the 1221 have a document structure that was compatible 
with that of the OAS V4 group. One day in late March he and Rich Brown 
were discussing the problem when John Steffano happened to walk by. 
"John," said Parris, "I don't care how many Ph.D.s that guy in OAS has, 
this V4 document structure sucks. It's a pig [uses too much code space] 
and it's slow." 
"Why are you beating around the bush?" Steffano asked wryly. 
"Why don't you just tell me what you think?" 
Parris laughed. 
"You know how I feel about it," Steffano continued. "But 
there's nothing we can do about it." Steffano was one of the few people 
in marketing who felt that the requirements were too exacting, given 
what was needed. Little did he know at that moment how drastically 
things would change, and soon. 
On March 28th and 29th a late-season snowstorm deposited over a 
foot of snow on the surrounding area. Before leading for a meeting in 
California, Dr. Smith, having been briefed on the memory, functionality, 
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and performance problems with the 1221, had scheduled a meeting for 
Thursday, the 29th. That meeting had to be cancelled because his flight 
back from the Vest Coast had been delayed. It was rescheduled for 
Monday, April 2nd. 
On Friday, the 30th, most of the area businesses and schools 
were closed; snow removal was proceeding very slowly. Some of the 1221 
engineers came in to work anyway. Jim Miles was snowed in at home. 
Suddenly, his phone rang. It was Steffano. The Doctor felt he simply 
could not wait until Monday to resolve the problems with the 1221. 
Steffano told Miles that he would be around shortly in his 
four-wheel-drive vehicle to pick him up. 
Present at the meeting were Dr. Smith, Fred Riley, Alfred Tsou, 
Jim Miles and John Steffano. Miles admitted that he thought the memory 
problem was insurmountable. Dr. Smith decided that the product was 
worth continuing. He authorized a doubling of the core memory, to 
256K. This added about $100 to the cost, and therefore about $500 to 
the price, of the machine. It also meant that manufacturing operations 
would have to be changed, since the additional memory chips would 
complicate the process. Finally, it meant that the elaborate 
advertising plans which had been made--heavy television and print 
advertising in the fall aimed at generating high Christmas sales--would 
have to be shelved, or at least substantially altered. 
Tsou complicated matters by insisting that, since the customers 
would have to pay for 256K, the multitasking feature be kept in the 
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print a document while also running a spreadsheet, or running the CRT 
Phone application. For the programmers, this meant that the doubling 
decision provided very little relief. They could now implement the word 
processing with relative ease, but fitting that in with a second task 
would be difficult. But Dr. Smith and Tsou relaxed the compatibility 
requirements, eliminating the document structure compatibility. 
Tsou announced shortly after the meeting that he was 
restructuring the 1221 management team. Sam Fratelli was put in charge 
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of all applications, except the CRT Phone. Erhardt retained technical 
responsibility for the word processing application, but administratively 
he now reported to Fratelli. But, as Miles put it, "Hans has been 
moved laterally. He now reports to Sam, but it's all pretty nebulous." 
(See Figure 8.) 
The Big Decision's Aftermath 
After the pressure of Alpha I, the decision to double the memory 
might have made the engineers very happy. Instead, it created a climate 
that was almost too relaxed. A couple of weeks later, Bill Wright, Rich 
Brown and Bill Parris (the engineer in charge of developing the document 
manager, which is the interface between the editor and the disk drives) 
talked about the implications of the decision. They agreed that 
pressure around Alpha II was almost nonexistent. They said that the 
emphasis was on "tightening up," rather than enhancing, the software. 
But this was not really what reduced the pressure. "We have changed 
goals, so Alpha II seems insignificant," Parris said. "Now we have 256K 
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instead of 128K. We are rethinking multitasking. We*re rewriting 
'driver' [screen and document managers] codes in assembly language, to 
save space and add speed, and we're nailing down the functionality. 
"Before,'' Parris continued, "our emphasis had been on cutting 
down the WP code, while retaining functionality. Now we're streamlining 
the code. It's like driving from Boston to New York in a Volkswagen to 
check out the roads, flying back, and driving there again, but in a 
Porsche [the assembly-language drivers]." 
The "Dunce Cap" 
Towards the end of April, an Alpha user complained that when she 
typed a three-page document, she could only get one page to print. 
Parris, Wright and Rogers set to debugging this problem. At first they 
could not duplicate the problem, but ultimately they did. After Wright 
and Rogers decided that the problem was not of their doing, they left 
Parris alone. He decided that it was a problem in the file management 
system (FMS). He became somewhat heated about this FMS problems 
People are always saying "it's WP's fault." Well, sometimes 
it's someone else's fault. In general, people here don't 
want to wear a "dunce cap." They don't want to be 
identified as the ones responsible for a slowdown in the 
project. For example, when we had the discrepancy between 
the WP and OS groups on the small mode-large mode C, what we 
should have done is to tell the managers to push the FCS 
back a month while we cleaned up the problem. But no one 
wanted to suggest a slowdown on this issue, even though one 
would have been good. 
When a bug is found, people want to point fingers and make 
sure that someone else wears the dunce cap. Managers in 
particular want to avoid wearing dunce caps, and Alfred will 
never wear one--he*ll make sure that one of the managers 
wears one 
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There a lot of finger pointing between groups on this 
project. I think that this is because of the size of the 
group. We can't all just talk together like in a small 
group. Trying to communicate through managers leads to a 
lack of common interests. That extra layer of management 
creates divisions that lead to conflict. As a 
counterexample, look at Jack Nelke [who works on the 
application interface for FMS] and Denise Davis [who works 
on the disk driver]. They work together really well, even 
though their technical subsystems are distinct. They are 
under the same manager, Mark Theroux. 
This idea of preserving one's reputation, proved to be a centrally 
important characteristic of the 1221 organization's frame of reference. 
Debugging Between Groups 
One day in late April, just before Alpha II, Jack Nelke and Paul 
Staras, both of the FMS group, were debugging together. They were 
joined by Cary Whipple of the CRT Phone group. Evidently the problem 
lay in the interface between the FMS and the telephone application. 
Nelke and Staras questioned Whipple about the flow of the routine he was 
attempting to run. 
As they attempted to zero in on the problem, each "side" (FMS, 
CRT Phone) tried to "pin the blame" on the other. At one point, Whipple 
was convinced that he had isolated the problem in some FMS subroutine. 
"Sorry," he said, condescendingly, to Nelke and Staras. But in trying 
to make his accusation definite, he found that he was wrong. 
A little later, Nelke and Staras isolated the problem in the CRT 
Phone code. "Sorry," Nelke said to Whipple. Whipple was visibly 
uncomfortable when it genuinely looked like his code was responsible for 
the problem. He tapped his pen vigorously on his pad, and forcibly 
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expelled air from his mouth. He also did a few "Bronx cheers" and 
looked down a lot. Everyone decided that Whipple should write some code 
that would better coordinate the activities of the FMS and the CRT Phone 
application. 
Nelke talked about the incident a few minutes later: 
Yesterday I wrote a new version of the OS, and I told people 
I'd be responsible for any problems. So last night Cary and 
other CRT Phone people came to me with some problems. I 
stayed to correct them. This morning, the CRT Phone people 
came to me again because their stuff still wouldn't work. 
So I got involved again, except that I asked Paul if he 
would help me, since he'd written a routine that was related 
to this problem. 
A little later, I realized that it was a CRT Phone, not an 
FMS, problem. At that point, I wanted no further 
involvement. Cary could write his new code knowing that the 
OS/FMS was not going to be wrong. There won't be any 
further involvement unless we make changes to the OS/FMS. 
But later that afternoon, Nelke, Staras, and Whipple were back 
in the lab, sitting at the debugger. They were working on the same 
problem. Whipple said, "I suppose Jack told you it was m^ problem?" 
There was some laughter, but it sounded tense. No one wanted to wear 
the dunce cap. 
The Confrontation Meeting 
Not everyone took the events which transpired between the two 
alpha releases as nonchalantly as Parris, Wright and Brown. Many of the 
engineers were quite angry about all the changes, and about how they had 
not been consulted on any of it. This was not so true in the word 
processing group, which had always been managed by consensus. But it 
was very true of the OS, FMS and forms groups. (The CRT Phone group was 
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also very unhappy, but that was because of specific problems between its 
members and the manager, J.P. Chin.) A comment by a member of the FMS 
group typifies the mood: "Why have I had to completely change my design 
six times between Alpha I and Alpha II?" 
Some of the engineers decided to take some action. Jack Nelke 
of FMS, Bill Wright of the forms group, and Bill Wardley of OS got 
together to discuss how the managers should be approached. They decided 
to confront them in a group. A meeting was arranged. About ten 
engineers attended, and all five managers were there. Some engineer 
began by saying that the product was a disaster. This sparked a 
wide-ranging discussion. A list of issues was made and discussed. One 
particular concern was held by many engineers—what was the product 
supposed to be? Was it a low end word processor, or was it a full-blown 
computer that could even be used for software development? 
Several more meetings were held. The major tangible result was 
that the managers extended a standing invitation to all the engineers to 
attend the weekly technical status meetings. A few improvements in 
manager-subordinate communication were also implemented. The perception 
of the outcome varied a lot. Many of the engineers felt that there was 
a substantial improvement, particularly in communication between the 
managers and the engineers. But a large minority felt that the 
situation was no better afterwards. One engineer in particular felt 
that his technical supervisor, Mark Theroux, had been "deliberately 
burned out" by the managers, Jim Miles in particular. Another openly 
questioned whether NICC was an "ethical company." 
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Alpha II 
Jim Miles was very nervous. It was time for the second alpha 
release of the 1221 software, and he was concerned about whether the 
team would have everything ready. Fortunately, Alpha II went fairly 
well. After the dust had settled, Miles talked about some ideas he had 
about the 128K version of the 1221, which the company still wanted to 
build. His idea was that the 1221 come out in two versions. One would 
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be the planned 256K version, at about $4000 with printer. The other 
would be a cheaper, 128K, version, at about $2200 with printer. The 
latter would be accomplished by using a cheaper keyboard and a cheaper 
video display, and by using fewer chips on the board (nine instead of 
the present twenty-six). He elaborated: 
This has been my idea all along, but I never asserted myself 
on it until now. Alfred has done two things with my 
suggestion. First, he's said that this will be the only 
version of the 128K 1221, and, second, he's telling everyone 
that lie had wanted this configuration as a precondition to 
even having a 256K version. 
The present design came about because a lot of people in 
hardware kept telling me that it wouldn't cost that much to 
"blank"—insert the addition of your choice. This resulted 
in a lot of additions. My idea will mean that the hardware 
engineers will have to think instead of just soldering chips 
together. 
Miles had felt for a long time that hardware engineers at NICC lacked 
creativity and commitment. 
The Denouement 
The month following Alpha II saw many of the veteran engineers 
in the 1221 project seeking to transfer. This was the very common "post 
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release syndrome,” to some extent, but it was also because of the 
dissatisfaction which had built up during the project, particularly 
during the last two months. 
The problem of what the 1221 was stretched outside the software 
development group. Sal Marinaro, the Director of Dealer Marketing in 
the Indirect Sales Organization, was the person charged with building a 
distribution channel for the 1221. He had some reservations about how 
things turned out: 
The original product premise was that there was a market 
opportunity, above the ET [electronic typewriter] and below 
the PC [Professional Computer], dedicated to people who were 
keyboarding professionals. Nine-to-five people were the 
target group--secretaries, not managers. 
At present, there is a perceptual problem with the 
product. Some see it as an upgrade of the ET; others see it 
as a limited function PC. If you maintain the product 
premise (and I do), what happened is that product marketing 
heard voice number two, and they got off their mission. 
Thus, they added functionality which is too much for the ET 
group, and still not enough for the PC group. 
We think it fits on the ET side--it was designed for that. 
It's great, but the price elasticity is so sensitive, it may 
not work. We have a complete retail channel in place, but 
its not the ideal segment of the dealer channel. The ideal 
would be office products dealers who sell ETs. We are 
trying to recruit that channel. 
We could be sitting in a prime market position, but we are 
not going to after all this. 
In mid-June, Alfred Tsou reflected on some of these problems. 
and on some of the history of the project: 
We couldn't decide if we should keep the 1221 a 
single-function word processor, thus making it harder to 
sell, or if we should give it MS/DOS [the IBM operating 
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system] and undercut the NICC PC. In the end Dr. Smith 
decided that we should avoid price wars with IBM, and stress 
the uniqueness of the 1221. We decided to make it a word 
processor, but to keep the PC market we called it the "NICC 
Secretarial Computer." 
It was recognized that we needed a new generation of 
workstations. The PC could do this, but that market was 
controlled by outside forces [IBM]. The 1221 is under our 
control. 
In late March the managers admitted that they couldn't fit 
everything into 128K, so we switched to a 256K system. We 
traded cost for timeliness. The internal trigger was the 
memory problem. The external trigger was the IBM price 
cut. 
April was a bad month. My managers panicked. I slapped 
them in the face. I stopped any more elimination of 
functions. Dr. Smith supported me. He OK'd the extra 
memory, and the idea of keeping lots of 
functions--multitasking. That is, WP plus an option. My 
marketing partners were very supportive and never 
buckled. ... The 1221 managers wanted to prove that they 
could build a super-duper machine. They didn't realize that 
we have an OAS group whose job it is to design high end 
stuff. 
What happened with the 1221 is typical of NICC development 
efforts. Dr. Smith and I expected it. Lots of people 
expected it. Most projects have a hiccup. MS started at 
64K and ended up at 256K. Software development always sucks 
up more memory than they've been allocated. Part of the 
problem is that software development is not totally a 
science. There's too much creativity. 
On July 6th, Dr. Smith dropped a bombshell on everyone in the 
company. Although the company had evolved into a firm organized around 
product areas, (OAS, MS, PC, 1221) the decision was made to reorganize 
into functional form. The rationale was that the company would offer 
integrated office automation systems; consequently, the functions around 
which the company would be organized were the functions of office 
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automation systems--software and hardware, with some breakdown by size 
of product. Alfred Tsou was immediately put in charge of the software 
for large host systems, such as the MS. 
The 1221 group was kept intact temporarily. Beta I occurred on 
July 20th. It was the first time that the 1221 system was used 
somewhere other than NICC. Product Marketing finally decided to call 
the 1221 the "NICC Office Assistant," to keep in tune with the company's 
reaffirmation of its office automation roots. FCS occurred in 
mid-October of 1984. Print and broadcast advertising began at the same 
time. By early December, the company had sold approximately 5,000 
units, which was below the projected figure. 
Afterword 
The reorganization of July, 1984 ultimately resulted in a new 
person's being responsible for the 1221. This person decided he could 
not accept the operating system, mostly because it was not compatible 
with MS-DOS, the IBM PC operating system. He ordered a wholesale 
rewriting of code for the 1221. 
Some of the 1221 managers resigned. Others were fired. Yet 
others were stripped of any meaningful supervisory responsibilities. 
Even Alfred Tsou became very unhappy, and, remarkably, was rumored to be 
on his way out of the company. Only one manager, Fratelli, found a 
happy home elsewhere at NICC. 
Ill 
Analytical Highlights from the Ethnography 
Politics 
There are many points in the narrative where the political 
goings-on at NICC are very evident. In the early stages, Alfred Tsou's 
peers were very much against the 1221, either because of staff 
transfers, or because of elements of the strategic specification with 
which they did not agree (mainly not putting the 1221 under their 
purview). They took some steps to try to stamp it out: (1) forcing 
design changes, (2) refusing to allocate good development systems, (3) 
allowing staff "left behind" to personally scold staff who were 
departing for the 1221 project. 
Tsou took many steps to try to neutralize this kind of 
opposition. He used the demos to try to create a favorable impression 
in other parts of NICC. He used impression management; for example, he 
tried to run the 1221 project on a shoestring to prove that that kind of 
development effort could be done efficiently, and he adhered to an 
aggressive schedule to show the "gung-ho" nature of the 1221 project. 
In addition, he always reminded his managers of the need for building 
and maintaining credibility with "other parts of NICC." 
Tsou also did some organization building. He allied himself 
closely with Dr. Smith, and he maintained very close ties with 
marketing, which he felt could assist him in neutralizing, or even 
winning over, opposition. 
The reformulation of strategy occured in this political context, 
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with much involvement by the marketing group, when Dr. Smith called the 
meeting in late March, 1984, to decide the fate of the 1221. 
Marketing 
In addition to the direct contacts of allied marketing staff 
with other interested parties in NICC, marketing did a few other things 
in this project. Marketing staffers wrote the business plan, which had 
the dual functions of neutralizing opposition ("internal selling 
document") and beginning the specification process. They were heavily 
involved in, and largely responsible for, the specification and 
re-specification of performance, functionality, and memory size criteria 
as the project went along. 
In a key activity, marketing management supported upper 
management's desire for stringent compatibility with larger NICC 
systems. Marketing used the demos as a tool to assist in gaining 
support at NICC, and as a method of monitoring adherence to the 
specifications. Lastly, marketing was a major participant in the 
strategic re-formulation. 
Technical 
These political and marketing actions increased the technical 
complexity of the task facing the engineers. Design and coding both 
became more complex, and were partially responsible for bugs, poor 
performance, poor functionality, and excessive memory usage. These 
problems were also partially caused by the infrequent integration of 
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code by the engineers, and by the poor resources at their disposal. The 
main technical function of the demos was to give the engineers an excuse 
to integrate their code. 
The core group 
The ethnography'showed many things about the core software 
development organization of the 1221 project. 
Interpersonal communications. Interpersonal communication among 
members of the 1221 project differed according to organizational level. 
Managers communicated amongst one another a great deal. They met 
formally several times a week, and informally almost all the time. The 
subject matter was always technical. Occasionally, Alfred Tsou would 
ask them to consider administrative items like affirmative action, 
hiring, and incentive programs. But usually their communication was 
technical. When managers communicated with engineers, the subject 
matter again was almost always technical. The major exceptions to this 
were the confrontation meetings which occurred near the end of the 
project. 
The pattern among the engineers was different. They had two 
different modes of communication. One mode was social. When the 
engineers got together to socialize, there were two distinguishing 
characteristics: (1) they gathered in groups of three or more, and (2) 
they tended to stay within their functional work group. For example, 
three members of the CRT Phone group were talking, and two of them were 
kidding a third member, a Russian emigree, about his being a "commie." 
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Another time, four of the members of the File Management System (FMS) 
group got together to joke about how a local college student engaged in 
a well-publicized prank had the same name as an FMS engineer. 
The other mode of interaction was problem-solving. This mode 
was almost always one-on-one. When doing problem solving, individuals 
did stray from their functional work groups a bit. The problem solving 
mode had two sub-modes. When problem-solving (debugging) within 
functional work groups, the members tended to speak in "code." They 
used specialized language that sprang from the actual program. They 
used terms like "node," "calls," "returns," "FCB," "zeroing out the 
FCB," "locations," etc. When debugging across functional groups, the 
members tended to speak in plainer English. For example, when members 
from three different groups were trying to figure out why an Alpha I 
user couldn't get her document to print properly, they used terms like 
"opening the printer," "printing the document," "editing the document," 
and "printing another page." 
Organizational communication. There was little communication 
across groups, particularly of a social or administrative nature, and 
technical communication was low. 
There was little or no social interaction across the groups. 
Only twice were exceptions noted. Once was when a member of the CRT 
Phone group left for another job, and people decided to take him out to 
lunch. The twenty-five or so people who went were from a variety of 
groups. The other exception was an impromptu party held for the 1221's 
secretary, on National Secretary's Day. But this may have proven the 
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rule more than disproven it. The "party" was characterized by two 
things: (1) even though everyone was there, they clustered into their 
functional groups, and (2) the party totally lacked in any warmth or 
other emotion--no one made a speech, no one thanked the secretary; they 
just drank their coffee and ate a few cookies, then left. Jim Miles, 
who was the secretary's immediate supervisor, didn't even make a little 
speech. 
. Administrative problems were handled almost exclusively by the 
manager of a given functional group. Administrative problems were 
defined as obtaining supplies or documentation, and performance reviews, 
and to a lesser extent as guidance on specifications. 
If technical problems came up, engineers would seek out whoever 
was responsible, regardless of work group. But they were decidedly more 
comfortable about approaching a member of their own functional group. 
Problem-solving interaction between members of different functional 
groups was more tense, although usually civil. This observation brings 
us to a phenomenon which dominated communications on this development 
effort--avoiding the "dunce cap." 
Avoiding the "dunce cap". The major influence on the 
communications between members of the 1221 project was a deep desire to 
avoid looking bad in the eyes of fellow engineers or managers. One 
engineer called it "not wanting to be the one to wear the dunce cap." 
The effects of this ethos were pervasive. The primary effect was to 
withold information and thereby inhibit communication. 
The first example of this phenomenon occurred at the managerial 
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level. When the managers realized that they couldn't fit the editor and 
the operating system into the available memory, they first tried to cut 
out unneeded functions, then they developd an alternative hardware 
solution, putting the OS on a PROM. Upper management was kept ignorant 
of these activities until after a solution, the PROM, was selected. 
This pattern was repeated after Alpha I. Even though it was 
apparent that no solutions were available, the managers did not want to 
be the ones to recommend a change or slowdown in the project. They did 
not want to wear the dunce caps. Eventually, the problem became so 
desperate that upper management had to be told. 
The third example of this phenomenon was really an imbedded part 
of the development, one that occurred every day--the unwillingness to 
share information about bugs. Computer systems are complex, and they 
are classic systems, in that all the parts are interrelated. Ideally, 
this requires coordination between the various subcomponents of the 
system. In many software development projects, part of the coordination 
of the system is done through the mechanism of source control, which is 
nothing more than a formal system of notification of changes in 
programs. In the 1221 project, coordination was left unstructured. 
Formal code integrations occurred only for the demos and releases, when 
many errors would be found, lengthening the process of building the 
system code. Between these integrations, engineers were left to their 
own devices for eliminating bugs. To insure that they not have to wear 
a dunce cap, engineers, finding that a piece of code didn't function 
properly, would spend days trying to prove that the error lay in the 
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other group's code, only to find that the bug had been found and 
corrected days earlier, and that the correction had not been 
publicized. 
This problem was exacerbated by the lack of a formal source 
control mechanism in the project. Had a formal mechanism of change 
notification existed, groups could have avoided the kind of interaction 
with which they were most uncomfortable--between-group problem solving. 
They would have avoided days of effort aimed at keeping dunce caps off 
their heads. The "dunce cap" syndrome was an ironic one. Groups would 
spend much time and energy on proving that they weren't responsible for 
an error or a delay, which led to a larger quantity of uncomfortable 
interaction. Had errors, and their correction, been made more public, 
the degree of discomfort would have been reduced. 
Contributions from members. One way of inducing contributions 
from members is, to specify a purpose and to get organization members to 
commit themselves to the attainment of that purpose because they believe 
in it. That could have happened on this project, but did not. There 
was much skepticism attached to this project. Some of it was with other 
groups in NICC, but some was within the 1221 core organization. Tom 
Dickinson, a veteran engineer who coordinated the code integration 
process, expressed the problem in classic Barnardian terms: 
It's like putting an addition onto a house. You design the 
foundation, walls, floors, ceilings, and roof. But then you 
have to put the foundation in first. If you think that at 
some point you might want to put in a wood stove, you have 
to do things in a way that would easily allow you to take 
out the floor, put in bricks and a flue, etc. If you don't 
do that ahead of time, you might have to do substantial 
rebuilding when you decide to make that change. Designing 
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and building a computer works the same way. My problem now 
is that I'm very uncomfortable about conforming to the 
design we have, because it is so bad. There's a fine line 
between conforming to keep things moving along and being 
"balky" because you genuinely believe the design is faulty. 
I wish I felt better about conforming. 
Dickinson was saying that the organization side of his personality, 
"conforming," was only barely winning out against the individual side of 
his personality, "being balky." He was saying that the way the 1221 was 
turning out was only just barely in his zone of acceptance (Barnard, 
1938). 
As an alternative approach, Alfred Tsou tried to convince people 
that the 1221 project was worthwhile because it was a "start up," i.e., 
a new company. Start ups have an almost mythological hold on people in 
the computer industry, an industry which abounds with stories of people 
who started in a garage and who were now worth millions of dollars. 
Most of the members of the 1221 were not impressed with the argument 
that they were part of a start up. It was difficult to feel like the 
project was a start up when it was imbedded in the intruigue of company 
politics. Most of the engineers were also skeptical about Tsou's or 
Miles's ability to materially reward them the way employees of 
successful start-ups were typically rewarded. One young female engineer 
put it succinctly: "Where does Alfred get the idea that this is a start 
up company? Why aren't we given the same rewards and recognition as in 
a start up?" 
The engineers were promised material rewards, to be delivered 
after the successful completion of the project. However, there seemed 
to be some skepticism about those, too. As one project member asked, 
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"Will we get the things that have been subtly promised to us, like extra 
vacation, stock, and bonuses?" 
Another strong motivation for the engineers was the opportunity 
to do interesting work. But they felt that this was denied to them. 
One veteran engineer asked, "Why has management put us into a coding 
'box1?" Another asked, "Why is my input into the creative process 
stifled? Why am I just building somebody else's blueprint?" The 
engineers complained about, and ultimately confronted their managers on, 
what they felt was a lack of consultation on technical matters. 
Demos. The main function of demos for the core group was to 
give them some feedback on the quality of the code that they were 
writing. 
Outcomes. The main outcomes in the core group seemed three in 
number: (1) poor morale, (2) a desire to leave, or actually leaving, in 
some cases, and (3) the engineers' preoccupation with career development 
and their futures. 
Many of these ideas will be examined in greater detail later, 
and all will be integrated into an overall model of the implementation 
process, after we first examine some more structured evidence from this 
research project. 
CHAPTER V 
COGNITIONS ABOUT OBJECTIVES IN THE 1221 
CORE ORGANIZATION 
As mentioned earlier, this study was partly an in-depth 
examination of the core organization of the 1221 development project. 
This was stated more formally in research question one (pages 28 and 
29), "What were the initial outcome specifications for the project? Was 
there an integration in the project about these objectives, or was there 
conflict and ambiguity between technical and business objectives? Or 
between the managers and the engineers?" 
This is particularly important here because of this group's 
being a professional organization. Outcomes, subunits, and positions 
were only partially specified. The method of doing work was largely 
determined by the members of the organization. The "deliberateness" of 
the strategy formation is crucially dependent on the extent to which the 
objectives of the project, as interpreted by the members, fit into an 
integrated whole. 
The Semantic Differential Instrument 
Information on this point was obtained from observation and 
interviewing. But in an effort to triangulate, to try to pin down this 
phenomenon from multiple perspectives, using multiple methods, this 
study also used a semantic differential instrument. (The instrument is 




After several weeks of interviewing and observation in the 1221 
project, the author and a colleague close to the 1221 project chose six 
concepts for the semantic differential instrument. These particular 
concepts were chosen because they were felt to be representative of how 
the 1221 project engineers and managers thought of strategic and 
engineering objectives. The concepts chosen to measure the way the 
members of the project defined strategic objectives were numbers 1, 3, 
and 5 below, and the ones chosen to measure engineering objectives were 
numbers 2, 4, and 6 below: 
1. Low end product 
2. Technical excellence 
3. FCS by May 
4. Lots of functionality 
5. Compatibility requirements 
6. State of the art work 
Two explanatory notes are in order here. The objective "FCS by May" was 
initially "FCS by July", but the date was changed after some of the 
questionnaires were first distributed. After all the questionnaires 
were received, the FCS date was changed again, this time to September. 
This objective was probably not fatally harmed by any of this; instead 
it became a surrogate for the very aggressive scheduling which 
characterized this project. Also, "Lots of functionality", which had 
been considered an engineering objective, turned out to be associated 
with the marketing strategy, which emphasized the functions and features 
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of the 1221. This point will become clearer later in this discussion. 
Sample and statistical analysis 
Completed questionnaires were received from twenty-four members 
of the 1221 project--five managers and nineteen engineers. 
Each objective on the questionnaire was rated on the same twenty 
semantic differential scales. This allowed for the construction, using 
$tepwise discriminant analysis, of a semantic space, a "definitional 
space", upon which to array the six objectives. They were then compared 
for differences and similarities in how they were defined by members of 
the organization. The analyses were done separately for managers and 
engineers. 
The Managers 
The quantitative results for the managers are displayed in 
Tables 1 and 2 and in Figure 9. Because there are only five managers, 
the stepwise procedure eliminated all but four of the independent 
variables, and yielded only one statistically significant dimension. 





Table 1 shows that the first dimension loaded most heavily on TIMELY and 
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TABLE 1 
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS AND THEIR COEFFICIENTS FOR THE 1221 MANAGERS 
Function Eigen¬ 
value 






1 1.49794 62.97 62.97 0.0058 
2 0.58081 24.42 87.39 0.1323 










PERMISSIVE. The negative value for TIMELY suggests that it should be 
renamed UNTIMELY. Hence, the dimension upon which the managers' scores 
will be analyzed is defined as one which ranges from UNTIMELY AND 
PERMISSIVE to TIMELY AND CONSTRAINED. 
Table 2 shows that not all the objectives were statistically 
different from one another. The objectives of "FCS by May" and 
"Compatibility requirements" were together at one end of the dimension, 
while "Lots of functionality", "State of the art work", and "Technical 
excellence" cluster at the other end. These two clusters were 
statistically different from one another. The objective "Low end 
product" is statistically different only from "FCS by May." 
Figure 9 arrays the six objectives on the one dimension. This 
diagram illustrates the following: 
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TABLE 2 
SIGNIFICANCES BETWEEN PAIRS OF CONCEPTS 
FOR 1221 MANAGERS 
Concept 
Concept 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 N.S. 
3 * ** 
4 N.S. N.S. ★ 
5 N.S. ** N.S. •kirk 
6 N.S. N.S. irk* N.S. *** 
Key: 1: Low end product * = p < .10 
2: Technical excellence 
3: FCS by May 
4: Lots of functionality 
5: Compatibility requirements 
6: State of the art work 
** = p < .05 
*★* = p < .01 
N.S.*= not signi¬ 
ficant 
l -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 
5 3 124 6 
Timely Untimely 
Constrained Permissive 
Key: 1: Low end product 
2: Technical excellence 
3: FCS by May 
Figure 9. Plot of group centroids 
for 1221 managers 
4: Lots of functionality 
5: Compatibility requirements 
6: State of the art work 
on the single significant dimension 
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1. "FCS by May" and "Compatibility requirements" were seen as TIMELY 
AND CONSTRAINED. 
2. "Lots of functionality", "State of the art work", "Low end product", 
and "Technical excellence" were seen by the managers as UNTIMELY AND 
PERMISSIVE. 
These results do allow for a reasonably good interpretation. 
The aggressive schedule and the compatibility requirements were seen by 
the managers as necessary evils, things which had to be accomplished in 
order to succeed against competitive products (TIMELY), but things which 
severely limit the development operation (CONSTRAINED). Developing a 
low end product with lots of functionality was seen as difficult under 
the time constraints (UNTIMELY). Allowing the engineers on the project 
to work towards the state of the art and towards technical excellence 
was seen as likely to blow the schedule (UNTIMELY) and frivolous 
(PERMISSIVE). 
There is much evidence from the open-ended interviews that 
supports this interpretation. The managers were acutely aware of the 
schedule and of the need for getting a timely and acceptable, if not 
state of the art, product out to the users. The managers made many 
complaints about their specific subordinates who kept insisting on 
building more elaborate systems than were necessary for capturing the 
market, particularly in the allotted time. 
The Engineers 
Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 10 display the quantitative 
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TABLE 3 
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS AND THEIR COEFFICIENTS 
FOR THE 1221 ENGINEERS 
Function Eigenvalue 7. of Var¬ 
iance 
Cumulative 
7. of Vari¬ 
ance 
Significance 
1 0.57975 40.72 40.72 0.0000 
2 0.36547 25.67 66.39 0.0012 
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients: 
Funct 1 Funct 2 
TIMELY 0.11372 0.48730 
PLEASURABLE 0.74696 -0.11251 
SOCIABLE -0.43377 0.12671 
HARMONIOUS -0.10885 0.00514 
MEANINGFUL -0.04150 -1.03172 
PROGRESSIVE 0.60820 -0.26313 
IMPORTANT -0.01255 0.61482 
FREE 0.20732 -0.51995 
POSITIVE -0.30736 0.65103 
WISE 0.41006 0.19533 
HARD -0.18354 -0.10362 
STRONG -0.17303 0.11765 
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TABLE 4 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PAIRS OF CONCEPTS 
FOR 1221 ENGINEERS 
Concept 1 2 3 4 5 
Concept 
2 N.S. 
3 AAA tCiFCfC 
4 ** irk -i—■ _t. TCtTK 
5 
. ■ . ■ i TT7C7C irk irk ★ 
6 ★ irk ■ ■ ■ XTfx ** i • § AAA 
Keys 1: Low end product ★ = p < .10 
2: Technical excellence irk = p < .05 
3s FCS by May •kick = p < .01 
4s Lots of functionality N.S.= not : sign! 
5s Compatibility requirements 
6: State of the art work 
ficant 
results for the engineers. Because there were nineteen engineers 
responding, the results were much richer. Table 3 shows that there were 
two statistically significant dimensions for the engineers. (Actually, 
there were three, but only the first two were used in the remaining 
analysis, since two-dimensional plots are more easily interpreted.) The 
same table shows that the two dimensions load on to twelve semantic 
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The greater richness of the analysis for the engineers also 
yields a more difficult problem of interpretation. Keeping in mind the 
subjective nature of multivariate statistical analysis, the first 
dimension was called WORTHWHILE (i.e., pleasurable, progressive, wise) 
and the second dimension was called IMPORTANT (i.e., timely, important, 
constrained, positive). The first dimension seems to connote 
professional worthiness (pleasant, progressive), while the second 
dimension seems to imply strategic importance (timely, important). 
Table 4 shows that these two dimensions statistically discriminate 
between all the objectives, with the exception of "Low end product" and 
"Technical excellence." This is an important exception, one that was 
also true for the managers. The engineers saw no contradiction between 
technical excellence and a low end product. The possibility of such a 
conflict was a concern voiced by Alfred Tsou, but it did not 
materialize. 
Figure 10 plots the six objectives in two-dimensional space. 
The results were extremely revealing. As mentioned above, the engineers 









































-2 0 2 4 6 
h IMPORTANT BUT WORTHWHILE + 
NOT WORTHWHILE AND IMPORTANT 
I- + 
I- FCS by May * Low End Product + 
★ 
* Technical Excellence 
,+ 
8 
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 1 
Dimension Is pleasurable, progressive, wise. [WORTHWHILE] 
Dimension 2: timely, important, positive. [IMPORTANT] 
Figure 10. Plot of semantic differential concepts on the two 
significant dimensions for 1221 engineers 
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WORTHWHILE AND IMPORTANT quadrant. They saw the development of a low 
end machine for the company to be both developmental for them 
(WORTHWHILE) and strategically important for the company (IMPORTANT). 
What the engineers placed in the opposite quadrant was quite 
interesting. "Compatibility requirements" were seen as NOT WORTHWHILE 
AND UNIMPORTANT. Many of the engineers chafed under the requirement 
that they be compatible with the work of other groups within the 
company. Several expressed a feeling that compatibility had not helped 
some companies. It is interesting that these requirements were quietly 
dropped about sixteen months into the 1221 project. 
The other objective placed into the NOT WORTHWHILE AND 
UNIMPORTANT quadrant was "Lots of functionality." As mentioned earlier, 
this objective was placed in the questionnaire as an engineering, or 
personal, objective. The results show that the engineers sharply 
distinguished it from the other two engineering objectives, "Technical 
excellence" and "State of the art work." They placed it with an 
explicitly strategic objective, "Compatibility requirements." It is 
clear from the observations made of the engineers that this objective 
was a surrogate for the marketing strategy for the 1221, which stressed 
the functions that were felt to be needed for user acceptance. The 
marketing forces in the company mandated many changes in the software in 
order to achieve the proper functionality. Many engineers complained 
about the way their code looked as a result. Many also wondered aloud 
about what kind of machine the 1221 had become, stating that it seemed 
to have evolved into a sophisticated and powerful development system, as 
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opposed to a low-end typewriter replacement. Figure 10 clearly 
illustrates that the engineers felt that, on this project, lots of 
functionality was incompatible with technical excellence and a low end 
product. 
"State of the art work" is in the WORTHWHILE BUT UNIMPORTANT 
quadrant. The engineers seemed to be saying that while they would have 
liked to do state of the art work, they realized that it was untimely 
and relatively unimportant to do so. 
Finally, "FCS by May," the surrogate for the project*s 
scheduling, is in the IMPORTANT BUT NOT WORTHWHILE quadrant. In other 
words, they felt that the aggressive scheduling was unpleasant, 
regressive and foolish, but also realize that it was timely, important 
and positive. This mirrors a phenomenon that was frequently seen and 
heard--almost all the engineers complained about the schedules, yet, in 
response to a question about what they would change about the project, 
most said that "to get the product out on time" there might not be an 
appropriate change. Implicit in these results was the feeling by the 
engineers that this type of scheduling was incompatible with the 
development of a good low end product, with technical excellence, and 
with state of the art work. It is again interesting to note (1) that 
the management of the company found it necessary to lengthen the 
schedule substantially in order to complete a salable product, (2) the 
product was not as low-end as had originally been planned, and (3) it 
did not perform as well as, or have the functionality that, was 
expected. 
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Comparison of the Managers and the Engineers 
It ssirs clear that the gulf between the managers and the 
engineers in the 1221 project was wide. But let us first examine the 
areas where there was apparent agreement. 
The managers and the engineers seemed to agree that the 
scheduling was a necessary evil; for the managers, it was timely but 
cmstraining, for the engineers it was important but unworthy. The 
managers seemed to have been able to get grudging acceptance from the 
engineers cm the scheduling. The engineers also seemed to have been 
committed to the idea of a low end product. They did not have a problem 
working cn a lew end product; indeed, they saw it as both worthwhile and 
important, and did not distinguish it from technical excellence. 
There were important differences. While the managers saw the 
compatibility requirements as necessary evils, the engineers saw them 
only as evils. The managers saw the functionality issue as a difficult 
problem to be solved; their subordinates saw it as a pure obstacle, as 
neither worthwhile nor important. It seemed that the managers did not 
succeed in gaining commitment by the engineers to these two strategic 
objectives. For the functionality question, in particular, this was a 
wide and important gulf. A more subtle difference concerned the 
objective "State of the art work." The engineers agreed with the 
managers that it was untimely, but they saw it as progressive, 
pleasurable and wise, while the managers saw it as permissive or 
frivolous. This may have been a source of tension between managers and 
engineers, and there is some evidence from the qualitative data that 
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this was true. 
Conclusion 
Superficially, the members of the 1221 project's technical core, 
the software engineers and their managers, seemed to agree on the 
objectives of the project. Both groups saw the development of a low end 
product and technical excellence to be mutually compatible. Indeed, for 
many organization members, this combination was precisely what drew them 
to the project. The managers and engineers also agreed that "State of 
the art work" was not possible (however desirable) on this project—it 
would have consumed too much time. The two groups also agreed on the 
need for the tight scheduling, on getting the First Customer Shipment by 
May (or July). 
There were key disagreements, though. As shown in Figure 10, 
the key members of the 1221 core organization, the engineers, did not 
accept the validity of two strategic objectives which were important to 
top management and marketing--the high-end functionality mix, and the 
requirement that the 1221 be compatible with the V4 group in Office 
Automation Systems. 
Recall from the project narrative that the functionality mix was 
a central aspect of the business plan formulated by product marketing. 
Not only was this considered important from the standpoint of eventual 
end-user acceptance, it was considered important from the standpoint of 
building political credibility with other, possibly rival, groups within 
NICC. Several managers mentioned that other groups felt that what the 
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1221 group was attempting was impossible. Jim Miles enjoyed that, 
likening the project to a "suicide mission." But, contrary to what 
Miles said in the narrative, this cross-sectional examination of the 
organization reveals that there was not widespread agreement with the 
"suicide mission" ethos. This is evidenced also by the confrontation 
meetings near the end of the narrative, where several engineers said 
that they felt that the 1221 had gone beyond what was needed for its 
original goal--low end word processing. 
NICC had made a decision that all of its products be compatible 
with one another, from the least expensive machine (the 1221), all the 
way up to the most expensive (the MS). As John Steffano pointed out, 
this could be accomplished at various levels of rigor. The top 
management of NICC decided to go for the most exacting compatibility 
with the V4 document structure. This required the use of much more 
memory space than would have been necessary under other approaches. 
Some engineers, particularly Bill Parris, who was in charge of the 
document manager (which was most directly affected by this policy), 
complained that the V4 standard was a poor one. Consequently, the 
compatibility requirements were seen by the engineers as opposed to both 
the specific low end product goal and to technical excellence in 
general. 
So, while the 1221 core organization was trying to put on its 
best face for the rest of NICC, it was not completely "coalesced" 
itself. There was still important disagreement about some key issues 
where technical and strategic concerns interacted. This disagreement 
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was between the engineers and the managers. But, and this was more 
important, it was also a split within the collective cognition of the 
organization. The members did not think highly of what they were being 
asked to do. 
This kind of disagreement had profound consequences on the 
success of the project. As noted above, in a professional organization, 
using an umbrella strategy, agreement on objectives is perhaps the most 
important control mechanism, because of the autonomy granted the 
professional worker. Without an "integrated whole" of objectives, there 
is a risk of losing control of the development effort, i.e., of straying 
from the "deliberate strategy" path. There is also a risk of losing the 
commitment of the professional workers, and of engendering conflict and 
poor communications. All of this may, and in this project did, lead to 
poor individual and organization performance, and to technical and 
commercial failure 
CHAPTER VI 
INTERACTION AND COMMUNICATION IN THE 
1221 CORE ORGANIZATION 
Research question two (page 29) addressed the issue of 
interaction and communication within the core organization. As 
mentioned earlier, authors like Barnard (1938) have identified the 
importance of communications in organizations, and Homans (1950) 
discussed the particular importance of the activities along the 
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dimensions of technology, administration, and socializing. These 
questions were measured sociometrically. 
Sociometric choice data, obatined by semi-structured interviews, 
were gathered along four dimensions: 
1. Technical: respondents were asked which three people they would 
approach if they needed to consult with someone on a technical 
matter 
2. Administrative: respondents were asked which three people they would 
seek out for assistance on administrative matters, such as the 
obtaining of tools, supplies, and scheduling 
3. Social: respondents were asked to name those people with whom they 
socialized; there was no effort to rank these choices 
4. Contacts: respondents were asked to name those people with whom they 
came in contact during a typical week; these choices were not ranked 
either 
Information on all four of these dimensions was obtained for 
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each of three points in time: June 1983; January-February 1984; and May 
1984. The number of respondents varied with each time point. 
Measurements 
The data are extensive. They have been converted into two 
measurements. The first measurement is simply the percentage of a 
group's overall choice that is made within that same group. The higher 
this percentage, the more insular, or isolated from other groups, that 
group is on the given dimension. 
The second measurement is the percentage of a group's overall 
choice that is made within the same software category, viz. systems or 
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Figure 11. Technical choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, June 
1983. Numbers without parentheses indicate choices made by individuals: 
1 = third choice, 2 *= second choice, 3 *= first choice. Numbers in 
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Figure 12. Technical Choices, by subsystem, 1221 Project, Winter 
1984. Numbers without parentheses indicate choices made by individuals 1 
= third choice, 2 *= second choice, 3 = first choice. Numbers in 










3 2 1 
32 1 
2 




1 2 3 
3 2 1 
2 13 
3 2 1 
3 1 2 
2 3 1 
3 
2 3 1 
1 32 
(19) 312 (53) 
Figure 13. Technical Choices, by subsystem, 1221 Project, May 
1984. Numbers without parentheses indicate choices made by specific 
individuals: 1 = third choice, 2 = second choice, 3 = first choice. 
























Figure 14, Administrative Choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, 
June 1983. Numbers without parentheses indicate choices made by specific 
individuals; 1 = third choice, 2 *= second choice, 3 = first choice. 
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Figure 15. Administrative Choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, 
Winter 1984. Numbers without parentheses indicate choices made by 
specific individuals: 1 = third choice, 2 *= second choice, 3 = first 
choice. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total weight of choices 
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Figure 16. Administrative Choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, 
May 1984. Numbers without parentheses indicate choices made by specific 
individuals: 1 = third choice, 2 = second choice, 3 *= first choice. 
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Figure 17. Social Choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, June 
1983. X's indicate choices made by specific individuals. Numbers not in 
parentheses indicate number of choices exceeding one. Numbers in 
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Figure 18. Social choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, Winter 
1984. X's indicate choices made by specific individuals. Numbers in 
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Figure 19. Social choices, by subsystem, 1221 project, May 1984. 
X's indicate choices made by specific individuals. Numbers not in 
parentheses indicate choices made in excess of one. Numbers in 
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Figure 20. Contacts, by subsystem, 1221 project, June 1983. 
Numbers without parentheses indicate the number of choices made by 
specific individuals. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total weight 




1 1111 1 111 1 11 11 1 1 1 1 8 
1 1 1 1 11 1 5 
1 1 1 1 2 
1 111 111 1 1 1 2 
S 1 1 11 1 111 5 
Y 1 11 1 
S 1 1 ' 1 1 1 
T 1 1 
E 1 1 111111 1 1 3 
M 11 1 1111 1 1 
1 11 11 1 11 1 
1 111 1 (29) 
s 1111 1111 1 1 1 
E 1 111 1 1 1 1 2 
L 1 (76) 1 111 (38) 1 1 1 
v £i 
C 1 11111 1 1 3 
T 1 11 1 1 11 2 
0 1 1 1 11 11 11 1 11 1 
R 1 1 11111 1 1 
S A 1 1 1 11 111111 6 
P 11 11 1 2 
P 1 1111 111 3 
L 11 1 11 111 
I 111 11111 1 11 8 
C 1111 111 1 111 111 1 11 1 6 
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
T 1 1 1 1 1 111 1 1111 1 1 1 15 
I 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 11 11 1 
N 1 1 111 1 
S 1 111 111 1 1111 2 
1 1 1 11111 8 
11 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 11 1 1 (72) 
1 1 11 
1 (138) 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 (42) 11111 5 
Figure 21. Contacts, by subsystem, 1221 project, Winter 1984. Numbers 
without parentheses indicate the number of choices made by specific 
individuals. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total weight of 
choices made in bounded area. 
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SELECTEES 
SYSTEM APPLICATIONS OTH 
11 1 1 1 11 12 
1 111 1 3 1 1 9 
11 11 3 1111 1 2 
SYSTEM 11 1 11 2 11 
1 115 1 1 10 
(45) 1 12 
SELECTORS 
1 11 5 (17) 1 1 (33) 
1 111 1 1 7 
1 1 1112 1 
113 1 1 2 
11 11 1 11 3 
1 111 1 4 
11 1 12 1 3 
11 1 111111 2 11 1 1 
APPLICATIONS 11 1 12 1111 11 111112 1 1 9 
1 1 1 1 1 111 
111 2 1 13 11 1 1 11 1 1 2 
11 1 1 1 111 11 3 
1 1111 11 1 1 
1 1 11 
12 
(25) (105) 1 2 (34) 
Figure 22. Contacts, by subsystem, 1221 project, June 1984. 
Numbers without parentheses indicate the number of choices made by 
specific individuals. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total weight 
of choices made in bounded area. 
TABLE 5 
PERCENTAGES, 1221 PROJECT, OF TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND 
SOCIAL CHOICES MADE IN JUNE 1983 
Group Percent of Choice Percent of Choice on 
Inside Group Same Side of System 
Technical Choice: 
FMS 59 100 
OS 69 100 
WP 76 76 
TC 0 0 
% 
Administrative Choice: 
FMS 69 56 
OS 47 47 
WP 68 68 
TC 60 60 
Social Choice: 
FMS 81 94 
OS 0 63 
WP 94 100 
TC 0 0 
Contacts: 
FMS 74 96 
OS 20 70 
WP 83 86 
TC 40 60 
FMS: File Management System 
OS: Operating System 
WP: Word Processing 
TC: Telecommunications 
Statistical Significance of these Distributions (taking FMS, 
and WP only into account): 
Technical: p < .01 
Administrative: p < .001 
Social: p < .001 
Contacts: p < .001 
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TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGES, 1221 PROJECT, OF TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND 
SOCIAL CHOICES MADE IN WINTER, 1984 
Group Percentage of Choices Percentage of Choices 
Made in Group in Same Side of System 
Technical Choice: 
FMS 50 100 
OS 46 100 
WP 89 97 
FORMS 57 86 
TC 35 65 
Administrative Choice: 
FMS 89 100 
OS 54 93 
WP 64 72 
FORMS 67 71 
TC 56 56 
Social Choice: 
FMS 39 70 
OS 70 81 
WP 48 75 
FORMS 60 95 
TC 48 70 
Contacts: 
FMS 45 63 
OS 50 72 
WP 64 78 
FORMS 40 76 
TC 58 72 
FMS: File Management System WP: Word Processing 
OS: Operating System TC: Telecommunications 
FORMS: Forms 
Statistical Significance of these Distributions (taking FMS, OS, 
and WP only into account): 
Technical: p < ,001 Social: N.S. 
Administrative: p < .001 Contacts: N.S. 
TABLE 7 
PERCENTAGES, 1221 PROJECT, OF TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND 
SOCIAL CHOICES MADE IN MAY 1984 
Group Percent Choosing 
Within the Group 
Percent Choosing on 
Same Side of System 
Technical Choice: 
FMS 25 25 
OS 22 67 
WP 79 92 
FORMS 21 58 
TC 50 100 
Administrative Choice: 
FMS 61 67 
OS 33 67 
WP 35 58 
FORMS 52 74 
TC 60 100 
Social Choice: 
FMS 43 62 
OS 27 38 
WP 48 94 
FORMS 29 65 
TC 60 80 
Contacts: 
FMS 33 64 
OS 72 80 
WP 68 91 
FORMS 38 69 
TC 100 100 
FMSs File Management System WP: Word Processing 
OS: Operating System TC: Telecommunications 
FORMS: Forms 
Statistical Significance of these Distributions (taking FMS 
and WP only into account): 
Technical: p < .001 Social: p < .001 
Administrative: N.S. Contacts: p < .001 
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between system software and applications software. (See Figure 4, page 
58.) Figures 11 through 22 are the sociometric matrices which display 
the technical, administrative, social, and contact choices for each 
point in time. Each matrix is divided by software category. 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 summarize both measurements for all four 
dimensions and all three points in time. Information at the bottom of 
each table shows the results of a chi square test for the statistical 
.significance of the choices made by the Operating System, File 
Management System, and Word Processing groups. Except for social choice 
and contacts as measured in January, 1984 and administrative choice in 
May 1984, all the percentage distributions are statistically significant 
at the .01 level or better. Figure 23 shows plots of the data for 
within-group choice. Figure 24 shows plots of the data for 
within-subsystem choice. These data and plots are analyzed after the 
next section. 
The technical and administrative structure of the 1221 
development project was discussed on pages 55 to 59 in Chapter Four. In 
this chapter, the operating (OS) and file management system (FMS) 
groups, taken together, will be called the "systems side" of the 
software. The word processing (WP), Forms, and telecommunications (TC) 
groups will be called the "applications side" of the software. The bulk 
of this section will examine the OS, the FMS and the WP application. 
Some mention will be made of the Forms application, and very little of 
the TC application. 
To some extent it could be expected that elements of the overall 
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computer system which are technically adjacent to one another would tend 
to agree more on the proper level of outside-the-group or 
other-subsystem choice. This will not be formally tested in this 
chapter, but it will be mentioned in the appropriate places. 
Technical Choice 
Over time, OS and FMS consistently Increased their interactions 
.outside their groups. By contrast, WP technical choice occurred mostly 
within the WP group throughout the duration of the study, peaking at the 
midpoint and ending up essentially where it had begun. (See Figure 23a) 
Figure 24a shows that for the first two points in time, OS and 
FMS made 1007. of their technical choices on the system side of the 
project. But by May 1984, they both (but especially FMS) substantially 
increased their involvement with the other, applications, subsystem. WP 
decreased its involvement with the systems side from June 1983 to 
January 1984, and essentially leveled off from January to May 1984. 
These statistics show that the WP section was consistently more 
insular than either the OS or the FMS groups, by either measure. Table 
8 shows the correlations between groups over time. The correlation 
between the OS and the FMS sections is .97 for within-group choice and 
1.00 for within-subsystem choice. This supports the idea that OS and 
FMS would agree on the degree of intra-group choice. The correlation 
between OS and WP is negative for both within-group and within-subsystem 
choice, supporting the notion that the groups furthest apart technically 
would agree the least on technical choices. But the correlation between 
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FMS and WP, expected to be high because of their adjacency in the 
overall system, is almost zero for within-group choice (.04) and 
actually negative for within-subsystem choice (-.29). 
This shows that not only was the WP section somewhat isolated 
from the other two groups taken together, it was isolated from its 
closest supposed collaborator, the FMS group. Comparison to the other 
two groups corroborates the idea that the WP group is distinctly 
.different from them. For example, as already mentioned, FMS and OS 
agreed on intensity of within-group choice, and they changed their 
choice patterns in very similar fashion. The WP group’s movement was in 
the opposite direction. 
Administrative Choice 
Figure 23b shows that FMS was always likelier to choose within 
itself for administrative guidance, with OS and WP relatively lower. 
Over time, WP consistently dropped its inward choosing, possibly because 
of the organizational change mentioned above, namely, that the Forms 
manager was ostensibly given responsibility for the WP group. This 
would have had the WP engineers going to him, a person outside their 
group, for administrative help. This explanation is corroborated by 
Figure 24b, which shows that WP consistently increased its choice of the 
applications side for administrative help. For both within group choice 
and choice within their own systems side, OS and FMS peaked in January 
1984 and went down by May 1984. The data for administrative choice are 



















Figure 23. Plots of percentage within-group choice, by type of 
choice, by group, 1221 project, time periods 1 (June, 1983), 2 (Winter, 











Figure 24. Plots of percentage within-subsystem choice, by type 
of choice, by group, 1221 project, time periods 1 (June, 1983), 2 
(Winter, 1984) and 3 (June, 1984). 
157 
TABLE 8 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GROUPS, 1221 PROJECT, OVER TIME 
Within-group choice Within-subsystem choice 
FMS-OS OS-WP FMS-WP FMS-OS OS-WP FMS-WP 
Technical 0.95 -0.21 0.04 1.00 -0.29 -0.29 
Adminis. 0.91 0.90 0.64 0.98 0.07 -0.13 
Social -0.79 -0.74 0.99 0.87 -0.41 0.10 
Contact -0.99 -0.80 0.88 -0.63 0.66 0.16 
FMS: File Management System group 
OS: Operating System group 
WP: Word Processing group 
NOTE: The numbers in the cells represent the correlations 
between the scores on the row variables, for the two groups in the 
column, over the three time points. 
pattern for within-group choice, the inverted-V of Figure 23b. (This 
agreement between the three groups is corroborated in Table 8, where the 
intercorrelations are quite high.) This pattern indicates that members 
of all three groups were most likely to go to their own section manager 
for administrative help, and that this happened most intensely in the 
middle of the project. As for system-side versus applications-side 
choice, the three groups moved in a similar direction (more insular) 
from the beginning to the middle of the project, with OS and FMS 
becoming more insular than WP. The three groups all became less insular 
from the middle to the end of the project, with WP the least insular at 
a 537. applications-side choice level. 
Social Choice 
For social choice, OS started out the least insular of the three 
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groups, but in the middle of the project it became the most insular. By 
the end, it had again become the least insular. 
Socially, both WP and FMS had been quite insular at the 
beginning. This reflects their being intact units from other projects, 
brought into the 1221 project by the overall manager. Both groups 
became consistently more "outgoing" as the project wore on. Again, 
though, Figure 24c shows that the WP group kept its social activity 
within the applications side, while the OS and FMS groups branched out 
socially into the applications side. This is emphatically shown in the 
three figures for social data, numbers 16, 17, and 18. Notice that the 
"white space" in the upper right hand corners fills up over the life of 
the project as the OS and FMS groups choose members of the applications 
side. The converse space in the lower left hand corner has 
subsections—it remains white where the WP group does not choose the 
system side, but fills up where the Forms group does choose the system 
people. 
Contacts 
The FMS and OS groups exhibited an interesting pattern in the 
contacts they reported within their respective groups. As Figure 23d 
depicts, they moved in almost exactly opposite directions, as the 
correlation of -.99 from Table 8 shows--OS became more insular, FMS less 
insular. WP became slightly less insular from the beginning to the 
middle of the project, then essentially leveled off. 
If we define residual contact as that contact that is not 
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intra-group, then most of WP's residual contact was with its 
applications brethren, the Forms group, while the residual contact for 
OS and FMS was with each other. Still, a substantial amount of contact 
for both FMS and OS was with the applications side; the converse cannot 
be said for the WP group. 
Overall Assessment 
In almost every case, in almost every time period, these data 
show that the WP group group was more insular than the other two groups 
which were followed all the way through. This was most clearly true in 
the crucial area of technical choice. 
In most instances, the OS and FMS groups were in agreement about 
within-group or within-subsystem choice, which was expected because of 
their close technical proximity. But neither of them was usually in 
agreement with WP. Again, this was not always true, but it was most 
clearly true for technical choice. Figure 24 shows that, except for 
administrative choice, the WP group always chose more on the 
applications side than the other two groups chose on the system side. 
This was especially pronounced for technical choice and social choice. 
Figures 13, 19, and 22 (for technical, social, and contact 
choice, respectively) subtly show that the WP group was much more 
insular than its sister applications group. Forms, by the end of the 
project. In all three matrices, there is more white space in the left 
portion of the upper right-hand quadrant. On the raw data matrices, the 
WP group was listed first along the margin, i.e. the left hand side. 
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In the lower left hand quadrant, there is more white apace at the top, 
which again is where the WP group was listed. Together, these mean (1) 
that most of the selections made by the systems side of the applications 
side were Forms people, and (2) that most of the applications people who 
made choices on the systems side were Forms people. Members of the WP 
group were neither selectors nor selectees of systems engineers. 
By May 1984, the OS, FMS and Forms groups had reached a high 
level of mutual technical and social choice, and a mutually high level 
of reported contact. The WP group remained relatively isolated on all 
three, increasing its activities mostly with its sister applications 
group, the Forms group. 
Many of the members of the 1221 project complained about the 
divisiveness between the groups. Towards the end, this was primarily 
couched in terms of "system" versus "applications." The sociometric 
data clearly show that this feeling of division had some foundation in 
the choice and contact patterns. 
They further show that the WP group was the most isolated 
group. Given the crucial work being done by that group, this 
non-integration of WP into the rest of the 1221 organization may have 
had far-reaching consequences. Focusing on technical and administrative 
choice shows a pattern where the OS and FMS groups became consistently 
less insular as time went on, but the WP group got more insular. 
These data show that the 1221 organization was fragmented. The 
integrations needed for technical reasons were the only sure mechanism 
for coordination among the subgroups, and they did not occur with any 
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great frequency—three demos and two releases in fifteen months. 
Perhaps they should have occurred more frequently. 
The data from the semantic differential suggested that the 1221 
organization was not a fully "coalesced" organization. The data here 
suggest similar things. This was not a cohesive group. It may not have 
been expected, or even' desirable, for the subgroups to engage in much 
social contact, but it is surprising that the subgroups engaged in so 
little technical and administrative interaction, even among groups which 
were technically adjacent. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE 1221 ORGANIZATION'S FRAME OF REFERENCE: 
SUGGESTIONS FROM COGNITIVE MAPPING 
Research question three (page 29) asked: "What was the frame of 
reference which emerged in this organization? What was the pattern of 
givens, means, and ends in the cognitive map of the project's 
organization?" This chapter will examine the findings relevant to that 
question. 
Cognitive Mapping: A Brief Summary of the Method 
Cognitive mapping was developed in political science to analyze 
the effects of policy choices upon valued goals. But it has been 
extended to mapping the "social cognitions" of entire organizations. 
This was first done by Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst in 1977, when they 
mapped the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra. This is what was attempted here. It 
is the first application to a "regular" business organization, and the 
first to a research and development organization. 
There are two kinds of elements in a cognitive map. The first 
kind are called concepts; these are treated as variables, i.e, can take 
on different values. Causal assertions are the second kind of element 
of cognitive maps. These relate variables to each other. The 
relationships can be either positive (direct) or negative (inverse). The 




The valency matrix 
The valency matrix is the tabulation of the direct effects of 
each variable on each other variable, as measured by the average of all 
organization members' responses. The total of all the effects for a row 
of the valency matrix is called the outdegree of that variable. The 
outdegree is a measure of the potency of the variable. The higher the 
outdegree, the more potent that variable is, according to the members of 
the organization. The total of the values in a column of the valency 
matrix is called the Indegree of that variable. Indegree is a measure 
of how much that variable is caused by the others; it is a surrogate for 
the goals of the organization. The higher the indegree, the likelier it 
is that a variable is an end or a goal of the organization, according to 
its members. (See Bougon et al, 1977.) 
Table 9, the valency matrix for the 1221 organization, shows 
that there were many interconnections in the 1221 organization. To cut 
down the number of relationships that would be depicted on the cognitive 
map diagram only (1) the largest two in each column, and (2) any others 
that were greater than .8 in absolute value, were included. Before 
discussing that map, one more topic--cumulative reachability--must be 
addressed. 
The cumulative reachability matrix 
There are two rules for the analysis of cognitive maps: 
Rule I: the indirect effect of a path is positive if the path has 
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an even number of negative arrows, and negative if it has an odd 
number. 
Rule II: the total effect of point A on point B is the sum of 
the indirect effects of all paths from A to B. 
The first rule is self-evident. The second can be derived 
mathematically in the cumulative reachability matrix, defined as 
CR «= A + A2 + A3 + . . . + A^11"1^ 
where A is the valency matrix and CR is the cumulative reachability 
matrix. The exponent to which A is raised shows the influence of one 
k 
variable on another in a chain the length of the exponent. In other 
3 
words, A shows the influence of variable A on variable D in the 
following chain of length three: 
A-> B-> C-> D 
Any cell in the cumulative reachability matrix represents the total 
effects, direct and indirect, of the row variable on the column 
variable. In a sense the values in this matrix indicate how potent the 
variables are even after "going through" several other variables. It is 
usually not necessary to raise the valency matrix to the n-1 power. The 
matrix here was raised to the 7th power; the cumulative reachability 
matrix for the 1221 organization is shown in Table 10. 
A particular cell in the cumulative reachability matrix 
represents the total effects of the row variable on the column 
variable. The value in the cell is a measure of the overall effect, 
through all possible paths, of the row variable on the column variable. 
The main usefulness of this is that it illuminates the nature of the 
cycles in the cognitive map. If a cell has a positive value, it means 
that that variable is on a deviation amplifying cycle. That is, the 
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cumulative effects of the row variable on the column variable tend to 
lead to "more" of the column variable. If, on the other hand, the cell 
is negative, then that cell represents a deviation counteracting loop or 
cycle. This means that the cumulative effect of the row variable on the 
column is such that more of the row variable leads to less of the 
column--deviations are "counteracted." The information in the 
cumulative reachability matrix may facilitate the interpretation of the 
interrelationships in the complete system. 
Variables in the Cognitive Map 
In all the tables and diagrams which follow in this analysis the 
fourteen variables are abbreviated because of space constraints. Here 
is a list of the fourteen variables exactly as they appeared on the 
questionnaire (which is partly reproduced in Appendix C). 
1. The management we have experienced on this project 
2. The schedules and deadlines we have had on this project 
3. The poor communications and the competition among the groups in 
the 1221 organization 
4. The commercial success of the 1221 
5. Company politics 
6. The bad tools and scarce resources we've experienced on this project 
7. Poor morale and dissatisfaction 
8. Working on this project 
9. The lack of a solid product definition 
10. The personal career development of an engineer 
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11. Leaving the 1221 project 
12. The quality of an engineer's performance 
13. The lack of consultation of the engineers on technical matters 
14. The technical success of the 1221 
Analysis of the cognitive maps 
of the 1221 organization 
Tables 9 and 10 show the valency and cumulative reachability 
matrices, respectively, for the complete sample. Figure 25 shows the 
resultant cognitive map. The second step of the analysis was to break 
the data down by managers and engineers. The managers' matrices are 
shown in Tables 11 and 12, and the engineers' matrices are shown in 
Tables 13 and 14. The cognitive map for the managers is shown in Figure 
30, and that for the engineers is shown in Figure 31. 
The Complete Sample: The Matrices 
Outdegrees, or potency 
Table 9 shows that the most potent variable for the organization 
was the type of management they experienced on the project. This was no 
surprise. This variable was mentioned by everyone in the self-Q 
interviews. 
The second most potent variable was "lack of a solid product 
definition." In the theory section it was mentioned that one important 
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and emergent strategy. This part of the cognitive map illustrates how 
an ill-formed intended strategy, when combined with poor management, 
poor communications, tight schedules and virulent company politics, can 
lead to a realized strategy which is not what was intended, and can have 
adverse human resource outcomes as well. The cumulative reachability 
matrix showed that the 6um of all direct and indirect effects on the 
variable "bad product definition" was positive for each of the other 
variables. This implies that there was a deviation amplifying loop in 
the cognitive map, a loop which ensured that the realized strategy would 
continue to be more emergent than deliberate. 
The third most potent variable was "lack of consultation of 
engineers on technical matters." There is much discussion in the 
literature about the need to include people in the decision making of an 
organization. This is not so much linked to effectiveness as it is 
linked to individual motivation, or what Chester Barnard called 
"obtaining contributions" from organizational members. Close 
examination of the valency matrix shows that this variable has its 
greatest effect on "poor morale," which in turn is strongly linked to 
"leaving the 1221 project." In other words, failing to include the 
engineers in decisions did not elicit contributions from organizational 
members; the contrary was true in the minds of the members of this 
organization. 
The fourth and fifth most potent variables were "the schedules 
and deadlines we have had on this project" and "the poor communications 
and the competition among the groups in the 1221 organization," 
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respectively. These are both aspects of what Barnard (1938) called 
"communications." It is interesting to note that the three things which 
Barnard called the critical functions of executive leadership--defining 
purpose, obtaining contributions from members, and communications--are 
all represented in the five most potent variables of the 1221 
organization's cognitive map. 
Indegrees, or goals 
As mentioned earlier, indegrees measure the degree to which a 
variable is an "outcome," "goal," or "end." The highest outcome in the 
cognitive map of the 1221 organization was "poor morale and 
dissatisfaction." To anyone who knew the organization, this is not a 
surprise. The second highest outcome was "leaving the 1221 project." 
The amount of turnover in this organization, particularly in the last 
two months of this study, was probably the most noticeable thing about 
it. It was widely observed and discussed by people both in and out of 
the 1221 organization. 
The third highest outcome variable was "the technical success of 
the 1221," which is something one would expect should be a desired 
outcome or goal. The fourth highest variable was "the commercial 
success of the 1221," another desirable outcome variable. It is 
interesting to note that both of these "desirable" outcomes had indegree 
totals below the top two, negative, outcomes. This was particularly 
true for "commercial success." The fifth outcome variable was "the 
quality of an engineer's performance." All the members of this 
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organization were committed to personally doing well. 
Cumulative reachability 
The cumulative reachability matrix for the complete sample 
(Table 10) can be summarized succinctly--all five top outcome variables 
were adversely affected by all the other variables. 
"Commercial success" (column 4), "quality of individual 
performance" (column 12) and "technical success" (column 14) have 
negative signs from top to bottom. That means that these three 
variables were on deviation-counteracting loops--decreases in any of the 
variables (including these variables themselves) will lead to increases 
in the three, and increases in the other will lead to decreases in the 
three. It seems that commercial, technical, and personal success were 
their own punishment in this organization. "Poor morale and 
dissatisfaction" (column 7), and "leaving the project" (column 11) have 
positive values from top to bottom. These two negative outcome 
variables were on deviation-amplifying loops--more of anything, 
including themselves, will lead to more of these, less of anything will 
lead to less of these. In this organization’s cognitive map, 
dissatisfaction and turnover fed on themselves and got worse. 
So this system developed, in the minds of its members, into one 
which (1) worked against technical and commercial success, (2) worked 
against high quality individual performance, (3) generated poor morale, 
(4) encouraged turnover, and (5) gave rise to intense company politics. 
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"company politics" rose to the second most potent variable when all 
direct and indirect effects are taken into account. This is again not a 
surprise to one who knew the organization; intra-company politics were a 
frequent topic of conversation in the organization. A closer look at 
the politics line of Table 10 shows that the five highest values on that 
line were for the five leading outcome variables discussed above, with 
"technical success" leading the way. Company politics were in 
deviation-counteracting loops for technical and commercial success, and 
quality of individual performance, meaning that politics tended to 
depress these forms of good performance. Politcs were in 
deviation-amplifying loops for dissastisfaction and turnover, tending to 
increase those negative outcomes. 
Conclusions 
In summary, this was an organization which knew what it wanted 
for success—good management, a solid product definition, inclusion of 
everyone in technical decisions, effective schedules, and good 
communications. It did not realize any of these. The result was 
technical and commercial ineffectiveness (in the view of the members), 
poor individual performance, poor morale, and turnover. 
The Complete Sample: The Maps 
Figure 25, which was constructed from Table 9, shows the 
cognitive map for the entire organization. Please remember that this 



































































































1221 organization about the interrelationships between the fourteen 
variables, and not some sort of "objective reality." Also, variable 8, 
"Involvement in the Project," was dropped, since it scored low on both 
indegree and outdegree (11th and 12th, respectively). 
To see whether a particular chain through the map is potent, one 
examines the cell in Table 10 which has the row and column coordinates 
corresponding to the beginning and end of the chain, respectively. Even 
though Figure 25 was distilled from all possible relationships, it is 
still complex. Figures 26 through 29 show only portions of the complete 
map, with greater clarity. 
Figure 26 shows the "success cycle." It focuses on technical 
and commercial success, and on career development. This diagram shows 
the key role of communications. The poor communications on this project 
had a direct negative effect on technical success. They also had an 
indirect negative effect on both technical and commercial success 
through the variables "poor morale" and "quality of individual 
performance." In other words, the quality of an individual's 
performance was the key to commercial and technical success, but the two 
variables which caused performance, poor communication and poor morale, 
both created a negative loop, a loop for "failure" instead of success. 
The members of the organization felt the same way about the outcome of 
career development. 
Figure 27 focuses on motivation, dissatisfaction and turnover. 
If we define motivation as something that gets workers to perform well, 
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performance.*' The only positive causal assertion for quality of 
individual performance came from "career development." The other two 
causal arrows aimed at quality of performance were "poor morale" and 
"poor communication," both negative. This map creates an image of 
people performing well only for their own career advancement—doing well 
to maintain or enhance their reputations, since the organization has 
given them no other reason to perform well. 
The story is the same for satisfaction. Every arrow leading 
into "poor morale" was positive, meaning that all the linked variables 
promoted dissatisfaction. This led in turn to turnover, to "leaving the 
project." 
Figure 28 illustrates the effects of poor product 
specification. Only one causal arrow led from "bad product definition," 
and it caused poor communication. This led, either directly or 
indirectly, to poor morale, turnover, poor individual performance, 
technical failure and commercial failure. Table 10 shows that poor 
product specification had its strongest cumulative effects on these 
variables, and that those effects were all deleterious. This has 
important implications. It could mean that formulation of purpose and 
objectives is not merely an ivory-tower exercise for top management, but 
that clear strategic purposes and objectives are seen as crucially 
important by those who actually carry out the implementation. This 
shows the critical importance of specifying an agreed-upon umbrella 
strategy in a professional organization. It also demonstrates one 
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in this type of organization, namely: an unclear intended strategy leads 
to poor communication, which leads to a realized strategy of technical 
and commercial failure. 
Before moving on the the next figure, let us pause for two 
definitions which will help in making the next argumemt. Let us define 
power as "the ability to have others in the organization do one's will 
despite their own resistance." And let us define politics as "the 
definition, allocation, and use of power in an organization." As the 
ethnography showed, the exercise of power, i.e., politics, was rampant 
at NICC. The members interpreted these activities in a distinctive way, 
a way which was captured in the cognitive map with the variable "company 
politics". Figure 29, which is the last of the "detail" diagrams, 
focuses on the effects of "company politics." Recall that this variable 
had strong cumulative effects on the five outcome variables (Table 10). 
This is clearly shown on the map. One way was by promoting a poor 
product definition, which led to the kinds of things discussed above. 
The other way it affected things was by causing the "bad tools" used by 
the organization. Many people related in conversation that they were 
tied to NICC and Tektronix equipment, for political reasons, even though 
development equipment from other vendors was superior and could have 
facilitated (and speeded up) the development effort. What is really 
intruiging about the effects of politics is that there was a feedback 
loop leading to politics from commercial success. As commercial success 
increased, so did company politics. But since all the loops leading 













































loop--if politics decrease, commercial success increases, leading to an 
increase in politics, which cuts back on commercial success. This 
implies that, in the minds of the 1221 organization's members, the 
dominant effect of company politics was to impede the realization of the 
intended strategy. Politics seemed to be a prominent factor for 
ensuring that strategy would emerge rather than be deliberate. 
This ends the section on the organization as a whole. The next 
section compares the managers and engineers. 
The Managers Compared to the Engineers: 
The Matrices 
Tables 11 and 13 are the valency matrices for the managers and 
engineers, respectively. Tables 12 and 14 are the cumulative 
reachability matrices for the managers and engineers, respectively. 
Rather than conduct an exhaustive analysis of each of these matrices 
alone, the next sections briefly compare and summarize the results from 
the two groups. 
Potency 
Here are the seven most potent concepts for each group: 
Managers 
1• Management 
2. Poor communication 
3. Technical success 
4. Commercial success 
5. Bad product definition 
6. Individual performance 
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Technical success, commercial success, and quality of individual 
performance are on the managers' list, but not on the engineers' list. 
It is interesting that the managers find technical and commercial 
success, usually outcome variables, to also be potent causal variables. 
This is perhaps an indication of how fixated on outcomes the managers 
were during this project. Perhaps they viewed commercial and technical 
success to be so important that they, by themselves, could influence the 
other variables. The managers, who were mostly inexperienced, were also 
concerned with the performance of the engineers under their command. 
This is reflected in their valency matrix. 
Schedules, company politics, and bad tools are on the engineers' 
list but not the managers'. It is not clear why the managers did not 
see the schedules as being potent, since they seemed to be a pervasive 
element of the climate in the 1221 organization. It is also interesting 
that the engineers thought company politics were potent, but the 
managers did not. Perhaps the managers were so embedded in the politics 
that they did not see the effects in as dispassionate a way as did the 
engineers. There was also some evidence that when the engineers said 
"politics” they were talking about power struggles among the 1221 
managers, and not just the effects from the rest of the company. Maybe 
the managers did not see their disagreements as being anything but 
technical, but the engineers saw those as somehow ethical or political. 
The result on bad tools may have come about because the managers were 
somewhat removed from using those development tools on a daily basis. 
In contrast to the engineers, they may have felt positively about the 
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mandated use of NICC equipment, either for reasons of cost, or genuine 
belief in the superiority of that equipment, or because they had been 
successfully socialized into thinking that way by upper management. 
Goals 
Here are the top seven goal variables (as measured by indegree) 
for each group: 
Managers 
1. Technical success 
2. Quality of indiv. perf 
3. Poor morale 
4. Commercial success 
5. Leaving the project 
6. Poor communications 
7. Schedules 
Engineers 






Quality of indiv. perf 
In contrast to the potency lists, these two lists have identical 
contents; only the order differs. Clearly, the engineers felt that the 
outcomes of this project, for them, were negative--leaving the project 
and poor morale. The managers also recognized the salience of poor 
morale in this project, placing it third on their list. They saw 
technical success as the paramount outcome; the engineers place that 
third. It is interesting that both groups listed commercial success 
relatively low--the managers placed it fourth, the engineers placed it 
fifth. In many conversations and meetings, Alfred Tsou stressed both 
technical excellence and commercial success. Yet the managers and 
engineers appear to have weighted technical success much higher than 
commercial success, and they weighted other outcomes (morale, turnover, 
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The Managers Compared to the Engineers: 
The Maps 
Figures 30 and 31 show the cognitive maps for the managers and 
the engineers, respectively. 
The maps are generally similar. There are only a few 
differences in the direct linkages. One is about the variable "bad 
product definition." The engineers saw this as linked, positively, to 
only one other variable, "poor communication." The managers saw the 
lack of a solid product definition as positively linked to "schedules" 
and "poor morale," and as negatively linked to "technical success." 
Another difference is about the causes of bad tools--the managers see 
those as caused only by the management of the project; the engineers see 
them as caused by company politics as well. Speaking of company 
politics, both maps have the feedback loop, from commercial success to 
politics, that was seen in the complete map. 
Aside from the larger number of relationships, what made the 
managers* map more difficult to draw was that the variable "quality of 
individual performance" was, for the managers, both a potent variable 
and a high outcome variable. This yields an odd result. Table 14, the 
cumulative reachability matrix for the engineers, shows that all the 
direct and indirect effects of each variable have negative (adverse) 
effects on the two critical outcome variables of commercial and 
technical success (columns 4 and 14, respectively). The same matrix for 
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commercial and technical success. One of those is quality of individual 
performance. Although there may be some negative loops in the managers* 
map, on balance they felt that the quality of individual performance on 
this project was a positive influence on success. They also valued it 
1 
as an objective. The engineers mildly agreed on the latter, but 
disagreed that it was a positive influence on outcomes for this 
project. 
This is an important difference. Recall from Figure 26 that 
quality of individual performance was crucial to the "success cycle" in 
the complete map. The managers felt that they had created an 
organization which positively affected the quality of the performances 
of their subordinates, which led to a positive effect on success. The 
engineers, on the other hand, felt that their performance quality was 
adversely affected, which in turn adversely affected commercial and 
technical success. In terms of the frame of reference created by the 
members of this organization, these two points of view could not be more 
different. In the end, it seems that the engineers' view was at least 
partially vindicated. 
Implications of These Results for the 
Frame of Reference of the 1221 Organization 
From the ethnography, the semantic differential data, and the 
sociometric data, we know at least two important things about the 1221 
core organization: (1) agreement on objectives did not exist, and (2) 
the organization was fragmented in its technical, administrative, and 
social communications and interaction patterns. In this chapter, we 
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begin to see how these two pieces fit into a larger frame of reference 
enacted by the 1221 core organization. 
Communications and the umbrella strategy 
Variables which can be reasonably construed as hurting 
communications (poor management, no consultation of engineers, the 
schedules, and poor communications), and a variable which can be 
reasonably construed as indicating a lack of clarity on objectives and 
intended strategy (lack of a solid product definition), make up the five 
most potent variables in the cognitive map. The communications problems 
all led to negative outcomes--poor morale, turnover, technical failure, 
commercial failure, and poor individual performances. The lack of a 
solid product definition (lack of commitment to the intended umbrella 
strategy) led to the same negative outcomes. 
Both of these phenomena were on deviation-amplifying loops, 
i.e., the negative outcomes made the poor communications poorer and the 
unclear intended strategy less clear, which made the outcomes "more 
negative," and so on. 
Organizational politics 
As the ethnography showed, organization politics played an 
important role in the 1221 project, indeed at all of NICC. In the 
cognitive map, organization politics was the terminus of a deviation 
counteracting loop--much political activity ultimately led to commercial 
failure, which led to decreased political activity; conversely, 
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commercial success led to greater political activity. This implies 
that, in the minds of the 1221 organization's members, the dominant 
effect of company politics was to impede the realization of intended 
8trategies--politics were a prominent means for ensuring that strategy 
would "emerge" rather than be deliberately "executed." 
Conclusion 
. We see how these three elements of the frame of reference—the 
quality of communications, the clarity of intended strategy, and 
organizational politics—interact, resulting in emergent, as opposed to 
deliberate, strategy. In the 1221 organization, the emergent strategy 
was negative, both in the view of the members (as manifested in the 
cognitive map) and in the view of the marketplace, which did not accept 
the product. 
An important question is: "Could we reach the same conclusions 
about the interplay between intended and emergent strategy if the 
characteristics of the map were more positive?" The answer is not 
straightforward. If all the signs in the cognitive map were reversed 
(communications were great, clarity about intended strategy was high, 
and organizational politics were supportive), and the outcomes were 
generally seen as different and better than expected, then the answer 
would be "yes, the conclusions are the same." But if all the signs were 
reversed and the outcomes were simply the straightforward execution of 
the intended strategy (i.e., Mintzberg's deliberate strategy), then the 
answer would be "no, conclusions are not the same", and the conclusions 
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reported in this section would hold only when the outcomes are 
negative. Obviously, this question needs further research. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE DYNAMICS OF EMERGENT STRATEGY: 
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF IMPLEMENTATION 
IN THE 1221 PROJECT 
The previous four chapters presented material designed to answer 
research questions one, two and three, which were focused in-depth on 
the core organization in the 1221 development effort, namely, the 
software development group. No space was given to research questions 
four and five. Research question four, on page 29, asked: 
How did the members of the organization extend the initial, 
partial, outcome specifications into subunit outcomes? How 
did the subunits extend those into overall organizational 
outcomes? Putting it another way, what was the interplay 
between the project's intended strategy and its emergent 
strategy? 
Question five (pages 29 and 30) asked: 
How useful are the political models of strategy formulation, 
specifically the Narayanan and Fahey (1982) model, in 
explaining the process of implementation? 
This chapter will (1) review and integrate the results of the 
in-depth study of the core organization, (2) examine the context and 
process in which the core organization was imbedded, and (3) combine all 
the findings into one integrated model of the implementation process. 
Points two and three will serve as answers to research questions four 
and five. 
The Core Organization 
Members of the software development group agreed with the 
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abstract idea of building a good, inexpensive standalone word 
processor. Unfortunately, the results indicate that they did not feel 
that the approach used in this project would do that. They did not feel 
good about the basic design, and they did not feel good about the 
specifications which emerged during the effort. 
The core organization was an "uncoalesced" one. The group was 
fragmented administratively, technically, and socially. Communication 
•was poor, partly because of poor management, partly because of the 
technical complexity of the task, partly because of a lack of mutual 
assumptions about many things, and partly because of the ethos of not 
wanting to wear the "dunce cap." Consultation of the members was also 
poor. 
Resources, from development systems to floppy disks, were 
inadequate. The members felt that this was caused by organizational 
politicking by 1221 managers, particularly the general manager, Alfred 
Tsou. Lastly, the schedule was perceived as too aggressive, even though 
the members agreed that some sort of aggressive schedule was needed to 
get the project completed in a timely way. 
The results of these factors were threefold: 
1. a skepticism about the technical and commercial viability of the 
emerging computer system 
2. poor morale and high turnover 
3. a focus on the one possible tangible outcome--career development 
In abbreviated form, this was the frame of reference which 
characterized the 1221 software development group, the core 
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organization. This frame of reference was not formed in a vacuum. The 
core organization was imbedded in a much larger organization, the 
Northeast International Computer Company. Figure 32 shows the core 
organization's frame of reference arrayed at the bottom, with the larger 
context above it. To answer research questions four and five, we must 
examine the software development group's relationship with this larger 
context. To this we now turn. 
The Integrated Model 
The implementation process studied here proceeded on four 
parallel tracks—political, marketing, technical, and "institution 
building." Figure 32 shows the model graphically. 
The activities of the core organization, which we have been 
examining in detail so far in this paper, are drawn along the bottom 
track, "institution building," of Figure 32. This track was called the 
"institution building" track because the core organization started from 
scratch and, along the lines of the ideas discussed in Chapter I, built 
its institutional character, enacted its frame of reference. 
The three other tracks were briefly examined earlier, after the 
ethnography, in Chapter IV. The track immediately above the institution 
building track in Figure 32 is the technical track. It was placed there 
because, despite all the other influences on them, it was through 
technical requirements that the core organization members were most 
affected. The technical track acted as a quasi-buffer between the 
social and administrative systems of the core organization and the 
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activities of the marketing group and the politics in the rest of NICC. 
Next is the marketing track. Marketing is broken out from the 
rest of the NICC organization for two reasons: 
1. in this project, for the first time at NICC, top management 
explicitly increased the role of marketing in the development effort 
(which is why John Steffano played such a prominent role) 
2. most of the changes in specifications either originated in, or were 
filtered through, the marketing department 
Arrayed along the top of Figure 32 is the organizational 
politics track. It is important here to keep some distinctions in 
mind. Recall that politics was defined earlier as "the definition, 
allocation, and exercise of power in an organization," and that power 
was defined as "the ability to have others in the organization do one's 
will despite their own resistence." The variable used in the cognitive 
map to measure how the engineers interpreted the exercise of power at 
NICC was "company politics." Although is may be slightly confusing, the 
term "company politics" as it is used in this chapter refers to the 
organization-wide exercise of power, and not to the engineers' 
interpretation of it. The point is that, as the ethnography showed, 
much of the activity of the core organization was attempts to exercise 
power against other coalitions in the NICC organization, or attempts to 
create power for itself (by building legitimacy) which it could then 
marshall against salient interest groups. Also, much of the core's 
activity was forced on it by specific actors in the wider company 
environment exercising their power, either directly or through the 
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marketing buffer or the technical buffer. The interpretation of these 
power moves was captured in the cognitive map variable "organization 
politics." Since this term is so descriptive, it will be used in this 
chapter. 
Cutting across all four tracks were the demonstrations and 
releases mentioned in the narrative. These are superimposed across all 
four tracks because they served a purpose in all four tracks, albeing 
not the same one in each. In the institution building track, they were 
the only mechanism for bringing the whole group together 
administratively and socially. In the technical track they were the 
only mechanism for integrating the complex code needed for the 1221 
product. For the marketing track they served as means for monitoring 
how closely the project was holding to the specifications that marketing 
felt were needed for this product to meet customer needs. Lastly, the 
demos and releases served as an important impression management tool at 
the organizational political level. 
Except for poor morale and turnover, which were part of the 
frame of reference of the core organization, and are therefore placed to 
the left of the demos in Figure 32, the outcomes are arrayed along the 
right margin of the figure. "Causal" flows are shown by lines 
connecting the elements—solid lines represent initial flows, while 
dashed lines represent the result of some sort of feedback, either from 
a demo or some other source. 
Figure 32 is complex. The phenomenon which it is intended to 
describe is complex. It is impossible to escape this. The verbal 
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description of this phenomenon is likely to be correspondingly complex. 
Rather than describe each track separately, which is impossible because 
of all the interrelationships, the model will be described in more of a 
quasi-sequential, interconnected-flow way. 
The Intended Strategy 
This project began with the formulation of a strategy. This was 
.not a top-down, analytical effort. It resembled the process described 
in Bower (1970), where an idea is hatched at a lower level, given 
impetus by someone with some influence, and finally approved by top 
management. Here, Alfred Tsou and Jim Miles had the idea for a low-end, 
high-functionality word processor. Even though their paper received 
some notoriety as a creative effort, it did not get the backing of 
anyone who could move it further. Then, when the vice president 
lamented the lack of creativity and momentum at NICC, Tsou's and Miles's 
paper suddenly was in a position to receive some support. It did, and 
top management gave its approval to the project. This process closely 
resembles the Narayanan and Fahey (1982) political formulation model: 
1. Activation: Tsou and Miles get their idea 
2. Mobilization: their paper gets the attention of some others in the 
organization (but nothing much happens) 
3. Coalescence: suddenly the idea is seized upon by some top managers 
who see it as one avenue for shaking NICC out of its seeming 
lethargy; these top managers form a powerful coalition favoring the 
concept of the 1221 
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4. Encounter: the idea is submitted to many people in the company for 
their comments; some coalitions resist it 
5. Decision: the dominant coalition decides to form a separate 
organization to build the 1221 
The outcome of this process was a particular intended strategy: 
(1) the 1221 would be a low-cost word processor that would be an 
alternative to electronic typewriters; (2) it would be capable of 
sophisticated word processing functionality; (3) it would operate within 
the constraint of 128 kilobytes of core memory; and (4) it would operate 
at a speed rivaling larger, clustered word processors. 
Unfortunately, this general vision of the product was not 
translated into a clear, generally-accepted definition of the product, 
as was shown in both the semantic differential results and the cognitive 
map. There was no agreement on the desirability of the compatibility 
requirements. There was a really crucial lack of agreement, on the part 
of the software developers, about the desirability and importance of the 
particular product characteristics which emerged from their interaction 
with marketing. And the cognitive map showed that members believed that 
the product definition was unclear. 
This disagreement and lack of clarity led to poor communication, 
as demonstrated in the ethnography, the sociometric choice data, and in 
the cognitive map. These factors led in turn to negative outcomes. The 
ethnography showed how these led to poor code integration, and thereby 
to technical problems. Important outcomes in the cognitive map were 
dissatisfaction, turnover, and poor individual performance. In that 
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map, perhaps the most important outcomes were technical failure and 
commercial failure; this is another way of saying that the intended 
strategy was not realized. 
This lack of clarity and lack of acceptance of the intended 
strategy, and poor communication (along with the correlated effects), 
are some of the reasons why the intended strategy did not proceed along 
a deliberate path to realization. The intended strategy was what 
tyintzberg and Waters called an "umbrella strategy." They state that 
"the central leadership must monitor the behaviour of other actors to 
assess whether or not the boundaries are being respected" 
(1985: 263). The assumption underneath this assertion is that the 
umbrella and its boundaries are clear, understood, and accepted, a sort 
of "feedforward" control. In the 1221 project, this was unfortunately 
not the case, as we saw above. 
Mintzberg and Waters state that in response to straying outside 
the boundaries, central management has three choices: to stop them, to 
ignore them, or to adjust to them. In the 1221 project, management 
first ignored, and then adjusted to, the emergent strategy. 
One of the main lessons learned about the interplay between 
intended and emergent strategy from the 1221 project is that strategic 
project management in a professional organization like this one can be 
thought of as a series of contingencies. Ideally, the "umbrella of 
intentions" should be as well-specified as possible (which, admittedly, 
is difficult in a professional organization). Failing this, management 
must be prepared to do either of the following: (1) be very activist 
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about stepping in when the emergent strategy deviates dysfunctionally 
from intentions, or (2) be prepared to accept the deviations and adjust 
to them, if the changes are not fatal to the strategy. 
But these were only some of the reasons why the realized 
strategy was more emergent than delibarate. Organizational politics 
were another important factor. 
* The Politics of Implementation 
There were three direct outcomes of the decision. First, it 
created opposition among other product managers at NICC, some of whom 
felt the 1221 should have been placed under their supervision, rather 
than split off from other activities. Opposition was also fostered by 
the recruitment of personnel for the 1221 project from existing units at 
NICC. Second, the decision was the impetus behind marketing research. 
This was the opposite of the classical marketing model, where the firm's 
product strategy is the result of market research. (Since the interface 
between the marketing staff and the dominant coalition was so fluid 
during the formulation phase, in Figure 32 this activity was placed on 
the boundary between those two tracks.) Third, top management specified 
that the product had to be technically compatible with larger NICC 
systems. 
The first two of these points suggest that the encounter stage 
of Narayanan and Fahey's model does not end with the decision. The 
opposition which was created necessitated much impression management and 
coalition building by the 1221 core (particularly its chief 
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representative, Alfred Tsou), with the objective of at least 
neutralizing this opposition. One manifestation of this was an activity 
in the marketing track—the publication of the business plan. The 
author, John Steffano, admitted that the document was, "being 
charitable," only fifty percent business plan. Both he and his boss 
admitted that it was mostly an "internal selling document." 
The business plan was the closest thing to a direct assault on 
the rival interest groups. Tsou did not believe in direct assaults, 
although his rivals did not have the same qualms. For example, they 
were able to deny good development equipment to the 1221 engineers for a 
long time. They were also able to force changes during the design stage 
of the project that made things more difficult for those engineers. For 
the most part, Tsou did not respond in kind. He believed in 
"encirclement and subtlety." So he mostly relied on results and 
impressions to achieve his political results. The results were 
communicated mostly through the demonstrations and releases. (These 
will be discussed later.) He also insisted on using NICC equipment for 
the development, even though it was inferior to some other kinds of 
equipment available to the organization, to flatter the rival managers 
of those NICC units. Lastly, he kept a tight rein on the 1221*s 
budget--the engineers even had a difficult time getting floppy disks. 
This was because he wanted to prove to the rest of the organization that 
the 1221 project could be successful and come in at or under budget. 
The ethnography and the cognitive map both show that politics 
affected product definition as well, i.e., directly altered the intended 
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strategy. If emergent strategy is characterized by unintended or 
non-rational activities which serve to alter the realized strategy in 
such a way that it does not resemble the indended strategy (Mintzberg, 
1978), then clearly organizational politics were a major force behind 
emergent strategy in the 1221 project. Even though these activities did 
result in the partial neutralization of the opposition, the activities 
in the political track negatively affected activities in the technical 
and institution building tracks. The result of these effects was to 
change the intended strategy. A different strategy emerged (Mintzberg, 
1978). As Figure 32 shows, these political effects were either direct 
or indirect (i.e., through the marketing track). 
The direct effects were on the managers of the 1221 project and 
on the resources available to the engineers on that project. The 
managers were acutely sensitive to meeting the schedule, because of the 
political benefits of doing so. Their emphasis on these external forces 
led them to neglect certain internal aspects of the institution building 
track, and all this was at least partially responsible for the poor 
communications, the intergroup conflict, and the lack of consultation 
which characterized that track. The inadequate resources made the 
engineers* technical jobs more difficult, which led to problems with the 
software. They also led to poor morale and turnover, according to the 
cognitive map. The latter also showed that the engineers felt a direct 
effect of politics was on their schedules. They were probably correct, 
as meeting the schedule was a key element of Tsou's impression 
management with the rest of NICC. 
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The Marketing Track 
The Indirect effects of the political tract were mostly through 
the marketing track. The business plan, the compatibility requirements, 
and the specifications for performance, functionality, and memory size 
all increased the technical complexity of the software development. 
This increased complexity led to problems with the software, which in 
turn exacerbated the problems within the institution building track. 
% 
When it appeared that the performance, functionality, and code 
size constraints would not be met, it was usually the marketing track 
which acted on the problems. The almost constant example was the 
ubiquitous presence of John Steffano. He became another manager under 
Alfred Tsou, even though he nominally was reporting to another manager 
altogether. A more distinct example of the effects of marketing was the 
meeting of the three key 1221 managers that Steffano called when it 
first appeared that the project might not meet the specifications. As 
Figure 32 shows, when the result of a demo, release, or review of the 
software was the identification of a problem, it was marketing which 
mandated changes in the specifications, although it frequently did so 
through the 1221's five managers. These changes in the specifications 
led to greater problems in the code, and also led to more of the 
activities in the institution building track that ultimately led to poor 
morale and turnover. 
Marketing acted as a buffer between the project engineers and 
the political track in another way. The compatibility requirements, 
which were mandated by agents in the political track, were not popular 
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among the engineers affected by them. But marketing was steadfast in 
insisting on meeting them. (This was despite some private reservations 
held by John Steffano.) 
The Demos 
The "demos" in Figure 32 mean any kind of review of progress by 
any one or several of a variety of actors at NICC. The demos usually 
took the form of code integrations by the software development group, 
followed by literal demonstrations to other groups at NICC. Towards the 
end they took the form of releases of prototype products to users within 
the company. Less frequently, they were informal reviews of progress by 
Miles, Steffano and one or two other interested managers. The demos cut 
across all four tracks. 
At the institution building level the demos served to encourage 
communication among the engineers, who were almost forced to work 
together. Positive feedback from the demos led to a decrease in the 
negative elements present in the frame of reference of the core group, 
and to a feeling that the engineer was enhancing his or her career 
development. At the technical level, they served to integrate the code, 
which was being written in pieces, but which had to run in concert. 
Positive feedback from the demos in this track resulted in adequate 
performance, functionality, and memory usage. For the marketing track, 
the demos served as a mechanism for marketing managers to monitor the 
progress of the development, and to build commitment among the sales 
force. They also served as a means for assessing what changes had to be 
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made to the specifications. At the political level, the demos were 
mostly impression management--if the feedback were positive, they were 
designed to prove to political actors, both hostile and neutral, that 
the 1221 was indeed a viable, and valuable, product, worthy of their 
support, or at least their tolerance. 
The Realized Strategy 
* At this level, the continuing negative feedback from the demos 
led to one of the most dramatic moments in the project—a reformulation 
of the strategy of the project. This mostly took the form of ratifying 
the memory usage that seemingly was needed to get the job done, from 
128K to 256K. The reformulation also specified multitasking, and the 
rewriting of major code elements from the high-level language "C" to 
assembly language. The increased memory size necessitated a retail 
price increase of about $500. 
This action by top management was really just a ratification of 
the characteristics of the product which had emerged over the year and a 
half of development. It was not a top-down reformulation. It was an 
authorization to continue with the project, along the lines in which it 
had emerged. The choices facing top management at that point were 
three: (1) they could have scrapped the project, (2) they could have 
started over, from scratch, or (3) they could have taken what was there 
and gone with it. They chose the last. 
When thoughtful people in the company looked up at the end of 
the project, people like the sales manager, they saw a product which was 
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not exactly what had been envisioned at the beginning. It was not aimed 
directly at any segment. It seemed to be too powerful, and too 
expensive, to be an electronic typewriter replacement. Yet it was not 
powerful enough to be a personal or professional microcomputer. In 
terms of the specific intended strategy (p. 202), the product which 
emerged was too expensive, used double the intended memory, and had 
reduced functionality and performance. 
. All of this shows the effects of organizational politics on the 
intended "umbrella" strategy. As predicted by most of the political 
models, organizational politics are a force acting to force the intended 
strategy off the "deliberate" track, and onto either the "unrealized" 
track (which seems extreme) or the "emergent" track (which seems 
likelier, and which happened here in the 1221 project). 
Vhat was learned about the interplay between intended and 
emergent strategy here was that central management must take politics 
into account. This can take several forms. If politics are rampant in 
an organization, central management can break the implementating 
organization off from the rest of the company—this was attempted here, 
but not vigorously, or successfully, enough. Or central management can 
use its own political clout to insulate the project from the rest of the 
company, in a kind of brute force solution. In another approach, 
following the ideas of Bourgeois and Brodwin's crescive model, central 
management can neutralize the politics by effective "premise setting," 
i.e., setting, and getting acceptance for, a clear umbrella strategy; 
this notion was empirically supported in the 1221 project's cognitive 
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map--the cumulative reachability matrix shows that the cumulative effect 
of "bad product definition" on "company politics" is negative; in other 
words, the better the specification, the better the premises, the lower 
the level of organizational politics. This conclusion should be treated 
with some caution; remember that this is the situation as manifested in 
the causal schema of the 1221 project staff; it does not necessarily 
follow that this phenomenon exists objectively, although there are 
plausible reasons for thinking that it does, as seen above. Failing any 
of these approaches, central management can decide to see where the 
politics take the project (i.e., use "deliberate emergence"), and then 
adjust, or abandon, it. 
Conclusion 
As Figure 32 shows, the reason why the 1221 project drifted away 
from deliberateness is complex. In each of the four tracks, much 
shifting and adjustment went on throughout the project. 
The institution building track 
The groups in this project started out somewhat segmented, and 
they never really got together, socially or technically. Communication 
was poor, conflict was high, consultation of the engineers was poor. 
There was much confusion and suspicion. The "dunce cap" ethos resulted 
in much duplicated effort, which raised the negative issues to higher 
levels. The members of the software development organization were 
scrambling throughout this project. 
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The technical track 
The engineers in the various groups did not agree on what 
product they were building, nor did the managers. Some thought they 
were building a high-end word processor (Hans Erhardt and his group). 
Others were unsure of how to proceed—for example, the confusion between 
the word processing and operating systems groups over which mode of the 
C language to use. As a result, the technical aspects of this project 
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were never truly set, or even fully understood. 
The marketing track 
Because of the political problems and the technical problems, 
the marketing people were forced into a mode of constant adjustment. To 
appease political rivals, they had to alter the original specifications, 
and they had to insist on compatibility with other software groups at 
NICC. Because of the problems the 1221 engineers had with their 
software, marketing was constantly reassessing what could be expected 
from the product in the way of functionality, performance, and memory 
usage. Often, these reassessments were done with no involvement of the 
engineers. 
The political track 
The adjustments in this track were mostly maneuvering among the 
various interest groups. Tsou and his 1221 group were forced to do 
certain things (compatibility, limiting to NICC equipment) because of 
political concerns. Their rivals (the PC group, the Microsystems group) 
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had to adjust when it appeared that the 1221 was vulnerable (e.g., at 
the beginning, when they denied it hardware support), and when it was 
succeeding (after Demo III). Neutral groups (e.g., manufacturing, 
sales) "came around" when it appeared that the 1221 would actually get 
built and distributed. 
Summary 
In essence, the answer to research question four, about the 
interplay between the intended strategy and the emergent strategy, was 
that all the adjustment which went on in the four tracks was simply too 
complex for the system to keep a tight rein on the intended strategy, to 
be able to turn it into a deliberate strategy. What would have been 
needed for that to happen was (1) an intense effort to increase 
consensus and cohesion in the 1221's core software development 
coalition, (2) a better and more solid product specification, or at 
least one that was better understood, and (3) much better insulation 
from the political vicissitudes at NICC. 
The model described in this chapter provides an answer to 
research question five, also. The political models of strategy 
formulation clearly are applicable, in some form, to strategy 
implementation. Here, it was clear that the encounter of the core 
coalition with other coalitions extended after the decision to proceed 
with the formulated strategy. Indeed, since their was both an emergent 
and an explicit reformulation of the strategy for the 1221, perhaps all 
that is really needed to turn Narayanan and Fahey's (1982) model into an 
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implementation model is to add a sixth box called "continued encounter," 
with a feedback loop to the decision box. 
This research project was a specific, detailed look into that 
kind of "black box." It showed that the continued encounter process 
took place along four parallel, but heavily interrelated, tracks: 
1. An "institution building" track, where a core organization or 
coalition is enacted by its members 
2. A technical track, where the core organization's or coalition's task 
is specified and carried out 
3. A marketing task, which has the manifest function of selling the 
product to the public, and the latent function of being a partial 
buffer between the core group and the rest of the company in the 
encounter process 
4. An organizational political track, which is the arena where the 
"encounter", a complex and potent process, takes place. 
CHAPTER IX 
DEFINITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Toward a Definition of Implementation 
Chapter I postponed the task of formulating a formal definition 
of implementation, adopting instead a working definition. That task can 
no longer be postponed, and will be taken up in this chapter. First, a 
brief review of conceptualizations of strategy is in order. 
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For Bower and Doz (1979), strategy is the outcome of four 
sub-processes: (1) cognitive, (2) social, (3) organizational, and (4) 
political. The administration of those four sub-processes is the task 
of the chief executive. For Mintzberg and Waters strategy is "a pattern 
in a stream of actions" (1985: 257). Their research looks at patterns 
characteristic of organizations over long periods of time; it does not 
examine the processes which lead to these patterns, but does say that 
realized strategy comes in two varieties. One is deliberate, which is 
when an intended strategy is executed in a straightforward way. The 
other is emergent, which is when stategy evolves in unintended and 
possibly even non-conscious ways. 
This study blends elements of Bower and Doz, and Mintzberg and 
Waters, in studying implementation. Like their work, it shows that 
formulation and implementation are distinguishable conceptually but not 
in practice. Like Bower and Doz, it shows that implementation is an 
amalgam of many complex subprocesses; here, those subprocesses were (1) 
"institution building," (2) technical, (3) marketing, and (4) 
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organizational political. Like Mintzberg and Waters, it shows that 
realized strategy is a combination of deliberate strategy and emergent 
8trategy--the final product roughly resembled the intended product, but 
it was also significantly different, in terms of cost, functionality, 
and characteristics like memory size. 
The main contribution is that the link between Bower and Doz*s 
ideas and Mintzberg ideas were elaborated. The interrelationships 
between the four layers of the implementation effort were extensively 
specified. The implications of the myriad links were also specified, 
espcially the effects on the intended strategy. That is, the mechanism 
for emergent strategy was exposed: the many adjustments between the (1) 
the enacted frame of reference of the core software development group, 
(2) the technical system of that group, (3) the marketing function, and 
(4) organizational politics. 
The frame of reference which developed among the members of the 
core group was distinctive. It included their interpretation of goings 
on at the company, and many of the effects observed at a macro level, 
especially the political ones, were incorporated in the cognitive map of 
the group. This map proved to be highly predictive of ultimate events 
surrounding the 1221, such as the technical and commercial failure, the 
dissatisfaction, the turnover, and the adverse effect on career 
development, all of which followed the project. 
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A definition of implementation 
All of this leads to the formal definition of implementation 
which was implied earlier: 
A complex combination of processes, including social, 
organizational, political and cognitive (frame of reference 
building), whereby an organization forms, over time, a 
pattern of strategic content, a realized strategy. 
This realized strategy may contain some elements of a rational, intended 
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strategy; it may also contain elements which emerged non-rationally. 
The emergent elements are the result of the large amount of interplay 
among the subprocesses. 
Because of these emergent elements, it is not useful, in 
practical terms, to separate formulation and implementation. 
Intentional strategic directives jio trigger some implementational 
activity, particularly in machine bureaucracies. But other 
possibilities are that emergent results (1) may be ratified by so-called 
"formulators" (which is what happened here), or (2) may significantly 
constrain future intended ("formulated") strategy, or (3) may be ignored 
by central management, or (4) may be allowed to develop in experimental 
fashion. It is certainly more useful to adopt Mintzberg's term 
"strategy formation" (1977) instead of the "formulation followed by 
implementation" dichotomy. Alternatively, the term "strategy 
realization" could be used. Both terms imply a more seamless, less 
rigidly intentional process, which reflects the reality as seen in this 
study, and by Bower (1970), Mintzberg (1977, 1978), Mintzberg and Waters 
(1985), Pettigrew (1977), and Quinn (1980). 
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Implications for Practlcloners 
Strategy formation or realization (implementation) involves the 
management of many processes. It is not simply the blending of 
technical specifications with rudimentary incentive systems. It 
involves the management of activities in four distinct areas: 
1. activities in the core group, including organizational goals, 
specifications, and communications, leading to a healthy frame of 
reference 
2. technical activities 
3. marketing activities 
A. organizational political activities 
Strategy formation also involves management of the interrelationships 
between those clusters of activities. One example is how core group 
processes like poor communications and the development of a "dunce cap" 
ethos inhibit technical activities. Another example is how 
organizational political necessities lead to marketing's mandating 
changes, which cause technical problems, in turn leading to the core 
group's re-interpreting organizational reality to include dysfunctional 
outcomes; all these factors may then, as happened here, actually result 
in organizational ineffectiveness. 
Implementation is not a simple, straightforward process, as this 
study demonstrates. Merely knowubg this may be useful to overburdened 
managers, who may be feeling inadequate because things aren't going 
smoothly. This is particularly true of the political track, an area 
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which many managers refuse to believe even exists, or in which they may 
not feel effective. Managers will also benefit from learning that all 
four tracks are interrelated, that it is not sufficient to do well on 
only one track, indeed, it may not even be possible to do well on only 
one track if the other three are mismanaged, given the interdependence 
among the four tracks. 
This research also highlighted the ubiquity of emergent 
Strategy. It is very likely that in any implementation effort there 
will be elements in the realized strategy that do not correspond to the 
intended strategy--one should not strive for 1007. adherence to the 
specifications. On the other hand, the seemingly easy slide into an 
"emergent mode" requires that managers be sensitive to the adequacy of 
the intended strategy and other mechanisms for keeping realization 
activities under the strategic umbrella. Here, the semantic 
differential data showed that there was important lack of agreement on 
crucial elements of the strategic specification. The cognitive map 
showed that "lack of a solid product definition" was related, in the 
minds of the core group's members, to a whole gamut of negative 
outcomes. The cognitive map and the sociometric data showed that this 
relationship was aggravated by the poor communications that 
characterized the group. 
Lastly, the study showed that for this organization, the 
cognitive map which was developed was quite powerful. It incorporated 
things which were measured using other methods, and it proved to be very 
predictive of actual outcomes in the project. If this kind of finding 
220 
is borne out by future studies, it will mean that managers might be 
helped by being aware of the cognitive maps of their organizations. 
Implications for Scholars 
What this study tells us about present 
theory and knowledge 
The results of this study show decisively that the non-rational 
and political models of strategy formation are good descriptors of 
strategic implementation. This study provides support for Mintzberg*s 
and Waters's (1985) model of "umbrella strategy." The latter is a 
strategy where the central management of the organization, usually a 
professional bureaucracy or adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1979) can only 
partially specify the strategic intent, by laying down general outlines, 
an "umbrella," under which the strategy must fit. Relative "emergence" 
versus "deliberation" is determined by how, and how well, central 
management deals with deviations from the umbrella. The 1221 
organization was a good choice for examining this model, since it was a 
hybrid between a professional bureaucracy and an adhocracy, and it 
operated under an umbrella strategy. There is one caveat about the 
results here—it is not clear how generalizable they are to 
implementation efforts involving organizations which differ from the 
kind represented by the 1221 software development group. This caveat 
applies to much of the discussion in this chapter. 
The findings here also provided some support for Bourgeois's and 
Brodwin's (1984) "crescive model" of strategy implementation. In the 
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1221 project there was no top-down, analytical formulation of strategy 
followed by the top-down imposition of implementation. So this project 
did not resemble their Commander Model. There was no involvement of a 
management team in some sort of group process, with the end of 
developing a strategy to which those managers had some commitment. So 
it did not resemble Bourgeios's and Brodwin's Collaborative 
Model. There was also no effort to effect change in an 
organization-wide way, either through applied behavioral science (the 
Change Model), or through cultural manipulation (the Cultural 
Model). In the 1221 project, the strategy grew from within the company 
with the adoption by central management of the Tsou and Miles paper, and 
the project itself was allowed to emerge. This supports the Bourgeios 
and Brodwin Crescive Model. Using the same reasoning and evidence, the 
1221 findings also support the ideas of Burgelman (1983). 
These results also support Pettigrew*s political model of 
strategy formulation. The project had its genesis in demands generated 
by a powerful top-management coalition; this coalition saw that its 
demands might be met by the adoption of Tsou*s and Miles's ideas. The 
rest of the project could certainly be characterized as dominated by 
power mobilization, as various interest groups at NICC vied to either 
support or disable the 1221 development efforts. And, as was seen 
above, the results here gave direct support to Narayanan and Fahey's 
(1982) micro-political model of strategy formulation. 
The study does add to Mintzberg's and Waters' notion by showing 
that it is not enough for the central management to articulate and 
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monitor an umbrella strategy--it must gain acceptance of a clearly 
understood umbrella strategy. 
Lastly, the study underlined the lack of a true dichotomy 
between formulation and implementation, and supported the notion of 
strategy formation or realization. 
Questions this study answered 
. Was there conflict or misunderstanding between the strategic 
intent and the frame of reference of the project staff7 And did it 
matter? The semantic differential results showed that there was 
conflict and misunderstanding between the strategic intent and the way 
that intent was cognitively interpreted by the members of the 
organization. This was shown in the cognitive map also. Given the 
nature of this organization, the existence of these problems clearly 
mattered. Indeed, in their cognitive map, the engineers indicated that 
they believed that these problems would lead to many negative outcomes, 
including technical and commercial failure. They were proven right in 
the end. 
Were coordination and communication adequate in the project 
organization? And did it matter? The sociometric results and the 
ethnography showed that coordination and communication were not adequate 
in the 1221 project. That the engineers realized this was manifested in 
the cognitive map. For the same reasons as were mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, it definitely mattered that conditions were like 
this. 
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Was there ja distinctive frame of reference created by this 
organization, and did it help us understand some of what happened in the 
project? It is hoped that this paper has demonstrated in painstaking 
detail that a distinctive frame of reference was enacted by the project 
staff. This frame of reference proved to be extremely helpful in 
understanding what happened on this project. Some of the "objective” 
characteristics of the project, such as the unclear umbrella strategy 
and the poor communications, were ingested by the group, interpreted by 
them, and included in an organizational cognitive scheme. Some 
"objective" outcomes--technical failure, commercial failure, 
dissatisfaction, turnover, and lack of career development—were 
accurately predicted by the cognitive map. 
Did this research uncover, and help us understand, the interplay 
between intended and emergent strategy? This research answered this 
question in the affirmative for organizations like the 1221, which was a 
complex hybrid between a professional bureaucracy and an adhocracy. It 
showed that in that kind of organization the degree of "emergence" in 
the realized strategy depended on (1) the clarity of, and commitment to, 
the strategic intentions, and (2) the virulence of politics in the 
organizational context within which such intentions are attempted. 
Did the study help us to understand the usefulness of the 
political models ^f strategy formation? This was one of the clearest 
outcomes of this research. The Pettigrew (1977) and Narayanan and Fahey 
(1982) models of strategy formulation were decisively supported. To 
some extent, the latter was elaborated as well. 
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Future research 
This study opens up a wide range of possible future studies. 
For one thing, it identifies four classes of variables which might be 
important for future studies: 
1. institution building variables: ones related to the frames of 
reference of core organizational groups, and ones measuring 
communications, interaction, and cognitions about goals 
2. technical activity variables 
3. marketing activity variables 
4. organizational political variables 
Perhaps even more important, the study raises the issue of the 
interrelationships among these classes of variables. For example, what 
would this process look like in an organization where the givens and 
means were more positive, such as one where the strategic specification 
was clear, people agreed on it, communications were good, and 
organizational politics were supportive? Vould the results be more 
"deliberate?" Or would the realized strategy still be "emergent," except 
in a more positive way? Is the pattern of the 1221 typical of 
implementation efforts, hindering the answering of this question? 
There are other, larger questions: How important is the frame of 
reference in implementation? Here, the core group's frame of reference 
had its finger on the pulse of what was happening, and what would 
happen--is this typical? Here, the project was not truly innovative, 
was not developing or using cutting edge technology; would the results, 
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particularly concerning the vagueness of the intended strategy, be the 
same in a more "innovative" project? How does the paradigm developed in 
this study apply to non-technical organizations? How does it differ 
between manufacturing and service organizations? Between profit and 
not-for-profit organizations? Are the classes of variables the same? 
Are the interrelationships the same? Are the dynamics described in this 
paper the same, or does one track or another dominate in various 
organizations? Are these phenomena contingent on the type of industry 
in which the organization is acting? Are they organization-specific? 
Would organizations always benefit from keeping tighter reins on the 
intended strategy? Or does that cut off the possibilities for 
departures from intended strategy that actually result in better 
products or services? Are there no benefits to vagueness?** 
Because this was a case study, it was difficult to generalize, 
and it was also difficult to find ways to contrast the variables in such 
a way as to answer some of these important questions. In effect, this 
study generated more questions than it answered, although it did answer 
some. The intent of the study was to examine the literature, to develop 
a different view of implementation, to specify the implications of that 
view (in the form of research questions), to draw upon the empirical 
results here for some modest substantiation of that view and its 
implications, and to construct a model for future testing and 
elaboration. In some ways this project was trying to do the same thing 
as the 1221 project, but with even less specification up front, and 
fewer controls along the way--it was more emergent than the 1221 
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project. Perhaps that is appropriate for a creative, one hopes 
innovative, scholarly work. In any case, it is hoped that the 
realization, be it deliberate or emergent, is useful, and leads to much 
fruitful work in the future. 
r 
APPENDIX A 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE, 1221 PROJECT 
Questionnaire Instructions 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to measure the meanings of 
certain things to people of the 1221 project by having them judge them 
against a series of descriptive scales. In completing this 
questionnaire, please make your judgements on the basis of what these 
things mean jto you. On each page of this booklet you will find a 
different concept to be judged, and beneath it a set of scales. You are 
to rate the concept on each of these scales in order. 
Here is how you are to use these scales: 
If you feel that the concept at the top of the page is very 
closely related to one end of the scale, you should place your check 
mark as follows: 
fair X :_:_:_:_:_:_ unfair 
or 
fair _:_:_:_:_:_: X unfair 
If you feel that the concept is quite closely related to one or 
the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your 
check mark as follows: 
strong _: X :_:_:_:_:_ weak 
or 
strong _:_:_:_:_: X :_ weak 
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If the concept seems only slightly related to one side as 
opposed to the other side (but is not really neutral), then you should 
check as follows: 
active _:_: X :_:_:_:_ passive 
or 
active _:_:_:_: X :_:_ passive 
The direction toward which you check, of course, depends upon which of 
the two ends of the scale seem most characteristic of the thing you’re 
judging. 
If you consider the concept to be neutral on the scale, both 
sides of scale equally associated with the concept, or if the scale is 
completely irrelevant, unrelated to the concept, then you should place 
your check mark in the middle space: 
safe _:_:_: X :_:_:_ dangerous 
IMPORTANT: 
(1) Place your check marks in the middle of spaces, not on the 
boundaries: 
THIS NOT THIS 
_:_: X :_: X :_ 
(2) Be sure you check every scale for every concept—do not omit 
any. 
(3) Never put more than one check mark on a single scale. 
Do not look back and forth through the items. Do not try to 
remember how you checked similar items earlier in the questionnaire. 
Make each item a separate and Independent judgement. Do not worry or 
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puzzle over individual items. It is your first impressions, the 
immediate "feelings" about the items, that we want. On the other hand, 
please do not be careless, because we want your true impressions. 
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS, 1221 PROJECT 
Preliminary instructions 
After introductions, the interviewer reviewed the research 
project, saying that it was an effort to understand how development 
projects are carried out. Respondents were then told that the purpose 
of the interview was to get information about how the project was 
actually carried out, and that the best way to get this was to find out 
directly from the people involved. They were told that in this 
interview the researcher would ask questions and make notes, that it was 
a very straightforward interview. 
Confidentiality was discusses. Respondents were told that they 
were free to not answer any or all questions, that no one would know. 
Data would be identified by code number, and would be aggregated. No 
quotations would be used without written permission. 
Because the university and the company had applied for a federal 
grant, a university committee, which oversees the rights of people 
involved in research, required a release form to be read and signed by 
all respondents. All interviewees signed the form. 
The questions 
What is the name of your position? 
How long have you been in this position? 
How long have you been at NICC? 
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Where had you done similar or related work before? 
How long had you worked elsewhere? 
What things do you do in your present position? 
To whom do you report? 
Who reports to you? 
On what project(s) are you currently working? 
How long have you been working on it (them)? 
When will it (they) be finished? 
We are interested in learning about the workflow on the 
project. When your project(s) is (are) finished, where does it (do 
they) go (to what person, position, or unit)? How will it (they) be 
used by them? 
Who assigned you to this (these) project(s)? 
Upon what things that someone else has done does this (do these) 
project(s) build, use, extend, or depend? 
How do you determine how to do your assigned project? (probes: 
using established methods, using basic knowledge, solving problems, 
developing solutions, creating new things) 
If you have a very general, philosophical question on a 
technical matter, whom would you consult first? If that person were not 
available, to whom would you go next? Is there a third person to whom 
you would go? Can you give illustrations of what you have gone to 
others for? [NOTE: these questions are where the technical sociometric 
data were gathered.] 
When you have problems or need assistance in handling some 
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administrative aspect of the project, e.g., specifications, schedule, or 
tools, to whom would you go for assistance first? To whom would you go 
next? Is there a third person to whom you would go? Give some 
illustrations of what you have gone to others for. [NOTE: these 
questions are where the administrative sociometric data were gathered.] 
Who are the people here with whom you socialize? [NOTE: these 
questions are where the social sociometric data were gathered.] 
Think about yesterday (or the last working day). What 
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activities did you do? Use as simple a term as will identify what was 
done, e.g., attend meetings, code, debug, etc. How much time did you 
spend on each, within a quarter of an hour? 
Was this typical of last week? What activities would have to be 
added, and deleted, to make it represent last week? How much time 
(hours per day) was spent on these activities last week? 
In the period of a week, with which people do you come in 
contact? List names and what groups they are with. Which of these 
would you see frequently, i.e., once a day on average? 
Are there any people with whom you came in contact during the 
last month who are not on this list? List names and groups. 
Of the people on both lists, with whom do you initiate contact, 
and who initiates contact with you? Obviously, some people can be on 
both lists. 
APPENDIX C 
COGNITIVE MAPPING INSTRUMENT 
Instructions 
A little while ago I conducted a series of distinctive 
interviews with several members of the 1221 project, where the 
respondents were asked to question themselves about their view of the 
1221 project. These interviews were the first step in a process 
% 
designed to uncover the aggregate frame of reference of the 1221 
organization, in the form of a map of the concepts which members think 
are important, and how those concepts fit together. 
The self-questioning interviews yielded a very large number of 
questions. From those I attempted to distill concepts. I had an 
opportunity to check some of my distillation with some of the 
respondents, and found that I was on the mark virtually all the time. I 
think that this was largely a function of the clarity of thinking and 
the consensus among the members of the 1221 organization whom I 
interviewed. 
Once all the individual concepts were distilled from the 
questions, I set about finding out which of these many concepts were 
found in the cognitive fields of most of the members, or, in other 
words, where were the overlapping concepts, so that we could begin 
finally to construct the aggregate map. Here are the fourteen concepts 
that were held in common by the respondents: 
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1. The management we have experienced on this project 
2. The schedules and deadlines we have had on this project 
3. The poor communications and the competition among the groups in 
the 1221 organization 
4. The commercial success of the 1221 
5. Company politics 
6. The bad tools and scarce resources we've experienced on this project 
7. Poor morale and dissatisfaction 
8. Working on this project 
9. The lack of a solid product definition 
10. The personal career development of an engineer 
11. Leaving the 1221 project 
12. The quality of an engineer's performance 
13. The lack of consultation of the engineers on technical matters 
14. The technical success of the 1221 
These are the fourteen things that were on the minds of half or 
more of the organizational members questioned. The only step that 
remains for the construction of the aggregate cognitive map is for you 
members of the 1221 organization to indicate how these fourteen concepts 
are interrelated. That is the purpose of today's session. 
The remainder of this document will present you with all 
possible pairs (except of a concept with itself) of the fourteen 
concepts. For each pair you will be asked to indicate your opinion 
about whether the first concept causes the second concept. You will 
have three choices for each pairs 
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1. No [concept A does not cause concept B] 
2. There is a positive relationship [that is, Increasing concept A 
results in an increase in concept B, or decreasing concept A results 
in a decrease in concept B] 
3. There is an inverse relationship [that is, an increase in concept A 
results in a decrease in concept B, or a decrease in concept A 
results in an increase in concept B] 
An example 
Let me present a very simplistic example to illustrate the 
procedure. Assume that we have queried several high school students 
about their view of high school, and the result is that only three 
concepts "overlap" in this sample: 
1. Good grades 
2. Studying 
3. Watching TV 
We want to find out how these three concepts are interrelated in 
the minds of group members. Here is one question we could ask: 
Does studying cause good grades? 
If a student felt that studying caused him or her to get good 
grades, it would be an example of a positive relationship, and he or she 
would answer the question as follows: 
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(check one) 
[0] _ No 
[+1] *>C There is a positive relationship. 
[-1]   There is an inverse relationship. 
Another question we might ask is: 
Does watching TV cause good grades? 
If the student feels that watching TV lowers grades, while not 
watching TV helps keep grades high, it is an example of an Inverse 
relationship, and the student would answer the question as follows: 
(check one) 
[0] _ No 
[+1]   There is a positive relationship. 
[-1] ^ There is an inverse relationship. 
This is somewhat tricky, because the student in effect is saying 
that TV watching causes bad grades. The only way that the student can 
indicate this is by checking the line that says that there is an inverse 
relationship between TV watching and good grades. THIS MAY BE THE CASE 
FOR SOME OF THE CONCEPTS YOU ARE BEING ASKED TO INTERRELATE, SO PLEASE 
BE ALERT TO THIS WAY OF THINKING ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS. 
Lastly, an example of another question we must ask, in order to 
ascertain all the interrelationships, is: 
Do good grades cause watching TV? 
Assume that our mythical student believes that his or her TV 
watching patterns have nothing to do with what grades he or she gets. 
This question would therefore be answered as follows: 
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(check one) 
[0] J<_ No 
[+1] _ There is a positive relationship. 
[■1] _ There is an inverse relationship. 
* * * * * 
This concludes the example and all other explanations. Please 
proceed directly to the first pair of concepts. If you have any 
questions, I will be here for whatever time it takes. I estimate the 
needed time to be about one half hour. 
Representative Questions 
Does the management we have experienced on this project cause the 





There is a positive relationship. 
There is an inverse relationship. 
Does the management we have experienced on this project cause the 
poor communications and the competition among the groups in the 
1221 organization? (check one) 
[0] _ No 
[+1] _ There is a positive relationship. 
[-1] _ There is an inverse relationship. 
Does the management we have experienced on this project cause the 





There is a positive relationship 
There is an inverse relationship 
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